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EFFECTIVE DEMOCRACY AND FORMAL
RIGHTS: RETALIATORY REMOVALS OF
UNION OFFICIALS UNDER THE LMRDA
George Feldman*
INTRODUCTION

This article is about union democracy. It argues that the removal from office of union officials in retaliation for their speaking or
organizing against the policies of higher union leaders violates the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19591 (the
"LMRDA").
Emil Cehaich was a machinist for General Motors in Detroit. In
1975, when he had seven years of seniority, he was appointed by the
union, the United Auto Workers, to be a benefits representative. As
the collective bargaining agreement provided, Cehaich remained a
GM employee and received his normal pay, but carried out his new
duties during the work day. He helped retirees, beneficiaries and surviving spouses with pension and insurance problems, and handled the
appeals of those whose claims were denied.'
In 1979, a new collective bargaining agreement was negotiated
with General Motors. The union brought elected and appointed officials who represented GM employees around the country, including
Cehaich, to Dallas for a special meeting. The stated purpose of the
meeting was to inform them about the tentative agreement before it
was presented to the general membership for ratification. It is safe to
assume that the union's national leadership wanted to convince these
4,000 "influential local union members"' that the proposed new con* B.G.S. Wayne State University, J.D. University of Michigan; Assistant Professor,
Wayne State University Law School. I want to thank my colleagues Robert Abrams, Kingsley
Browne, Jessica Litman, Stephen Schulman, and Jonathan Weinbergtfor their help. Clyde
Summers and Michael Goldberg read an earlier draft of this article and provided valuable
suggestions. I am grateful to both.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988) (hereinafter "the LMRDA" or "the Act"). The
LMRDA is popularly referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Act.
2. Cehaich v. UAW, 710 F.2d 234, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1983).
3. Id. at 237 n.2.
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tract was a good one, and to enlist their support in having it ratified.
In Dallas, Cehaich "became part of a dissident caucus which
opposed the tentative agreement. He was among those dissidents
who distributed a leaflet criticizing the agreement," and warning the
assembled local leaders that they would bear the brunt of the membership's anger in the next elections.4 In response, the UAW leadership instructed GM to remove Cehaich as a benefits representative,
which the company did.'
When Cehaich sued, claiming his removal from office violated
his statutory right "to express any views, arguments, or opinions," 8
the District Court granted summary judgment against him,7 and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. The court found that "Cehaich's status
as a member of the union remained unchanged after his dismissal
from his position as a union officer," and, therefore, he had failed to
state a claim under the LMRDA.8
There is nothing unusual about this decision; there is probably
no federal court that would have ruled otherwise.9 The union involved carefully protects the formal democratic rights of its members. It does not have a reputation for physically preventing opponents of the leadership from speaking at meetings, or of stuffing the
ballot boxes. It is not gangster-ridden and does not have dissidents
beaten up. It allows members to appeal many leadership decisions to
an impartial "Public Review Board," consisting of prominent outsiders whose reputations are above reproach.10
Nonetheless, the union's action prevents the emergence of effective opposition and preserves the union as a single-party monopoly.
The current law of retaliatory removals makes absolute loyalty to
the leadership the price that must be paid for inclusion in the union's
political life. As a result, it blocks the development of effective union
democracy and contradicts the goal of the LMRDA.
The primary objective of the Act was to ensure that "unions
would be democratically governed and responsive to the will of their
4.

Id.

5. Id. at 237.
6.
7.

LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1988).
Cehaich v. UAW, 496 F.Supp. 912 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff d, 710 F.2d 234 (6th Cir.

8.

Cehaich, 710 F.2d at 238.

1983).
9. It is possible that some courts would hold that the union may not remove non-policymaking appointed officials from office for expressing opposition and that Cehaich was a nonpolicymaker. See infra notes 446-448 and accompanying text.
10. See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 682 (1981).
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memberships.""' When Congress passed the original National Labor
Relations Act (the "NLRA"), it decided that encouraging unionization was to be the basic labor policy of the United States. 12 In passing the LMRDA, it dealt with the issue of deciding what type of
unions that policy required. The LMRDA represents a Congressional decision that the national labor policy can best be effectuated
by encouraging democratic unionism.
The rights at issue in a retaliatory removal are secured by Title
I of the Act. However, the entire LMRDA deals with limiting the

powers of union leaders, ensuring their accountability to their members and guaranteeing the members' basic democratic rights.' 3 Title
II of the Act, the reporting and disclosure provisions, requires the
filing of detailed annual union financial reports with the Department
of Labor.' 4 It also provides that members shall have access to that

information and the records on which the reports are based.' 5 The
availability of financial records of unions and their officers is a
means of increasing the accountability of the union hierarchy and
has been an important tool for union reform groups.'" Title III of the
Act limits the reasons for which a national union leadership may
place a local or other subordinate body into trusteeship. 17 Consequently, it is more difficult for a national union leadership to establish a trusteeship for the purpose of squelching opposition locals.' 8
11. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 436 (1981).
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
13. The summary which follows does not include all the provisions of the LMRDA, nor
does it describe the qualifications and special conditions included in some of the Act's
provisions.
14. LMRDA §§ 201(b), 202, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431(b), 432 (1988).
15. Section 201(c) provides that a union "shall make available the information [in the
required reports]. . .to all its members, and. . .shall be under a duty enforceable at the suit of
any member. . .to permit such member for just cause to examine any books, records, and
accounts necessary to verify such report." 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (1988).
16. See e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 349 (1989) (describing rank
and file group which used Department of Labor statistics in leaflets to demonstrate disparity in
spending by their local officers compared to others). Convoy-Dispatch, the newspaper of Teamsters for a Democratic Union, regularly uses Title II-required information to publicize the
multiple salaries of top Teamster officials.
17. LMRDA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1988).
18. Title III also provides procedures to eliminate the previous practice in some unions
of preventing the development of alternative leaderships by maintaining locals in semi-perpetual trusteeships. See James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in
National Union Elections, 13 HARV. L.REv. 247, 326 n.264 (1978) (examining the elections
of the United Mine Workers from 1969 to 1973). The Act includes an eighteen month time
limit after which a trusteeship will normally be terminated, and allows both private actions by
members and actions instituted by the Secretary of Labor on the complaint of a member to
terminate a trusteeship. LMRDA § 304(c), 29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (1988).
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The trusteeship provisions are evidence of an interest in local autonomy for the purpose of encouraging opposition. 19 Title IV mandates
the periodic election of union officers, requires secret ballots20 and
other procedural safeguards. 1 It also sets the maximum terms of
office, 2 bars the use of union resources to promote a candidate 3 and
provides for enforcement through the Secretary of Labor acting on
the complaint of any member. 24 Other sections of the LMRDA forbid union discipline for exercising any rights under the Act 25 and
provide criminal penalties for using violence to interfere with their
exercise. 26

When the bill that contained these provisions was introduced,
many legislators "feared that the bill did not go far enough because
it did not provide general protection to union members who spoke
out against the union leadership. 2 7 The resulting amendments became Title I of the LMRDA: the "Bill of Rights" of union members. 28 Title I guarantees members equal rights to nominate candi19. In Lynn, the Supreme Court stated that:
The Committee Report . .stressed that 'labor history and the hearings of the McClellan committee demonstrate that in some instances trusteeships have been used
as a means of consolidating the power of corrupt union officers, plundering and dissipating the resources of local unions, and preventing the growth of competingpolitical elements within the organization.'
488 U.S. at 356 n.8 (quoting S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., IstSess., 17 (1959))(emphasis
added by the Court).
20. LMRDA §§ 401(a),(b), and (d); 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(a), (b), and (d)(1988).
21. The Act provides for the union to distribute campaign mailings at a candidate's own
expense, allows candidates to inspect the membership list, and requires "[a]dequate safeguards
to insure a fair election. . .including the right of any candidate to have an observer at the polls
and at the counting of the ballots." LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1988). The campaign mailing requirement, unlike the remainder of Title IV, provides a private cause of
action.
22. LMRDA §§ 401(a),(b), and (d); 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(a), (b), and (d) (1988).
23. LMRDA § 401(g), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1988).
24. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1988).
25. See LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1988). See also infra note 135 and accompanying text. The section provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward,
or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine,
suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to
which he is entitled under the provisions of this chapter. The provisions of section
412 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 529 (1988).
26. LMRDA § 610, 29 U.S.C. § 530 (1988).
27. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 109 (1982).
28. The usual difficulty in ascertaining the "intent of Congress," except in the most
general sense, is heightened here for two reasons. First, because the LMRDA Bill of Rights
was first introduced as a series of amendments from the floor, there is little relevant legislative
history. Second, it is clear that Congressional supporters of the LMRDA saw it as a way of
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dates, vote, attend union meetings and participate in those
meetings.2 9 It provides for freedom of speech and assembly."0 It requires a secret ballot election to raise dues" and guarantees members the right to sue and institute actions before administrative agen-

cies. 32 It prohibits discipline of union members without due
process. 3 It invalidates any union constitutional or bylaw provision
that conflicts with the LMRDA Bill of Rights.3 4 Title I also creates

a private35cause of action to remedy the infringement of the rights it
protects.
weakening unions, as did some opponents. The "intent of Congress" was thus, perhaps more
than usually, composed of mixed motives, political compromises, honest confusion, and purposeful dissembling. See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act
of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REv. 819, 852 (1960); Atleson, A Union Member's Right of Free
Speech and Assembly: Institutional Interests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN. L. REv. 403,
406-09 (1967).
The Supreme Court has referred to these difficulties and cited them as reasons to heed
Professor Cox's admonition to interpret Title I flexibly, without too strict an emphasis on the
language. But when it suits the Justices, they have laid extraordinary emphasis on the language without any apparent interest in the broader purposes of the statute. See infra note 138
and accompanying text.
29. LMRDA § 101(a)(1) provides:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges
within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums
of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the
deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable
rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1988).
30. LMRDA § 101(a)(2) provides:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions;
and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an
election of the labor organization, or upon any business properly before the meeting,
subject to the organization's reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings:
Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor
organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct
that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1988).
31. LMRDA § 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1988).
32. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1988).
33. LMRDA § 101(a)(5) provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or
otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any
officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific
charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and
fair hearing.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1988).
34. LMRDA § 101(b), 29 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1988).
35. LMRDA § 102 provides in relevant part:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter [Title I of the
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Union democracy is, therefore, required by law. But the appro-

priate scope of union democracy, for too many courts, has been
based on a view that the union is like any business enterprise, with
management having a right to run the enterprise however it wishes.
This version of democracy allows no room for diversity of opinions
inside the union's "management" or among its "agents." a In keeping with this often unarticulated view, current law assumes that
some LMRDA rights are formal and abstract things: that penalizing
a low-level appointed union official37 for exercising her political
rights does not "infringe" those rights;38 that forcing her to choose
between her right to speak as a union member and keeping her job
does not violate her free speech right.39 It assumes that the law
should be indifferent to a major effect of compelling such officials to
make this choice: perpetuating the permanent entrenchment of the

incumbent leadership.
LMRDA] have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil
action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions)
as may be appropriate.
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1988).
Title I also provides that all members are entitled to copies of collective bargaining agreements that affect them, LMRDA § 104, 29 U.S.C. § 414 (1988), and that unions must inform
members of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, LMRDA § 105, 29 U.S.C. § 415 (1988).
In addition § 103 specifies that:
Nothing contained in [Title I] shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before any court or
other tribunal, or under the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 413 (1988).
36. See Newman v. CWA Local 1101, 570 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1978) [hereinafter
Newman I]. The court held that:
Unless the management of a union, like that of any other going enterprise,
could command a reasonable degree of loyalty and support from its representatives,
it could not effectively function for very long. To obligate union leaders to tolerate
open defiance of, or disagreement with, its plans by those responsible for carrying
them out, would be to invite disaster for the union.
Id. (emphasis added). See also infra note 209 and accompanying text.
37. The LMRDA defines "officers" to include constitutional officers only; but I will use
the term interchangeably with "officials" except when the more limited use is clear from the
context.
The terms "officer" or "official" refer only to those who are members of the union, and
thus, the discussion applies only peripherally to professional employees of the union, such as
attorneys, accountants, and economists. These professional employees, while they provide resources that help incumbents maintain power, are not the potential leaders of an opposition.
See infra note 365 and accompanying text. While union democracy requires the broadest possible interpretation of the rights of member-officials, democratic goals would probably best be
served by barring the participation of non-member employees in any aspect of the union's
political activity.
38. See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 (1982).
39. See Newman v. CWA Local 1101, 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978).
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These assumptions, manifested as legal doctrines, are not sup-

ported by the language or legislative history of the LMRDA. Furthermore, they are inconsistent with the doctrines that govern analogous areas of law. Most important, they function to defeat the
overriding policy of the Act, the encouragement of democratic
unions.40

The LMRDA requires a more democratic view, and it permits
the view that unions should be widely participatory-the view that is

required to revitalize American unions.4 1 The fact that American
unions are in a serious decline, by any measurement, is not seriously
disputed.4 2 This article is based on the belief that workers need powerful unions to advance their interests and that in order to be powerful in this way, unions must be democratic.4 The union democracy
necessary to advance workers' interests in the America of the nine44
ties goes beyond the formal rights now generally guaranteed by law

40. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the primary object of the
LMRDA).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988).
42. The causes of that decline, and its effect on the well-being of American workers, are
issues of great controversy. There are several competing theories; see generally P. WEILER,
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990). One
stresses that for reasons such as structural change in the economy, contemporary American
workers no longer desire union membership as much as they did in-the past. While many of
these changes are extremely important, this is an ahistorical explanation that completely begs
the question. See Book Review, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1079 (1986). Second, the argument is
strongly advanced by Prof. Weiler and others that a change in the legal climate has occurred
and that employers have become increasingly willing to break the law in efforts to defeat
unions. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers Rights to Self-OrganizationUnder
the NLRA, 96 HARV L. REV. 1769 (1983).
Again, while I believe this is true, and ought to be changed, it cannot seriously be argued
that American employers are less willing to accept unions now than they were in the period
that followed the passage of the Wagner Act and saw explosive union growth. Similarly, the
change in governmental attitude is important, but the judiciary, at least, was surely no less
hostile to unions in the thirties.
I believe that employer and, usually, government hostility to strong unions is to be assumed, and changes in economic structure, especially changes seeking cost advantages and
labor savings most specifically, is a constant of the American economy. Unions have failed to
respond to those changes, though they were able to respond to the greater changes of the
thirties. See generally, K. MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALL (1988); I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT
YEARS (1970).
I shall not say anything in this article about the ability of unions to change the economic
situation with which they are confronted. But it should be understood that some degree of
optimism about that ability is necessary for the argument of this article to make any
difference.
43. Congress apparently shares this view, and expressed it in its declaration of purposes
for the LMRDA. See 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988).
44. The legal guarantee of internal union democracy is much more restricted when the
collective bargaining relationship is involved. See Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining,
93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984). Thus even some formal democratic rights, including perhaps the
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and usually respected by most union leaderships. Instead, unions
must be able to use their most important strengths, which they have
largely squandered in the last decades. These strengths are the enthusiasm, solidarity, creativity, and endurance of their members, and
of those who must be convinced to become members if unions are to
regain their ability to improve the lives of working people. 4" Unions
that have not relied on these strengths have been increasingly unable
to confront employers; they will continue to fail. 4
The kind of union democracy required involves the transformation of unions from bureaucratically hierarchical entities into organizations whose structure and philosophy encourage mass participation.47 This transformation requires creating an atmosphere that
favors the vigorous expression of diverse views as a legitimate means
of advancing the union. Such a philosophy of unionism,4" would remost important, the right to ratify collective bargaining agreements, are not legally recognized.
The relationship between internal union democracy and union effectiveness in the collective
bargaining arena is directly implicated by these restrictions.
Democratic collective bargaining can be assured by democratic unions. Most collective
bargaining agreements are subject to membership ratification because the union's constitution
requires it. Membership control of bargaining demands can best be assured by assuring that
those top level union hierarchies that fail to listen to the rank and file are not, as they are now,
almost impregnable.
45. I do not intend to romanticize the working class; but my argument does assume that
the great run of ordinary human beings, individually and collectively, achieve a good deal
more, and are capable of still more, even under the most unfavorable circumstances than observers from above usually notice. See generally, E.P. THOMPSON. THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1964); E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL (1974); F. DOBBS, TEAMSTER REBELLION (1972).

46. The argument that unions are like an army at war in which disagreements threaten
the unity necessary for victory, what Edgar James describes as the "united front" conception
of the union, is the main justification advanced by union leaders for the lack of pluralism
within unions.
[But] "autocracy may well defeat. . .strong, militant bargaining. Without
more responsive mechanisms of government, union leadership is not likely to have
the united membership necessary to back it in collective bargaining. The workers
may feel antagonistic toward the leadership because they are not being consulted or
because the leadership is not pursuing strongly supported contract demands."
James, supra note 18 at 250-51.
If the justification for lack of democracy is the union's success at the bargaining table,
then, however attractive the argument may have been during the post-war gains of the American labor movement, it simply will not wash today. See generally, K. MOODY, supra note 42.
47. It is possible that all organizations tend towards bureaucracy and hierarchy. R.
MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (1915). But see K. MOODY, supra note 42 at 28-29. But even if
that is so, a tendency can be countered. And it is not necessarily crucial that the goal of a nonhierarchical mass participatory organization-a utopian goal, perhaps,-be achieved. Rather,
the process by which members attempt to achieve that goal is itself the necessary countermeasure, creating a democratic and participatory ethos, or if one prefers, ideology.
48. There is a connection between the philosophy of democratic unionism I am describing, as compared to the bureaucratic unionism typical of American labor unions today, and the
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ject the identification of the bureaucracy as the "union". It would
refuse to accept the views of the leadership as the only legitimate

position.
This is not to deny that the union leadership sometimes repre-

sents the union as an institution. This is especially true in collective
bargaining and other contexts when the union is confronting the employer. Both the logic of the situation, and the structure of American

labor law, based on exclusivity, require that the employer heed only
a single union voice in these circumstances.4 9 The exclusivity of the

bargaining relationship, however, does not require that union officials
speak with one voice to one another and to the membership. The law
now recognizes that the interest in union democracy protects an
elected union official from removal in retaliation for opposing the
union leadership. 50 However, the distinction between elected and appointed officials is irrelevant to the union's institutional interest in
presenting a united front to the employer. The statement of an

elected vice-president of a local, denouncing the local president's
bargaining program, is more likely to undermine the union's legitimate interest in maintaining itself as the exclusive bargaining representative than is the decision of an appointed benefits representative
of that local to vote for the "wrong" candidate in his capacity as a
delegate to the union's national convention.5" As the law now stands,
the LMRDA would be interpreted to prevent the removal of the

vice-president from office for his statement, while the benefits representative could summarily be fired. No legitimate union interest is

served thereby.
The law should be interpreted to protect both the vice-president
split between the "social unionism" of the early CIO and the "business unionism" that was
then, and has since been reinforced as, the dominant ideology. See K. MOODY, supra note 42;
D. LA BOTZ, RANK AND FILE REBELLION 118-125 (1990). The relationship is not simple; for
example the most important force in the creation of the CIO, and for a decade perhaps the
most militant American union, John L. Lewis' United Mineworkers, was run as an absolute
dictatorship. But the subsequent history of the UMW may actually prove the point: militancy
cannot depend on the presence of a militant leader. The lack of democracy in the UMW led to
its long term inability to defend coal miners in a changing economy; it also led to massive
corruption and violence to maintain the system. See James, supra note 18 at 327-28.
49. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988), provides that a union selected by the majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit
"shall be the exclusive [representative] of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining. . ." See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
50. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
51. See Cehaich v. UAW, 710 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1983) (removing plaintiff from position as local union benefits representative for opposing proposed new collective bargaining
agreement at leadership meeting called to discuss proposed CBA).
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and the benefits representative from removal.8 2 This would further
the Congressional mandate for democratic unionism, as well as the
broad participatory version of democracy necessary to union revival.
The first requirement of union democracy is the ability of the most
active and committed union members to create, join, or support opposition groups without fear of reprisal. The law can help fulfill this
requirement or it can raise barriers to its realization.
Almost a decade ago, Clyde Summers described American unions as one-party states. 53 From that metaphor, Summers drew critical insights about the ways in which the LMRDA should be interpreted in order to further the goals of the law. "The function of the
law," he wrote, "must be to loosen the grip of oligarchy so that those
opposed to the incumbents can make their voices heard and the
weight of their opposition felt."5' 4 For example, the Department of
Labor's interpretation of whether a particular union election violation "affected the outcome" 55 of the election might be quite different
if it were understood that a large anti-incumbent vote-though far
short of the majority needed to win-has important effects. 6 It
"measures the level of discontent among the members" and may
lead the incumbents-who, surrounded by a "sycophantic bureaucracy," often genuinely believe that dissatisfaction is limited to "a
few screwball malcontents"-to change their policies in response.57
It can encourage a split in the top union leadership, and lead to a
successful challenge in the next election by other elements of the
union's hierarchy.5 8 The larger the anti-incumbent vote, the less isolated individual members of the opposition feel, and the more legitimate their opposition seems to the membership as a whole. 9
Summers' analysis explains why fulfilling the statute's goal necessitates interpreting the LMRDA in light of the structural and in52. I am not arguing for the creation of a union "civil service" system to replace patronage, or for the establishment of a "just cause" standard; see infra note 388 and accompanying text.
53. See Summers, Democracy in a One Party State: Perspectivesfrom Landrum-Griffin,
43 Md. L. REV. 93 (1984).

54.

Id. at 99.

55.

29 U.S.C. § 482 (c) (1988). In order for a new election to be held, the Secretary of

Labor has the burden of proving that a violation of Title IV has occurred, and that it "may
have affected the outcome" of the election. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1988).

56. Summers, supra note 53, at 113.
57.
58.

Summers, supra, note 53, at 106-07.
Id.

59. Cf. Summers, supra note 53, at 106. "Although the incumbent oligarchy stays in
power, it becomes responsive to the election returns. The greater the opposition vote, the
greater the responsiveness." Id.
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stitutional obstacles to union democracy. The most important structural barriers to union democracy are based on the inherent
advantages of incumbency in controlling the methods of communication, financing political activity, maintaining stable organization, and
establishing the legitimacy of support and the illegitimacy of opposition. 0 The central mechanism by which the top leadership of a national union maintains control of these advantages is through control
of the union staff and officials: full and part-time, organizers, clerical
employees, administrators and educators.61 Depending upon the
union and the type of position, they are sometimes appointed and
sometimes elected. However, even elections usually occur with the
approval or designation of the higher elected officials and, therefore,
with the aid of the appointed staff. This body of union officials and
employees runs safety committees in the workplace, researches the
employer's finances, explains benefits, implements the union's political activities and organizes nonunion workplaces. Most important, it
negotiates the contracts under which the members must work and
controls the formal and informal mechanisms-including the grievance procedure-through which those contracts are enforced, reshaped, and recreated. For most union members, the people who negotiate and then administer the contract are the union. 2
The ability of the top union leadership to maintain the loyalty
of this staff is based partly on shared views of union policy, on
shared experiences and on the education and training that usually
flow downward from the top. It is also based on the fear of reprisal:
loyalty is a job requirement.
The LMRDA, particularly Title 1,63 can be read to prohibit
60.

Summers, supra note 53, at 96-98; see also R. MICHELS, supra note 47 (discussing

the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset who describes four sources of oligarchic power: the
identification of opposition as disloyalty, control of the union bureaucracy and resources, domi-

nation of the channels of communication, and centralization of control). My description differs
only in emphasis: while the ability of the top leadership to bestow positions that may be both
lucrative and prestigious is obviously one of the sources of its power, I wish to stress that the
machine that is thereby created is itself the means by which the other sources of the top
leadership's power are managed and perpetuated. The leadership's monopoly on communica-

tions, like its ability to identify itself with the union and paint opposition as disloyalty, depends
on its ability to control what views may be expressed by secondary union leaders. Similarly,
the union's resources, the control of which gives the top leadership such an enormous advantage, are largely, although not entirely, human resources.
61. Summers, supra note 53, at 105; see also James, supra note 18, at 277.
62. See Summers, supra note 53, at 105.
63. And in certain contexts the National Labor Relations Act may also prohibit these
reprisals. See Hartley, National Labor Relations Board Control of Union Discipline and the
Myth of Nonintervention, 16 VT. L. REV. 11 (1991).

There are important differences, both practical and theoretical, between union discipline
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these reprisals."" To a growing extent this has been done. But the
doctrines that many courts, including the Supreme Court, have developed in establishing these prohibitions have been based on an insufficient understanding of how unions work and what union democracy requires. The rulings in some cases include descriptions of
situations that betray an extraordinary lack of sensitivity to reality.
Courts6 5 have often treated these cases as a matter of balancing the
individual rights of union officials against the institutional rights of
the union. Typically, the institutional interest they are addressing is
not that of the union at all, but that of the leadership. The two are
not identical, neither in my view nor, I think it is clear, in the intent
of the LMRDA.
The basic goal of the LMRDA and the imperative for strong
unions - democratic unions - require not that the union's institu-

tional and collective interest be outbalanced by the individual officer/member's job, but that the nature of that collective interest be
properly understood. Current retaliatory removal doctrine rests on a
sharp separation between the rights of members, protected by the

LMRDA, and the unprotected status of holding union office. This
separation is based on wrong assumptions: both unarticulated theoretical assumptions about the nature of rights and unthinking as-

sumptions about how union politics actually work. It does not
cases under the NLRA and those brought under the LMRDA. The source of the protection is
a different statute, and the particular right is that of an individual union member to engage in
activity for "mutual aid or protection." NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). At least in
principle, the NLRA concerns only those actions, by an employer or by a union, that affect the
employment relationship. Finally, NLRA cases involve the relationship of an administrative
agency, the NLRB, charged with administering that statute, and how it must (or may) take
into account the policy of a different law, the LMRDA.
Board doctrine concerning union discipline in general and retaliatory removals in particular is incorrect, and fails to properly take into account the entire national labor policy of which
the LMRDA is more than an incidental aspect. Nonetheless, because of the differences, it is
more appropriate to discuss the issue of retaliatory discharges under the NLRA separately,
and I will not discuss it here.
64. The system I am arguing against is not based on "patronage" in the sense of having
to "know someone" in order to get a job. Indeed, unions often choose the most energetic and
active members, even if they have no connections, to fill the low-level, usually unpaid, and
often frustrating jobs that are the entry to the organization's political life. See infra note 329
and accompanying text. But the system does require that these active and militant members
unquestioningly support not only the candidacies of the incumbents, but the policy of the union
leadership on every issue that arises. Union democracy is stifled not by a "traditional" patronage system, based on established relationships, rewards, and largesse, but on a system
based on a requirement of unanimity, of a solid leadership front ranged, not against the employer, but against the membership.
65. And in a somewhat different context, the National Labor Relations Board. See
Hartley, supra note 63, at 40.
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strengthen democratic processes within unions by insuring that the
will of the electorate is carried out. Instead, it helps assure that elections, at least beyond the local union level, will almost always present the membership with only a single candidate who has any realistic prospect of winning. 6 The current law of retaliatory removals is
a powerful tool to maintain the union leadership as a self-perpetuating single party monopoly. This article will describe how this law
developed, why it impedes the development of democratic unions,
and how the LMRDA should be interpreted in order to fulfill the
intention and promise of the statute.
Part I of this article describes the development of the current
doctrines relating to retaliatory removals under the LMRDA. In
Finnegan v. Leu,67 the Supreme Court found no violation of the
LMRDA when a newly elected local president fired the appointed
business agents who had supported his opponent. The Court held
that since the business agents remained members of the union who
could still vote in union elections, attend union meetings and speak
on union issues, the firings did not "infringe" their LMRDA-guaranteed rights to do these things."8 In addition, the Court held that the
firing did not constitute "discipline" under the Act because that term
was meant to refer only to limitations on membership rights.69
The article then discusses three consequences of this formal
view of rights by examining the case law that both anticipated Finnegan and followed it. First, when the separation of membership
rights from officer rights was applied to elected officials, it made
meaningless the members' equal rights to nominate and vote for candidates because a successful opposition candidate could be removed
for speaking out against the policies of higher level union officials.70
Second, the removal of an official, whether elected or appointed, in
retaliation for her joining with other members in political opposition
to the leadership brought into question the members' right to speak
and associate for political change in the union. The article discusses
the courts' creation of a doctrine of exception in an attempt to miti66.

The enormous resource advantages of an incumbent candidate become less impor-

tant with a smaller unit. See James, supra note 18, at 265. Nonetheless, for reasons developed
in this article, the ability of the top leadership to remove low-level appointed officials who
express any divergence from the leadership's positions seriously hampers the emergence of
effective opposition even at the local union level.
67. 456 U.S. 431 (1982).

68. Id. at 440.
69. Id. at 438.
70. See infra notes 172-193 and accompanying text.
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gate this result and explains the limitations of this approach.7 1 Part I
concludes by examining the Finnegan approach to "discipline" and
finds that the formal view of membership rights on which it is based
makes the holding inapplicable in other contexts.72
Part II describes how the Supreme Court's decision in Sheet
Metal Workers' International Association v. Lynn7 resolved the
first of these contradictions by holding that the interest in union democracy requires that an elected union official not be removed for
exercising the free speech rights guaranteed to members by the
LMRDA.7 4 In Lynn the Court limited the Finnegan holding to appointed officials only but also applied an entirely different method of
analyzing the issue.75 Lynn recast Finnegan as a defense of union
democracy. It was the vindication of the members' free choice, expressed in the election, that justified the removal of the staff appointed by the defeated candidate. But the logic of Lynn does not
support this sharp distinction between elected and appointed officials;
nor does the underlying purpose of the LMRDA or that of federal
labor policy.
First, this new dichotomy does not correspond to its stated rationale because, within the model of "democracy" that the Court has
accepted, it is as pro-democratic under some circumstances to remove elected officials as it is to remove appointed union officials.
Second, Part II explains how prohibiting retaliatory removals is
necessary because of the nature of the union.7 6 Since it is a oneparty state, union officials and staff play a central role in perpetuating the control of the incumbents. Even more important, lower-level
union officials are vital to the creation of any realistic alternative to
current leadership and policy. Fulfilling the goal of democratic unions requires encouraging and protecting the development of diverse
views. It requires establishing that opposition is legitimate and that
change is a realistic prospect. To establish that legitimacy, it is necessary that these diverse views come to be held by some of those who
have proven themselves the most active and committed members,
who often hold low-level appointive posts. Removing them from of71.
72.

See infra notes 194-247 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 248-291 and accompanying text.

73. 488 U.S. 347 (1989).
74. See infra notes 292-322 and accompanying text.
75. The Finnegan Court never explicitly said that its holding was limited to appointed
officials. Although there is a good deal of language to indicate that this was in fact the
case-language emphasized in Lynn-all lower courts applied Finnegan to elected officials.

See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
76.

See infra notes 323-345 and accompanying text.
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fice at the first hesitant expression of dissidence prevents opposition
views from ever becoming identified with respected and proven secondary leaders. For the possibility of change to seem realistic, in the
absence of organized opposition parties, these secondary leaders
must be among the proponents of change. The creation of vigorous,
sustainable democracy requires that union officials be permitted, except in the most unusual circumstances, to express their opinions,
and organize support for those positions, even if the higher levels of
the union hierarchy disagree.
Using the analogy of the Supreme Court's analysis of political
patronage, Part II concludes by arguing that the rationale of Finnegan, even as limited to appointed officials, has been repudiated in the
context of the political system on which Congress modeled the
LMRDA.77 The political patronage cases repudiate both aspects of
the analytical basis on which the current law of retaliatory removal
of appointed union officials rests. They reject the formal and unreal
logic which denies that severely punishing the exercise of a protected
right may infringe that right as effectively as a direct prohibition.
They also reject the rights/privilege basis of retaliatory removal jurisprudence: that, since there is no legal right to hold union office,
the union may remove an official for any reason.
Part III develops a standard to determine the legality of retaliatory removals that is based on the statutory language and intent and
argues that the Lynn decision implicitly requires that standard.7 8
The statutory guarantee of free speech and assembly itself contains
limited exceptions under which the union may make reasonable rules
that restrict those freedoms in order to protect its status as exclusive
bargaining agent, and to protect itself as an institutional entity.
These exceptions incorporate a distinction between the interest of the
union and the partisan interests of its leadership. This article demonstrates that the legality of a union restriction does not depend on
whether the member to whom it is applied holds a union position or
not, nor on whether the position is elected or appointed. It concludes
that the removal of an appointed union official in retaliation for exercising the political rights guaranteed by the LMRDA should be illegal except when the union can demonstrate that the removal falls
within a narrow exception to protect the union leadership's ability to
79
carry out its mandate.
77.
78.

See infra notes 346-383 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 384-413 and accompanying text.

79. See infra notes 414-454 and accompanying text.
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The law of union democracy is full of rhetorical flourishes. The
courts speak of rights and of democracy without attempting to understand the context in which those rights must be exercised or the
institutional barriers to genuine democracy. If the union is a oneparty state, one would have supposed that American courts would be

sympathetic to intervening, to forcing union leaderships to adopt to
the politics of competing voices, diversity, and pluralism.80 But the
one-party state, abhorrent in Eastern Europe, may seem a less devi80. That Congress intended in passing the LMRDA to limit government intervention
into internal union affairs to the minimum necessary to insure that the statute's goals were
fulfilled is one of those rhetorical flourishes sprinkled throughout the cases. Congress felt that
union self-government was necessary to a free society, and feared that government intrusion
could lead to government control. As a bit of rhetoric, this contention is perfectly fine. See
Hartley, supra note 63, at 66 (stating that NLRB nonintervention into internal union affairs is
a shibboleth that cannot be discarded, but claim is a myth). But it simply does not help interpret the law about retaliatory removals. If the choice in remedying union corruption is between
imposing a government trusteeship with direct control by federal officers, as against holding
democratic elections whose legitimacy is assured by government supervision, then the policy of
the LMRDA favoring democracy and limited intervention argues for elections and against a
government takeover. But if the issue is whether a retaliatory discharge violates the law, the
policy of minimal intervention adds nothing. The LMRDA is an elaborate set of safeguards
and regulations. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Clearly Congress thought this
much intervention into union affairs was necessary. That Congress wanted to limit government
intervention to only what was necessary is not controversial; the question is how much is that?
(The argument for minimal intervention is in reality one of those contentions that, when it is
raised to judges who do not like it, is answered by pointing out that it is properly addressed to
Congress rather than the courts.)
Insofar as there are statements in the legislative history that support the view that Congress wished to limit intervention in internal union affairs, those statements generally predate
the introduction of the Bill of Rights into the LMRDA. Indeed, as Michael Goldberg has
pointed out, those statements were "put forward for the purpose of justifying the controversial
omission from the bill. . .of a bill of rights." Goldberg, CleaningLabor's House: Institutional
Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989 DUKE L.J. 903, 938 (1989). In fact, as Paul
Alan Levy has argued, "[t]he adoption on the floor [of the Bill of Rights] amounts to a repudiation" of such statements. Levy, Legal Responses to Rank-and-File Dissent: Restrictions on
Union Officer Autonomy, 30 BUFF. L.REv. 663, 684 n.118 (1981).
The broader justification for governmental intervention, a justification that apparently
convinced Congress, is well known.
When [a] private organization begins to take on the importance and power of public
governments in the lives of its members. . .[t]he loss of individual freedom within
private associations creates a threat to the freedom-producing goals of pluralism
itself, and establishes the basis of governmental intervention in order to protect private democratic rights in the name of pluralism. The irony of this intervention
should not obfuscate its inevitability.
Atleson, supra note 28, at 403-4.
As for the attitude of union reformers towards government intervention, the healthiest
view was best summed up by Ken Paff, National Organizer of Teamsters for a Democratic
Union (TDU), in defending his organization's use of the labor laws: "We don't rely on the
government or the law. We use the government and the laws, and we rely on the rank and
file." Quoted in D. LABOTZ, supra note 48, at 326.
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ant form to a court confronting it within a union because it so resembles the business organizations with which courts are already familiar.81 The belief that command and hierarchy is the natural order
of things, that those at the top are meant to decide and the passive
majority to obey or get out, is another of the unexamined assumptions with which the law of union democracy is filled.
To explore these assumptions and their consequences, an examination of the development and current state of the law is first
presented.
PART

A.

I: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

The Key Cases: A Brief Chronology

This section briefly introduces, in chronological order, the major
Supreme Court cases and a crucial Second Circuit case which have
shaped the development of the law of retaliatory removals. The doctrinal developments are then analyzed more fully in the rest of this
Part.
Judicial interpretation of Title I of the LMRDA, the statute's
Bill of Rights, has been marked by formalism from its earliest days.
In the Supreme Court's first interpretation of the LMRDA in
Calhoon v. Harvey,82 the Court held that the equal right to nominate candidates, guaranteed by Title 183 and actionable under Section 102,84 could not be violated by eligibility restrictions so long as
all members continued to have the same (highly limited) right to
nominate. Instead it held that "[w]hether the eligibility requirements. . .were reasonable and valid [under Title IV, which governs
elections] is a question separate and distinct from whether the right
to nominate on an equal basis given by §101(a)(1) [part of the Bill
of Rights] was violated."8 5 Because the exclusive remedy provision of
Title IV requires that challenges to elections be referred to the Department of Labor,8 6 Calhoon held that a violation of Title IV pro81. And against which the union is supposed to be defending the workers' interests.
82. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
83. The text of the "equal rights" provision, LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
411(a)(l) (1988), is set forth supra at note 29.
84. The relevant text of this section, 29 U.S.C. § 412, which creates a private cause of
action for the infringement of any right secured by Title I, is set forth supra at note 35.
85. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 139.
86. See 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1988) (providing that a union member may file a complaint
with the Secretary of Labor alleging a violation of Title IV's election procedures. The Secretary must investigate the complaint, and if she finds probable cause of an unremedied violation, she must file suit against the union); see also 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1988) (providing in
relevant part that "[tihe remedy provided by this subchapter for challenging an election al-
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vides no jurisdiction for a private cause of action under Section
102.87 As pointed out by Justice Stewart in a concurrence joined by
Justice Harlan:
[T]here are occasions when eligibility provisions can infringe upon
the right to nominate. Had the [union] issued a regulation that
only Jesse Calhoon [the incumbent] was eligible for office, no one
could place great store on the right to self-nomination left to the
rest of the membership. This Court long ago recognized the subtle
ways by which election rights can be removed through discrimination at a less visible stage of the political process. . . .If Congress
has told the courts to protect a union member from infringement of
his equal right to nominate, the courts should do so whether such
discrimination is sophisticated or simple-minded.""

While Calhoon is, in fact, irrelevant to the analysis of a retaliatory removal 9 and it will not be discussed in the text that follows, its

formalism shaped the reasoning of the most important early decision
on retaliatory removals. In Schonfeld v. Penza,9° the Second Circuit
held that although the retaliatory removal of an elected official did
not violate the members' "equal rights to nominate and vote for candidates, the removal could violate Title I if it were "part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt. . .to suppress dissent within the
union." 91 In that case, the court held that the removal of the elected
head of the New York District Council of the Painters Union stated
a cause of action under Title I, because "in the peculiar context of
the history of union factionalism" that existed in the union, the removal could "impede or infringe upon the free speech and association rights of union members." 92
ready conducted shall be exclusive" referring to Title IV).
87. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 139-40.
88. Id. at 143 (concurring opinion).
89. Neither the decision that eligibility requirements, if equally applied, can be challenged only under Title IV, which govern elections, nor the decision that a violation of Title IV
cannot create jurisdiction under Title I, applies because no election is being challenged. See
Drivers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 541 n.16 (1984) (stating that the exclusive remedy provision
may not "bar postelection relief for Title I claims. . . that do not directly challenge the validity of an election already conducted"). By definition, the removed official is not suing to overturn eligibility requirements that prevented her from running; nor is she challenging the validity of the election. On the contrary, she is suing, in effect, to sustain the outcome of the
election, and Title IV does not speak to this issue at all. In fact, in such a situation, it is a suit
by the Secretary of Labor that the courts have no jurisdiction to entertain. See Kupau v.
Yamamoto, 622 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1980).
90. 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
91. Id. at 904.
92. Id. at 903. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (enumerating LMRDA § 101
(a)(2)).
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The invention of the purposeful scheme exception was heavily
influenced by the Schonfeld court's concern that "the mere appencomplaint" would endage of free speech allegations to an election
93
able a plaintiff to circumvent Calhoon.
The competing values between Title I rights and Title IV proce-

dural requirements are best reconciled, in our opinion, by limiting
initial federal court intervention to cases where union action
abridging both Title I and Title IV can be fairly said, as a result of
established union history or articulated policy, to be part of a purposeful and deliberate
attempt by union officials to suppress dissent
94
within the union.
As the Schonfeld doctrine was applied in later cases, the courts
ignored this original rationale for requiring that the retaliatory removal, in order to be actionable, be part of a plan to suppress dissent. 95 In place of a limitation on Title I rights based on jurisdictional concerns, however formalistic and mistaken, the courts
articulated limitations based on a formal conception of the substantive rights themselves.96 The removal of a union official for speaking
against the leadership was not viewed as an "infringement" of the
right to speak; only union actions that directly prevented a member
97
from exercising the rights guaranteed by Title I were actionable.
Finnegan v. Leu99 was both the culmination and ratification of
this conception of rights. There, the Supreme Court held that Title I
protected only "membership rights," not the status of holding union
office. 99 Retaliation for exercising membership rights-so long as the
rights themselves remained intact-was not a prohibited "infringement."' 100 It also held that removing a union official for exercising
Title I rights was not "discipline" within the meaning of section 609,
93. Schonfeld, 477 F.2d at 903.
94.

Id. at 904. The Schonfeld court clearly overestimated the reach of Title IV. The

union trial board's decision, after finding him guilty of formal charges, to deprive Schonfeld of
eligibility to run for office cannot rationally be viewed as a "reasonable qualification[] uniformly imposed" on candidacy, which might bring it within the holding of Calhoon; it is obviously "discipline" within the meaning of LMRDA § 609, which although not part of Title I, is
actionable under LMRDA § 102.
More important, the removal of Schonfeld from office simply does not implicate Title IV's
exclusive remedy "for challenging an election," 29 U.S.C. §483 (1988) (emphasis added).

95. See, e.g., Franza v. Local 671, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 680 F. Supp. 496
(1988).

96. See id.
97.
98.

Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 440 (1982).
456 U.S. 431 (1982).

99. Id. at 442.
100.

Id. at 441.
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which prohibits union disciplinary action for exercising rights guaranteed by the LMRDA.' 0 ' The Court held that the prohibition applies only to those "retaliatory actions that affect a union member's
rights or status as a member of the union.

1 °2

After Finnegan, the lower courts were faced with two unresolved questions: whether a retaliatory removal that was part of a
plan to suppress dissent remained actionable, and whether Finnegan
applied to elected officials. As to the first, the courts generally continued to apply the Schonfeld exception, although the doctrine cannot be reconciled with the conception of rights to which these
courts
10 3
continued to adhere and on which Finnegan was based.
As to the second issue, some of the language in Finnegan implied that the holding was limited to the removal of appointed union

officials.'0 4 Despite this, as one Court of Appeals concluded, "most
courts have either rejected an appointed/elected distinction under
Finnegan or sharply limited it."' 10 5
101. Id. at 437.
102. Id. at 437 (emphasis in original).
103. See infra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing Schonfeld).
104. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, joined the majority "only on the understanding" that the holding was limited to "appointed union member-employees who will be
instrumental in evolving the [elected leadership's] administrative policies." 456 U.S. at 442-43
(concurring opinion). The emphasis of this short concurrence, however, is on the question of
appointed nonpolicy makers, rather than on the elected/appointed distinction.
105. Brett v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 879, 828 F.2d 1409, 1414-15 (9th
Cir. 1987). See, e.g., Adams-Lundy v. Ass'n of Professional Flight Attendants, 731 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir. 1984). In Adams-Lundy, a minority of the elected local executive board, through a
parliamentary maneuver, removed the majority from office. The court found Finnegan controlling, and vacated the preliminary injunction that the District Court had granted. Although the
issue was not before it, the court acknowledged that "implicit in our reasoning" was a failure
to state a cognizable LMRDA claim since there was no "infringement" of the majority's Title
I rights as members. Id. at 1160.
Other cases in which the membership rights/officer rights distinction was applied to
elected officers include Johnson v. Kay, 860 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1988); Dolan v. Transp. Workers Union, 746 F.2d 733, 741 (11th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that removal of elected official
poses a greater threat to democracy but applying Finnegan anyway, because "[nleither
§ 411(a)(2) nor LMRDA as a whole were intended to eliminate all threats to union
democracy").
Several courts applied Finnegan in cases where they did not think it relevant to mention
whether the removed official was elected or appointed. See e.g., Rutledge v. Aluminum Brick
& Clay Workers, 737 F.2d 965 (11 th Cir. 1984); Moore v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 714 F.2d
141 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
It should be pointed out that this trend was a reversal: before Finnegan, "most courts ...
recognized that the protections of Title I extend at least to elected union officials." Levy, Legal
Responses to Rank-and-File Dissent: Restrictions on Union Officer Autonomy, 30 BUFF. L.
REv. 663, 686 (1981). Written before Finnegan and Lynn, this excellent article remains a
valuable contribution to the literature. Its author has become the leading member of the union
democracy bar.
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Then in 1989, the Supreme Court decided without dissent in
Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAssociation v. Lynn'0 6 that the
removal of an elected union official in retaliation for his political opposition to the union leadership violates the LMRDA. In holding
that the overriding goal of the statute, union democracy, requires
protecting an elected official's speech, Lynn retrospectively called
into question not only the results, but also the rationale of all previous retaliatory removal cases.
While Lynn expressly reaffirmed Finnegan's holding as applied
to appointed union officials, the doctrinal analysis of Finnegan will
show that the reasoning of Lynn directly contradicts the basis on
which these cases rest. The formal conception of rights that is embodied in almost all pre-Lynn cases, including Finnegan, is at war
with the retrospective rationale for Finnegan that Lynn articulated.
The necessity for rethinking the results of these cases is illustrated in part by the continued pernicious influence of the formal
view of rights as exemplified in Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers.10 7 Breininger was the first LMRDA case decided by the Supreme Court after Lynn. Breininger was not a retaliatory removal
case; the plaintiff was a rank and file member who claimed that the
union had discriminated against him by refusing to refer him to jobs
from the union-administered hiring hall in retaliation for his support
of opponents of the union leadership. The Supreme Court held that
this action was not "discipline" within the meaning of the LMRDA.
This illogical conclusion was necessary to avoid confronting the implications of limiting LMRDA rights to formalities in a context
where those limits were unacceptable.
The sections that follow analyze these cases as well as other
cases from the lower courts in detail. The several doctrinal issues
involved are all present in Finnegan, which will be examined as a
kind of apogee of the formal conception of rights. Each of the various doctrinal issues will be discussed separately after Finnegan, because although they are related, they have been developed independently. While the decisive, but incomplete, break from judicial
formalism, Lynn, will be treated in detail only afterwards, these earlier cases must be measured against the reasoning of Lynn, and references to Lynn must necessarily appear throughout the earlier
discussion.
106. 488 U.S. 347 (1989). Justice White concurred; Justice Kennedy, who had sat on
the case as a judge of the Ninth Circuit, did not participate. See infra note 242.
107. 493 U.S. 67 (1989).
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Finnegan and Formalism: The Distinction Between the Rights
of Membership and the Rights of Officers

Finneganv. Leu, 08 decided twenty-three years after the passage
of the LMRDA, was the Supreme Court's first decision concerning
retaliatory removals, and for seven years it remained the Court's final word on the subject. 109 This case includes most of what is necessary to construct a coherent and pro-democracy theory of the
LMRDA's protection of official rights. Some of the elements for
such a theory appear in Finnegan as broad explanations of policy,
some as footnotes reserving an issue or seeming to approve, in passing, of doctrines developed by the lower courts. Unfortunately, Finnegan also includes all that is necessary to construct a theory of the
LMRDA as wholly unconcerned with the structural changes that are
central to challenging autocratic and bureaucratic control of unions.
More unfortunately still , it is this latter view of the statute that is
reflected in the holding."10

The petitioners in Finnegan were the former appointed business
agents of Teamsters Local 20 who had campaigned for the reelection
of the incumbent local president, who was defeated."" The new president fired all the business agents because "he felt the agents were
loyal to [the former president], not to him, and therefore would be
108. 456 U.S. 431 (1982).
109. Lynn was decided in 1989. 493 U.S. 67 (1989).
110. See Pope, Free Speech Rights of Union Officials Under the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 525, 547 (1983) (suggesting that
"in spite of its sweeping language, Finnegan leaves open far more than it settles. . is not
informed by a coherent vision of unionism. . .[and] can be interpreted favorably by proponents" of several competing visions of unionism). Professor Pope, writing soon after Finnegan
was decided, was too optimistic in seeing in Finnegan support for what he terms "rank-and-file
unionism." Professor Pope's argument, his description of the rank and file vision, which takes
into account both the union's need for united action against the employer and the value of
membership participation, does not attach sufficient significance to the one-party nature of
unions. He therefore undervalues the importance of opposition and pluralism in the union,
ascribing that view to what he calls "liberal unionism," which he describes as characterized by
an emphasis both on democratic values and on cooperation with the employer, as contrasted
with a conflict model of union/management relations. Similarly, he describes "business unionism" as emphasizing this conflict model, coupled with an emphasis on the union's administrative rather than democratic functions. See id. at 531-38. This typology ignores the relationship
of the two axes (administration/democracy; cooperation/conflict). In the long run, undemocratic unions cannot successfully confront management and become indistinguishable from the
"responsible union" model that emphasizes both cooperation and the union's hierarchallybased administrative role. Conversely, unions based on participatory democracy will tend towards a conflict model, unless conflict between workers and employers is based on misunderstanding or lack of trust rather than on a fundamental divergence of interests.
111. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 431.
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unable to follow and implement his policies and programs."'1 2 The
local's bylaws, the Court pointed out, gave the president the authority to "appoint, direct, and discharge" the business agents. 113 The

Court described the duties of a business agent as including:
participation in the negotiating of collective-bargaining agreements, organizing of union members, and processing of grievances.
In addition, the business agents, along with the president, other
elected officers, and shop stewards, sit as members of the Stewards
Council, the legislative assembly of the Union. Petitioners had
come up through the union ranks and as business agents they were
also members of Local 20. Discharge as business agents did not
render petitioners ineligible to continue their union membership." 4

The fired business agents claimed that their discharges violated
the LMRDA in two separate ways. First, they argued that the removals violated two sections of Title I, the "Bill of Rights." Section

101(a)(1) guarantees every union member equal rights to nominate
candidates and to vote."15 Section 101(a)(2) guarantees freedom of
speech and assembly."", Both sections allow the union to have "reasonable rules" that may limit these rights." 7 An "infringement" of
any right secured by Title I creates a private cause of action under

section 102.118
The business agents also sued under section 609, which is not

part of Title 1.111 Section 609 prohibits "discipline" of "any member
for exercising any right to which he is entitled" under the LMRDA;
a violation of this section is also actionable under section 102.120
112. Id. at 434.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 434. Chief Justice Burger apparently thought that the fact that the appointed business agents served on what the Court characterized as the local's "legislative assembly" underscored the need for the current president to be allowed to name his own choices
to the positions. Id. The Court never wondered what sort of union "legislative assembly" it
would be that included appointed members. Perhaps the Chief Justice was thinking of the
House of Lords.
115. See supra note 29 (enumerating LMRDA § 101 (a)(1)).
116. See supra note 30 (enumerating LMRDA § 101 (a)(2)).
117. See supra notes 29 and 30.
118. See supra note 35 (enumerating LMRDA § 102).
119. LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1988), is part of Title VI, the "Miscellaneous
Provisions" subchapter of the LMRDA. The text of § 609 is set forth supra at note 25.
120. LMRDA § 102 "provides independent authority for a suit against a union based on
an alleged violation of Title I of the Act." Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 439.
While the two provisions overlap, there are significant differences. Section 102 is meant to
enforce substantive rights, but only if they are contained in Title I. Section 609 is meant only
to prevent discipline for exercising substantive rights, but includes rights contained anywhere
in the LMRDA.
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The Court began its discussion of the infringement issue in Finnegan by noting that
[t]he amendments [that became Title I] placed emphasis on the
rights of union members to freedom of expression without fear of
sanctions by the union. .

.

.Such protection was necessary to fur-

ther the Act's primary objective of ensuring that unions would be
democratically 21 governed and responsive to the will of their
memberships.1
The Court thus recognized the relationship between the individual
rights protected by Title I and the overall policy of the LMRDA.
Congress felt that these individual political rights were among the
means to ensure union democracy. But the logical conclusion of that
recognition, that whether rights are infringed under Title I must be
judged within the framework of the mandate for institutional democracy, at least partially eluded the Court.
Instead, the Court viewed the key issue as the distinction between those rights granted an individual as a member of a union,
and the "non-right" to hold union office. 122 Thus, if the union's action infringed the right to vote or to nominate candidates on an
equal basis, or to attend union meetings and speak at them, then the
action could be challenged under section 102. However, if the individual's "rights" to do these things remained formally unaffected,
then that individual's "membership rights" guaranteed by the
LMRDA had not been "infringed" and there is no cause of action
under section 102. Since the fired business agents remained members
in good standing of the local, the Court found no infringement of
any right protected by Title 1.123 The Court did not analyze the removal of the business agents as a restriction on Title I's guarantees
of equal rights, speech, and assembly which could be justified only if
the union's actions fell within the "reasonable rules" exceptions to
those guarantees. Indeed, those exceptions were never mentioned.
Although Finnegan claims in its holding that its result is necessary to protect "the democratic process Congress sought to protect,"1 24 the Court's view of democracy and the democratic process is
a formal and unrealistic one. Congress was not concerned with the
Preventing a member from attending a union meeting would be actionable under § 102,
but not under § 609. Formally disciplining a member for filing an election complaint with the
Secretary of Labor would violate § 609 but not Title I.
121.
122.

456 U.S. at 435-36.
Id.

123.

Id. at 439-42.

124. Id. at 441.
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issue of union patronage in passing the LMRDA, according to the
Court. "To the contrary, the Act's overriding objective was to ensure
that unions would be democratically governed, and responsive to the
will of the union membership as expressed in open, periodic elections."' 2 5 The Court sees the goal of eliminating patronage and the
goal of democratic governance as conflicting. It says that "the ability
of an elected union president to select his own administrators is an
integral part of ensuring a union administration's responsiveness to
the mandate of the union election.' 2 6
No doubt this poses a dilemma for some union employees; if
they refuse to campaign for the incumbent they risk his displeasure, and by supporting him risk the displeasure of his successor.
However, in enacting Title I of the Act, Congress simply was not
concerned with perpetuating appointed union employees in office at
the expense of an elected president's freedom to choose his own
staff. Rather [and here again, the Court indicates that it believes it
is dealing with unrelated or even opposite phenomena] its concerns
were with promoting union democracy, and protecting the rights xof
27
union members from arbitrary action by the union or its officers.
The Court's conclusion in Finnegan is not without any basis in
the literal language of the statute. It is possible to believe that imposing a penalty for the exercise of "rights secured by the provisions
of this title" does not "infringe" those rights.
But what does such an interpretation say about the meaning of
rights? In some contexts, the courts have rejected the constrained
view of Title I rights as purely formal. Thus, the equal right to vote
in a union referendum12 8 involves more than "a mere naked right to
cast a ballot.' 129 Surely, it means that the ballots will be counted
125.
126.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

127. Id. at 442 (emphasis in original).
128.

LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(1) (1988), guarantees the equal right

to vote in elections or referendums; a contract ratification vote is a form of referendum.
129.

Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911, 916 (D.D.C. 1961); see generally American

Postal Workers Union Local 6885 v. American Postal Workers Union, 665 F.2d 1096 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). The court of appeals in Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 567 F.2d
1117, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) stated:

[A] union cannot immunize itself against charges of discrimination simply by affording each member the "mere naked right to cast a ballot;" the right each member has to vote must be "meaningful." Accordingly, the courts have found that the
"equal right to vote" was denied, notwithstanding universal suffrage, where union

officials circulated inadequate or misleading information about matters to be voted
upon; where union officials refused to provide opponents access to a membership

mailing list; where ballots were submitted to members in unsuitable form; where
irregularities occurred in counting ballots; and where union officials refused to im-
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accurately.130 Presumably, it means that the membership can vote
without excessive difficulty: the polls cannot be open during inconvenient hours or at inaccessible locations . 31 Obviously, it means that
the union leadership cannot use physical intimidation to prevent voting. However, it just as obviously means that if the union leadership
breaks the arm of everyone voting wrong, but continues to allow
them to vote, it would violate Title I. It would not be realistic to say
that the threat of a beating doesn't infringe the member's right to
vote, as long as the member has the formal right to show up at the
meeting. Yet, it could be argued that the member merely had to face
the difficult choice of voting or of having his arm broken.
Is there any way to distinguish this situation from that in Finnegan? It could be argued that the LMRDA recognizes a right to be
free of violence, 3 2 while there is no right to hold union office. But,
what if the union only allowed voting to ratify a collective bargaining agreement on payment of a special assessment, such as $500? If
this poll tax, properly implemented,13 3 were applied to all members,
there would be no violation of equality and there is no Title I right
to vote, except on an equal basis. 34 However, it is highly unlikely
that any court would allow such a restriction to stand.
These examples cannot be distinguished from Finnegan because
of that case's emphasis on formal rights. The issue should not be
whether the right guaranteed by Title I still exists despite the burden
placed on it. The unreality of this reasoning derives from its divorce
of the protected right from the context in which the right can actually be exercised. If placing serious penalties on the exercise of a
plement the result of a properly-conducted vote. Evidently, the equal right to vote
may be denied upon the occurrence of serious discrimination, irregularities, or foul
play at any stage of the electoral process.

(footnotes omitted).
130. Stettner v. International Printing Pressmen, 278 F. Supp. 675, 677-78 (E.D. Tenn.
1967) (holding that irregularities in counting ballots and deviations from union rules in conducting referendum discriminated against plaintiffs and diluted their equal right to vote).

131.

See McGinnis v. Local 710, Teamsters, 774 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1985). cert. denied,

475 U.S. 1121 (1986).

132. Section 610 of the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 530 (1988), provides criminal penalties for
using force or violence, or the threat thereof, "to restrain, coerce, or intimidate. . .any [union
member] for the purpose of interfering with or preventing the exercise of any right to which he
is entitled under the provisions of [the LMRDA]."
133.

LMRDA § 101(a)(3) requires certain procedures to raise dues or to levy a general

or special assessment. In the case of a national union, a majority vote of the delegates to the
regular convention would suffice; the national executive board could institute an assessment
that, under some circumstances, would be effective for five years. 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(3)(B)

(1988).
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1988).
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protected right is not seen as "infringing" it, then the right is in the
literal sense only formal: it need have no substance.
The other claim of the business agents was that their firing constituted "discipline" for their support of the losing candidate, thus
violating section 609, which makes it illegal for a union "to fine,
suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of" the
LMRDA. 135
If removing a member from an official position is discipline and
the removal occurs because the member has spoken out against the
union leadership, then section 609 would bar the removal. It would
not matter whether the removed official's rights were also "infringed." Resolving the issue presented under section 609 in this way
would have made unnecessary the development of the basic doctrine
of retaliatory removals - that rights are not infringed by severely
penalizing their exercise, so long as the formal ability to exercise
them remains intact.
Instead, the Supreme Court decided that a retaliatory removal
was not discipline.136 That decision too was based on the distinction
between "membership rights" and "officer rights:" "[T]he term 'discipline,' as used in section 609, refers only to retaliatory actions that
affect a union member's rights or status as a member of the
union.,"137

The Court apparently did not feel this holding required much
support:
Section 609 speaks in terms of disciplining "members"; and the
three disciplinary sanctions specifically enumerated. . .are all punitive actions taken against union members as members. In contrast,
discharge from union employment does not impinge upon the incidents of union membership and affects union members
only to the
138
extent that they happen also to be union employees.
This statement contains three related arguments, none of which
are persuasive. The fact that the section speaks of disciplining
"members" only restates the issue the Court is supposed to resolve.
The plaintiffs were members, and their claim was that their dismissal constituted discipline. Second, while it is true that the section
enumerates three forms of discipline (fines, suspensions, and expul135. LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1988).
136. See Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 437-39.
137. Id. at 437 (emphasis in original).
138. Id. at 437-38 (footnote omitted).
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sions), the fact that it adds "or otherwise discipline" was ignored.1 39
It subordinates the substance of punishment to its form and, notwithstanding the Court's denial of this implication in a subsequent
discipline case, it invites a union "to circumvent [section 609] by
developing novel forms of penalties different from fines, suspensions,
or expulsions. 140
The final thought of the Court's quoted language is the section
609 version of the main holding of Finnegan:that the Bill of Rights'
protections extend only to the formal, rather than the actual, ability
to exercise those rights. Thus, a union decision to deny a dissident
officer her right to vote in a union election would be actionable, but
firing her is not, because it "does not impinge upon the incidents of
union membership.'' In the context of discipline, this reasoning
can lead to results that the Court itself would certainly find unacceptable. For example, the decision of a union disciplinary panel to
formally punish members by suspending their right to work under
any collective bargaining agreement to which the union was a party
would obviously be discipline within the meaning of the LMRDA.
However, so long as they could still attend union meetings, vote, and
so on, it would "affect union members only to the extent that they
happen also to be.

.

. employees" of the relevant employers." 2 Re-

sults of this sort required
the creation of other doctrines that did not
143
depend on Finnegan.
The Court supported its holding on discipline with an additional
argument, based on the legislative history, that seems more persuasive.144 A closer examination shows that the history does not support
the Court's conclusion, and that the opposite interpretation more
fully comports with the structure and intent of the LMRDA.
As the Court pointed out, the "procedural due process" provision of the Bill of Rights, section 101(a)(5), states that a member
may not be "fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined,"
139.
140.

LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1988).
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U.S ....

110 S. Ct. 424, 439 n.15

(1989). The Breininger Court was rejecting the suggestion that this interpretation of §§ 609
and 101(a)(5), an interpretation that Breininger shares with Finnegan, meant that any punishment other than fines, suspensions, and expulsions, would be exempt from those sections. Id.

As I will show, this denial is unconvincing. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
141.

See Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 438.

142. See id.
143. See infra note 248 (discussing Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U.S. 67
(1989)). The example I have given would meet the definition of discipline in Breininger but
not in Finnegan.
144. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 438.
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without specific procedural safeguards. 45 Section 101(a)(5), although it uses the same phrase as section 609, is concerned only with
the procedural regularity and fairness of union discipline. Unlike
section 609, it does not bar discipline for prohibited reasons. The
legislative history, generally almost nonexistent for the Bill of
Rights, makes it clear that the safeguards of section 101(a) (5) were
not intended to apply to the suspension from office of a union officer.
The Court, adding its own emphasis, quoted the Conference Report:
[T]his "prohibition on suspension without observing certain safeguards applies only to suspension of membership in the union; it
does not refer to suspension of a member's status as an officer of

the union." This too is a persuasive indication that the virtually
identical language in § 609 was likewise meant to refer only to
punitive actions diminishing membership rights, and not termination of a member's status as an appointed union employee.1 4
But this language refers only to the "suspension" of an officer as
contrasted with a member. It can just as logically be read to mean
that only suspensions and not permanent removal or other forms of
discipline, would be exempt.'147 The quoted report does not create
any general distinction between officer rights and membership rights
as the Court implies. It simply recognizes the difference in "suspension" in the two situations.
Even in isolation, the language of the Conference Report does
not provide much support for the Court's position. When one considers the context of the language and the general scheme of the
LMRDA, the Court's reliance on these words for attributing to Congress an intent to create a sharp cleavage between officer and membership rights is a wild extrapolation. The explanation for this single
distinction in the legislative history that most courts had accepted 48
is the need Congress saw for a union to remove from office immediately (and temporarily) an officer who was accused of financial misconduct. This concern of Congress is entirely addressed by this limited exception.
145.

Id. See supra note 33 (enumerating LMRDA § 101 (a)(5)).

146.

Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 438 (quoting H.R.

CONF.

REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st

Sess., 31 (1959)) (emphasis added by the Court).
147. LMRDA § 101 (a)(5) prohibits suspensions and expulsions without procedural safeguards. Yet the Conference Report limits the exemption of safeguards to the case of suspensions. The statement in the Conference Report is not part of any larger explanation of the
purpose or scope of § 101(a)(5)-and it does not refer to § 609 at all.
148. See e.g., Grand Lodge, Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
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Even if the Court's reading of the legislative history is accepted,
it does not justify creating the fiction that a union official removed
from office or a union employee fired from a job, is not being disciplined. The legislative history on which the Court relies makes reference to section 101(a)(5), not section 609.1'1
Several circuit courts had concluded that the meaning of "otherwise discipline" differed in the two sections, since Congress' motive
for excluding officer removal from the procedural safeguards of section 101(a)(5) did not apply to an action under section 609.15" Rejecting this position, the Supreme Court acknowledged "that the
purposes of the two sections are different," but found insufficient evidence in "either the language or legislative history of the Act" to
justify reading the words "otherwise discipline" differently in the
two sections.' 5 '
The Supreme Court thus adopted the position of then Judge
Stevens who, concurring in Wood v. Dennis,152 had argued that the
essentially identical language of section 609 and section 101(a)(5)
had the same meaning. The Court did not however take up Stevens'
further observation in Wood that
[T]he risk of fiscal misconduct, which explains why the temporary
suspension of a union officer is not regarded as discipline within the
meaning of §101(a)(5),. . does not require or justify a narrow interpretation of the word discipline in other situations, including
permanent removal, in which the officer is plainly being punished.
Why a person occupying an office of trust should be less entitled to
fair procedures than other citizens is difficult to understand. 153
If an officer is "plainly being punished," it is unclear not only
why she should not be entitled to the procedural protections of section 101(a)(5), but also why, assuming the punishment is occurring
for exercising "any right . . . under the provisions of this Act," it

does not violate section 609.
Accepting that "otherwise discipline" has the same meaning in
section 609 as it does in section 101(a)(5) has therefore led to a
149. See Finnegan, 456 U.S. 431, 438 n.9.
150. See Grand Lodge, Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964); Wood v.
Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (1973)(en banc), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); Bradford v. Textile
Workers, 563 F.2d 1138 (1977).
151. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 438 n.9.
152. 489 F.2d 849, 857 (Stevens, J., concurring in result).

153. 489 F.2d at 858 n.4 (Steven, J., concurring in result). The view that the permanent
removal of an officer does not require the procedural protections of § 101(a)(5), combined with
the membership rights/officer rights distinction, has also led to some counter-intuitive results.

See Sullivan v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 707 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1983).
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narrowing of the meaning of section 609, lest procedural requirements, such as written notice of charges, be imposed in situations
where they are inappropriate or impossible.15 4 But it could just as
logically, as Stevens indicated, have led to the view that section
101(a)(5) requires procedural protections whenever a member was
being punished, including by permanent removal from office, and
that Section 609 prohibits such punishment, including by permanent
removal, for exercising rights guaranteed members by any provision
of the LMRDA. Under this view of the statute, the immediate temporary suspension, with no pre-removal hearing, of a union treasurer
accused of robbing the till would violate neither section 101(a)(5),
nor Section 609. The temporary removal could not be made permanent without according the officer the protections of section
101(a)(5). Further, the removal, temporary or permanent, of the officer for voting "wrong" at a union meeting would violate both
sections.
In fact, this is the view that the Court, unknowingly, has effectively adopted in relation to elected officials. The Court's decision in
Lynn, 155 that the retaliatory removal of an elected official violates
Title I means that a union wishing to remove such an official permanently 156 would now be required to follow the disciplinary procedures
described in its constitution and bylaws. The statute requires that
these procedures would have to conform to section 101(a)(5) at a
minimum. 5 7 But, the suspension of such an official for suspected financial irregularities remains legal according to the Conference Report. 58 That is, despite its interpretation of the Conference Report
in Finnegan, the Court has effectively read the statute to require a
disciplinary procedure for the permanent removal of elected officers,
but not for their suspension. 59 Thus, the Finnegan holding that permanent removal from office is not discipline is now only relevant to
appointed officials. 60 But the Conference Report lends no support to
154. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.

155. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347 (1989).
156.

Lynn does not discuss the temporary removal issue.

157. Section 101(b) of the LMRDA provides that "[a]ny provision of the constitution
and bylaws of any labor organization which is inconsistent with the provisions of [section 101,
the Bill of Rights] shall be of no force or effect." 29 U.S.C. § 411 (b) (1988).
158. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., IstSess., 31 (1959).

159.

Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 436.

160.

Although the Finnegan holding on discipline seems limited to appointed officials

only ("We hold, therefore, that removal from appointive union employment is not within the
scope of those union sanctions explicitly prohibited by §609." 456 U.S. at 439), lower courts
applied Finnegan to elected officials as well. See supra note 105 and accompany text. Inci-

dently, it is impossible to take issue with the literal language of the holding; retaliatory remov-
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that distinction. The Congressional intention to allow swift temporary removal to prevent continued looting of the union's resources
does not, in any sense, depend on whether the official is appointed or
elected. 61 Whether the Conference Report indicates that Congress
intended only to exempt suspensions from the protections of section
101(a)(5) or to exempt permanent removals as well, the exemption
must have been meant to apply to both appointed and elected union
officials.
There are other indications in the LMRDA that Congress intended the permanent removal of officers to be accompanied by procedural safeguards. Section 401(h) of the Act,162 while it applies
only to certain elected officers, 6 3 requires that the union's constitution and bylaws include an "adequate procedure" for removing such
officers who are "guilty of serious misconduct". It also implicitly provides that that procedure include the requirements that cause be
shown and that the official receive notice and a hearing. 64 The result
of this hearing may be an important penalty, removal from office.
Taken together, these are the hallmarks of a disciplinary procedure.
If the removal of an elected official is a form of discipline, it
must be governed by section 609's substantive bar on union discipline for exercising LMRDA rights, even if it were not governed by
section 101(a)(5)'s procedural requirements. Why then does section
609 not apply to the removal of an appointed official? One explanation is that the statute, by its terms, requires the existence of an
als clearly are not "sanctions explicitly prohibited by § 609;" neither is torture.
161. Most local and national unions in fact restrict disbursement of funds to elected
officials.
162.

LMRDA § 401(h) provides:

If the Secretary [of Labor], upon application of any member of a local labor
organization, finds after hearing in accordance with [the Administrative Procedure
Act], that the constitution and bylaws of such labor organization do not provide an
adequate procedure for the removal of an elected officer guilty of serious misconduct, such officer may be removed, for cause shown and after notice and hearing, by
the members in good standing voting in a secret ballot, conducted by the officers of
such labor organization in accordance with its constitution and bylaws insofar as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of [Title IV].
29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1988).
163.

It applies to local and national constitutional officers, and delegates to a convention

that elects national constitutional officers. In addition, the enforcement of Title IV is left to the
Secretary of Labor, rather than to private actions. See 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (1988).
164. The statute requires these safeguards only when the union itself does not have an
"adequate procedure" for removal. See 29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1988). The only reasonable read-

ing of the statute-though not the only possible one-is that the union's procedures must
contain similar safeguards in order to be adequate; this is the interpretation of the Department
of Labor. See 29 C.F.R. 417.2(b) (1991).
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adequate removal procedure only as to elected officials. 165 While that
explains why the existence of section 401(h) does not itself prove
that the permanent removal of an appointed official is a form of discipline within the meaning of section 609, it does not repair the hole
in the Court's argument. Since the procedure required by section

401(h) meets any reasonable definition of "discipline," and incorporates minimum standards of due process, the Conference Report

concerning temporary suspensions cannot mean, as the Court claims,
that Congress intended that the permanent removal of officials
should be unaccompanied
by procedural safeguards and therefore
1 66
was not "discipline".
The Conference Report lends no support to the Court's view

that the removal of an appointed official is not discipline. That holding, like the remainder of Finnegan, rests entirely on the view that

the LMRDA protects only formal rights.

67

165. The purpose of § 401(h) indicates that the specification of "elected" officials does
not support the creation of a distinction between elected and appointed officials. The law allows a union to choose not to impose discipline, and have no procedures by which discipline
would be imposed against any members. This was not a fear of Congress. It was unlikely that
unions would stop disciplining members for offenses such as strikebreaking; as the existence of
§§ 101(a)(5) and 609 indicates, Congress was worried about too much discipline, not too little.
Section 401(h) meets a different problem. Congress' concern was to ensure some means of
removing even the top officials of a local union for misconduct on the complaint of union
members.
The point made in the text does not require any softening of the distinction between
§3 609 and 101(a)(5) on the one hand and § 401(h) on the other. It only indicates that
Congress, at least in this part of the LMRDA, did not view the permanent removal of officials
as something that should be accomplished without procedural protections. If the Conference
Report explicitly said otherwise concerning the protections provided by § 101 (a)(5), then complex and convoluted explanations to reconcile the two views might be justified. When the most
logical and simplest explanation of the Conference Report statement also happens to fit best
with the overall statutory view on the necessity of due process protections, it would seem best
to adopt that view. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411 (a)(5), 481(h), 529 (1988).
166. Section 401(h) does not require the particular safeguards of § 101(a)(5). It is still
possible therefore that Congress did not intend any procedural protections for permanent removal of officials, except when elected local officials were removed on the initiative of the
membership, when §401(h) requires cause, notice, and a hearing, followed by a secret ballot
vote. This interpretation requires believing that Congress thought that procedural safeguards
were more necessary when the top union leadership faced charges from the rank and file rather
than when low-level officials were being removed by their superiors.
The more likely explanation is also the simplest: Congress meant only to exempt temporary suspensions from the procedures required by 101 (a)(5); see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
167. The Court's reasoning is also undercut by the existence in § 401(e) of language
that provides that "every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to
hold office. . .and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidates of his
choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any
kind. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1988).
This section, like § 401(h), is part of Title IV of the Act, and its guarantee of holding
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C. The Fruits of Formalism: Three Problems of Separating
Membership Rights from Officer Rights
The separation of officer rights from membership rights that
characterizes Finnegan's resolution of both the "infringement" issue
under sections 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) and the "discipline" issue
under section 609 does not correspond to the reality of union politics.
Because retaliatory removals are an important means of preventing
the formation of effective union oppositions," 8 the statutory goal of
promoting democratic unionism requires protecting lower-level union
officials. This interrelationship meant courts could be faithful to the
doctrine only at the cost of ignoring reality.
Both before and after Finnegan, courts were faced with
problems resulting from the officer/membership rights distinction
that they found in the LMRDA and from the formal view of rights
that they found in their own world view and which the officer/membership distinction manifested. Each application of these doctrines to
elected officials contradicted rights that are clearly guaranteed by
Title I: the equal nominating and voting rights of members guaranteed by section 101(a)(1)."'9 Each application to elected or ap-

pointed officials threatened 170 (and in the case of appointed officials,
still threatens) the members' right to speak and associate for political change in the union, which is guaranteed by section 101(a) (2).1
Finally, the interpretation of section 609 that, consistent with
Finnegan'smain holding, exempts from the definition of "discipline"
any union action that does not formally affect the penalized member's status as a member, leads to unacceptable results when applied
to contexts other than retaliatory removals. Each of these three areas
office without retaliation is therefore limited to certain elected union offices. See supra note
163. Nonetheless the absence of the "fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline" language

from this section provides further support for the view that the LMRDA was intended to
prevent retaliatory removals-for such removal is surely a "penalty," even if it is not
"discipline."
This language could also indicate that Congress was distinguishing between a "penalty"

and "discipline;" it could have used this phrase in § 609. It seems more likely that this is
loophole-plugging language, like the laundry list of prohibited uses in a copyright notice, or to

use a familiar phrase from labor law: "interfere with, restrain, or coerce."
The ban on "reprisal of any kind" (though the language could be read to mean "im-

proper.

.

.reprisal of any kind" ) indicates how broadly Congress wanted this provision to

apply.

168.

See infra note 331 and following text.

169.
170.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Before Lynn, the courts typically treated retaliatory removals of elected and ap-

pointed officials identically. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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will be discussed in turn.
1. The Contradiction between Candidacy and Election

The guarantees of Section 101(a)(1) include the equal right to
nominate candidates and to vote. In addition, there is an implicit

right to run for office, although recognition of this right is not necessary to this analysis.

72

What happens to these rights when an

elected official is retaliatorily removed?
In an important pre-Finnegan case, the Seventh Circuit, sitting
en banc in Wood v. Dennnis,173 rejected the member-plaintiffs' contention that their equal rights were violated by the removal of the
official for whom they had voted. The court thought that accepting

this theory would mean that no elected official could be removed in
retaliation for political opposition. As a result, it held that removal
from office was, by itself, insufficient to support a Title I claim by
members. The court reasoned that the procedural protections of Section 101(a)(5) did not apply to the removal of officers 17 4 and "summary removal is irreconcilable with the notion that members have an
absolute right to their elected officials." 1 75 Therefore, the court de-

clined "to extend the voting rights provisions of Section 101(a) (1) to
subsequent procedures not directly affecting the exercise of the guar-

anteed rights."1 76
The court's point that the membership does not have an "absolute right" to keep their elected officials is beside the point. It is

unlikely that anyone has ever claimed otherwise. 7 7 The fact that an
172. Title I was "specifically designed to protect the union member's right to seek
higher office within the union." Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 14 (1973). Although § 101(a)(1)
speaks of the members' equal right "to nominate candidates [and] to vote in elections," and
does not mention a right to run for office, most courts, even those that have interpreted Title I
rights most narrowly, view the right to run for union offices on an equal basis as guaranteed by
Title I. See e.g., Adams-Lundy v. Ass'n. of Professional Flight Attendants, 731 F.2d 1154,
1156 (5th Cir. 1984)(removed officers not denied membership rights because "still members in
good standing, possessed of the right to. . .run for union office"); Newman v. Local 1101,
Communication Workers of America (Newman 1) 570 F.2d 439, 448 (2d Cir. 1978)(holding
that plaintiff was "entitled to all the rights of union membership, including...candidacy for
union office"); Sullivan v. Laborers' International Union of North America, 707 F.2d 347, 350
(8th Cir. 1983) (holding that the right to run for office was protected by § 101).
173. 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
174. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. As I pointed out there, and as Judge
Stevens indicated in his concurrence in Wood, there is in fact no indication that "summary
removal" is permissible-though summary temporary suspension is.
175. Wood, 489 F.2d at 857.
176. Id.
177. As section 401(h) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1988), makes clear, the
union is required to have "adequate means" in its constitution or bylaws to remove an elected
officer for serious misconduct. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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elected officer may legally be removed in some circumstances does
not answer the question of whether the members' equal right to vote
is violated when the removal is in retaliation for political opposition.
By limiting the scope of Section 101(a)(1) to union actions that "directly" affect the equal right to vote, the Wood court ignored the
effect of the removal on members' rights.17 8
The Wood analysis permits the bizarre possibility that a union
could repeatedly remove a winning candidate from office for expressing views opposed by the administration. Since there is no Title I
right to hold a union office, these removals would not violate Section
101 (a)(1), so long as the union allowed the members to nominate the
removed official to run for the office again. The candidate would
have a right to criticize the administration vigorously, harshly, and
unfairly. 179 But if she were elected, even if she were elected precisely
because the membership agreed with her criticisms, she could then
be punished (though, of course this would not constitute "discipline") by removal from office. It is not clear what value there is in
having a legal right to nominate and vote for a candidate, but no
legal right to have that candidate, if elected, serve in office. The
courts were saying, in effect, that Congress had created a legal right
to run for office, but no legal right to win. 80
This absurd result did not exist only in theory, as two frequently
cited cases illustrate. In Dolan v. Transport Workers Union,' 8' decided shortly after Finnegan, the Eleventh Circuit struggled with the
question of whether Finnegan applied to elected officials and found
that it did under certain circumstances.' 82 Since only the speech of
178. Wood found broad protection under § 609 and very narrow protection under § 101,
the opposite of the law today. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. The choices the
Seventh Circuit made are not self-evidently less faithful to the language of the statute then the

law as the Supreme Court developed it.
179. Even libelous attacks against union leaders are protected against intra-union retaliation by the LMRDA, though they remain actionable under common law. See Salzhandler v.
Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963).

180. It is hard to imagine a court actually saying that Congress intended to confer an
illusory right. An alternative understanding is that Congress never contemplated the contradiction I have described. If so, according to most doctrines of statutory analysis, the courts ought

to have decided what result was most consistent with Congress' intent as to the issues it did
consider. There are two ways to frame the issue: First, did Congress mean to protect "officers'

rights" whenever that was necessary to protect members' rights? That was the approach by
which the courts created the Schonfeld doctrine. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
Alternatively, the issue may be conceived more broadly: did Congress intend to protect

"officers' rights" whenever that was necessary to advance the goal of union democracy? That
is the general approach adopted in Lynn. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
181. 746 F.2d 733 (lth Cir. 1984).
182.

Dolan, 746 F.2d at 742.
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members is protected, the court found that the "critical issue here is

whether the speech

..

constituted only membership speech or has

been transformed into 'officer speech,' " to which Title I does not

apply. 183 Finding that the speech in this case was "officer speech,"
the court held that the removal form office was legal."8

However,

barring a removed officer from then running for office did violate
Section 101(a)(2): "Union leadership cannot by dint of authority
prevent a dissenting member from attempting to regain office. At

least under the circumstances of this case, such action constitutes an
183. Id. at 742. The court acknowledged that "[a]ll speech by a member is, in a sense,
membership speech."
But when a member assumes a union office, the office can imbue the member's
speech with additional significance. [The speech can advance or interfere with the
duties of the office.] If the speech does either, it is no longer membership speech but
has been transformed into "officer speech." In addition, officers with broad policymaking or policy enforcing powers may be considered to be "speaking for the
union" on most any issue relevant to union policy. If the court determines that an
officer could reasonably be perceived as speaking for the union, or if her speech
affects performance of her specific duties, the protections of § 41 l(a)(2) for membership speech do not apply.
Id.
But see Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc., 804 F.2d 1472, 1479 n.5 (9th Cir.
1986) (rejecting "the Eleventh Circuit's approach, for any speech could arguably 'advance,'
'interfere,' or 'affect' an officer's performance of her duties: Just as 'all speech by a member is,
in a sense, membership speech . . . ' so all speech by an officer could be 'officer' speech."),
afl'd, 488 U.S. 347 (1989).
Judge Anthony Kennedy, dissenting from the Ninth Circuit's retaliatory discharge holding, also rejected Dolan's analysis, but came to the opposite conclusion:
The nature of the speech prompting the removal is essentially irrelevant. . . .[R]emoval of union officials, whether elected or appointed, does not sufficiently impair the integrity of union democracy to contravene membership rights
protected by the LMRDA unless. . .the dismissal was part of 'a purposeful and
deliberate attempt to suppress dissent.'"
804 F.2d at 1486 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Schonfeld v. Penza, 477
F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1973).
The panel majority also noted that
even if we were to adopt the remaining prong of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis,
whether the officer 'could reasonably be perceived as speaking for the union,' it
would not apply here, because Lynn's remarks occurred at an internal union meeting, while Dolan's statements were made to others outside the union.
Lynn, 805 F.2d at 1479 n.5.
In this respect, the Ninth Circuit majority perhaps took too charitable a view of Dolan.
Surely, speaking as a union policymaker to union members on relevant issues could be taken,
at least in some circumstances by some reasonable members, as words cloaked by the authority
of the position.
It seems that Dolan would allow the union to restrict the speech of elected officers whenever the speech either advances or interferes with union policy, or if it concerns an issue in any
way relevant to union policy. Speech entirely irrelevant to any issue the members care about
would presumably be protected.
184. Dolan, 746 F.2d at 742-43.
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unreasonable regulation of member speech." 18 5 The court did not
discuss what would happen if the removed officer succeeded in
regaining her office, but continued to voice opposition to the union
leadership.188 If the denial violated the official's own right to speech,
then the holding means that punishing member speech by denying
candidacy rights is unacceptable, while punishing the same speech
by removal from office is legitimate. The court is saying that there is
1 11
a protected right to run for office, but no right to win.
In a leading pre-Finnegan case that involved an elected shop
steward who was removed from office for advocating a more militant
bargaining strategy, the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's
granting of a preliminary injunction and allowed the union to remove him. 188 In pointing out that the steward, Dave Newman, had
not had his membership rights infringed, the court stated that after
89
his "decertification" as a steward:1
[H]e was entitled to all the rights of union membership, including
full participation in union meetings, candidacyfor union office, and
the right to speak out in opposition to the management [of the
union-i.e. the administration], to write and distribute any publication. . .and to nominate and vote for others to replace the union
officers with whom he disagreed. 8 0
185. Id. at 743.
186. A parallel contradiction emerges in improper discipline cases. See Sullivan v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 707 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that although Finnegan allows
elected official's removal from office without procedural protections of § 101(a)(5), barring
him from running to regain office does require those protections). See also Schonfeld v. Penza,
477 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that removal from union office does not violate the
official's rights, but making him ineligible to run requires compliance with § 101(a)(5)).
187. Another reading is that the court had difficulty separating the "equal rights" guarantee of § 101(a)(1) from the substantive speech and assembly rights of § 101(a)(2), and that
it really meant that the candidacy bar violated the equal rights provision under either of two
theories. Candidacy itself may be a Title I protected right derived by necessary implication
from the equal right to nominate and vote. I believe this is a correct view of those guarantees.
See supra note 172 (discussing a union member's right to run for office). Alternatively, the
court may have meant that the denial of the removed official's candidacy deprived the members' of their right to nominate and vote. Under either view the right would then derive from
§101(a)(1), but would not change the point I am making. The court would still necessarily be
holding that preventing a member from running for office is illegal in circumstances where
removing her from office is legal.
188. Newman 1, 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978). At the time of the events discussed in
Newman I, I was a shop steward in Local 1101, and worked closely with Dave Newman, the
lead plaintiff in the case. However, I was not involved in the legal proceedings.
189. "Certification" meant that the union informed the employer that the individual was
a steward and authorized to initiate and administer grievances, represent other employees
when they requested the presence of a steward, etc.
190. Newman I, 570 F.2d at 448 (emphasis added).
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The court also pointed out that Newman had been previously decertified as a job steward, allegedly because of his criticisms of the local's leadership. He had been chosen as a steward again by the
membership but denied certification, then again elected steward (receiving, said the court, the highest vote of seven candidates at his
jobsite), and "after a six-week delay he was this time certified by the
Local's management."' 91 The decertification now before the Court of
Appeals occurred about a year later. 9 ' The court drew from this
record the conclusion that there was no infringement of Newman's
rights under the LMRDA. 9 3
The judges apparently never wondered about the value of Newman's right to be a candidate for union office, nor of his right (and
the right of his co-plaintiffs, who included members who had voted
for him) to "nominate and vote for others to replace the union officers with whom [they] disagreed" if the newly elected officer either Newman or someone who agreed with Newman - would
have to stop criticizing the union leadership as soon as he entered
office. Presumably, the disgruntled members could change this only
if they managed to elect a majority of the union's governing body at
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. The court's analysis is remarkable:
[T]he significant fact is that despite a prior decertification as a job steward and the
union leadership's prior refusal to certify him after election to that office, Newman
continued to exercise his free speech rights as a union member, conducting vigorous
campaigns for greater democratization in opposition to Local 1101's incumbent
leadership. In view of this unique record, in which identical conduct by the defendants has not deterred Newman or any other union members from exercising their
rights under LMRDA, we do not believe that judicial intervention is necessary or
justified.
Id. at 448-49.
It is not clear how the court knew that no other member had been deterred from speaking
in favor of "greater democratization in opposition to Local 1101's leadership." Id. It seems
possible that any shop steward who wanted to remain a steward might have felt that silence
was appropriate. Perhaps the court simply meant that the record failed to show that anyone
had been deterred. Of course, the nature of such deterrence is that affected members are
unlikely to complain about it. The exceptions, like Dave Newman, who continue to oppose the
leadership, risk having their courage cited as proof that they were not deterred. See Tucker v.
Bieber, 900 F.2d 973, 978 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the plaintiff's contention that his removal from full-time appointed position while candidate for UAW Regional Director chilled
membership rights appears "completely baseless" since "vigorous campaign still occurred").
The real reason for the Local's efforts to remove Newman as a steward was an unwillingness to have him become a chief steward, a post chosen "by and from" the stewards' body at
each major job location. See Newman I, 570 F.2d at 446. In contrast to the hundreds of
stewards in Local 1101, there were less than a hundred chief stewards, and their political
influence was considerable. Id. at 446 n.5. Newman was chosen chief steward several times by
his fellow stewards.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

39

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 9:2

one time. Then, they too would have the right to silence the support-

ers of the previous administration who remained in office.
2. The Right to Dissent and the Schonfeld Doctrine
Section 101(a)(2) is a substantive guarantee of speech and assembly.' The removal of an official for speaking out to the members on union policy or for associating with other members in an
attempt to change union policies or leadership can be interpreted as
infringing those members' rights to speak and assemble for such purposes. 95 It both "chills" their willingness to speak out and also "deprive[s] the membership of [the removed official's] leadership,
knowledge
and advice at a critical time" in the political life of the
union. x9
This was the reasoning of Lynn, in which the Supreme Court
barred the retaliatory removal of all elected officials as part of a recognition of the connection between officer and membership rights.' 91
Earlier cases in the lower courts did not go so far. These cases, both
before and after Finnegan, usually held that punishing an official for
speaking did not "infringe" his Title I rights and his removal from
office did not violate the members' equal right to vote."9 8 Nonethe194. See supra note 30 (enumerating LMRDA § 101 (a)(2)).
195. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 354-55.
196. Id. at 355. The Court made this point as part of its contrasting the effect of the
removal of an elected official as compared to an appointee. This particular part of the argument, it seems plain, does not support that distinction. See infra note 403 and accompanying
text.
197. Lynn, 488 U.S. at 355.
198. This view was reinforced by the dicta in Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139
(1964), which seemed to imply that a union action that treats all members equally undemocratically cannot infringe the equal rights guarantee of section 101(a)(1). See supra note
83 and accompanying text. That view has been undercut in subsequent cases. See supra note
128 and accompanying text.
Insofar as Calhoon might conceivably apply, it would do so in precisely the opposite way
than the courts have thought. While the suit by a union official challenging her removal for
disloyalty should not be affected by Calhoon, a suit challenging her disqualification from running for that office might be. Normally such a disqualification is viewed as a direct infringement of a Title I right, and the courts have correctly so held. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
However, if the union constitution or bylaws provided that no official removed for disloyalty could be eligible to run, that-at least literally-would present the issue of a uniformly
imposed candidacy qualification which, under Calhoon, cannot support jurisdiction under §
102.
In that situation, only the Secretary of Labor could challenge the union rule. See
Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 134. LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) requires that the qualification not only be uniformly imposed, but also that it be "reasonable." See 29 U.S.C. §
481(e)(1988). I believe the only possible meaning of "reasonable" in this context is the same
as the standard by which I argue the retaliatory removal of a union official must be judged
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less, the lower courts developed a doctrine that held that a retalia-

tory removal might still infringe the members' Title I rights.
Schonfeld v. Penza,199 the landmark second circuit case, written
almost a decade before Finnegan, noted that the retaliatory discharge of a union official infringes the members' rights when it is

"part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt. . .to suppress dissent
within the union." 200 The case was, in a strong or a weak form,
widely followed. In Finnegan, the Supreme Court recognized the
doctrine as a possible exception to its holding.2"' The lower courts
held that the existence of a purposeful plan to suppress dissent mat-

tered because then, as the plaintiffs in Schonfeld alleged, the removal "constitutes a form of intimidation of the membership and

their duly elected officers and amounts to reprisal for efforts by
Schonfeld and others to advocate and implement changes in union
'20 2
structure and procedure.
Within the already prevailing formal view of Title I rights, a
view that would later culminate in Finnegan, the Schonfeld doctrine
was a way for courts to escape the consequences of their formalism
in situations where it seemed plainly necessary, according to the particular court's own view of union democracy. There are situations,
and Schonfeld itself was such a case, where it is almost impossible
under both §§ 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2). See infra note 417 and accompanying text. Thus, the
initial decisionmaker would be different, and the practical consequences of that difference may
be quite serious. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571 n.9 (1975); Trbovich v. Mine
Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972); Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE
L.J. 1221, 1257 (1961); James, supra note 18 at 334-36, 350-51.
Without minimizing these differences, which are part of the reason a private cause of
action is necessary, the legal standard should be identical. See Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 146
(Stewart, J., concurring).
199. 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
200. Id. at 904.
201. "[W]hatever limits Title I places on a union's authority to utilize dismissal from
union office as 'part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt . . . to suppress dissent within the
union,' cf. Schonfeld v. Penza, it does not restrict the freedom of an elected union leader to
choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own." Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441 (citation
omitted).
The viability of Schonfeld was reinforced in Lynn, which made it unnecessary for elected
officials, while leaving unresolved its applicability to appointed officials:
[W]e reject [the] contention that a union official must establish that his firing was
part of a systematic effort to stifle dissent within the union in order to state a claim
under § 102. Although in Finnegan we noted that a § 102 claim might arise if a
union official were dismissed as "part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt . . . to
suppress dissent within the union," we did not find that this constituted the only
situation giving rise to a § 102 claim. We merely stated that we did not have such a
case before us, and that we expressed no view as to its proper resolution.
Lynn, 488 U.S. at 355 n.7 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
202. 477 F.2d at 903.
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for a court to maintain that the union's action in removing an official
does not infringe the membership's right to speak and assemble
203
freely.
But as a method of avoiding the consequences of the division of
membership from officer rights, the Schonfeld exception is doctrinally incompatible with the formal view that requires it. Within that
formal model, if the members are still free to speak and attend meetings, then they have not - any more than the removed official himself - had their Title I rights infringed. The fact that the union
hierarchy removed Schonfeld to inhibit other union members from
speaking, or to remove the leader of the opposition from a position of
influence, visibility, and prestige, and thereby make the opposition's
chances of success more remote, should not change this analysis. 20 4
Schonfeld thus implicitly recognized that the formal right to
speak, vote and attend meetings is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Title I. The doctrine was necessary because the purpose of the LMRDA is not simply to allow members to cast votes in
elections that are uncontested, or might as well be, or to speak on
union policy only in circumstances where their speech can have no
effect. A union leadership rarely needs or attempts to "suppress dissent" in the sense of preventing members from exercising these formal rights, unless the exercise of these rights threatens to have an
effect or is so perceived by the leadership. In a few unions, including
the most corrupt, where the hierarchy has little political skill and
rules by physical intimidation, any sign of dissent, even an isolated
opposition statement at a membership meeting, may be viewed as
threatening. 0 5 Most unions, however, tolerate opposing views ex203.

Schonfeld v. Penza was one of many cases involving the corrupt, tyrannical, and

ineffective leadership of Painters District Council 9 and the efforts of reformers, led by Frank

Schonfeld, to reclaim their union. See e.g. Robins v. Rarback, 325 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1963);
Salzhandler v. Caputo 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963); Schonfeld v. Raftery, 271 F. Supp. 128
(S.D.N.Y.), affd. 381 F.2d 446 (2d. Cir. 1967); Schonfeld v. Raftery, 335 F. Supp. 846

(S.D.N.Y. 1971). The old regime's record of violence, intimidation, and flouting of the law,
while not unique, was too much for the courts to ignore.
The litigation was of course only one aspect of the struggle to restore democracy to the
union. The tenacity and bravery of Schonfeld himself contributed immeasurably to that cause.

204. See Schonfeld, 477 F.2d at 899-904. One might say that in order to accommodate
the Schonfeld exception, courts have presided over a transformation: the earthly bread and
wine of officer rights are transubstantiated by the miracle of the purposeful scheme into the
body and blood of membership rights.
205. In 1976, when the only delegate of the fledgling Teamsters for a Democratic Union

at the national Teamsters convention, Pete Camarata, attempted to propose a constitutional
amendment to limit the salary of the general president, he was prevented from speaking and

later beaten up in public. D. LA BOTZ, supra note 48, at 72. See also James, supra note 18, at
328 (stating that the first delegate to address 1964 Mineworkers convention was beaten so
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pressed by individual members, especially when those members are
isolated and marginal to the union's political life. The expression of
opposition by a secondary leader of the union, whether elected or
appointed, is different. A retaliatory removal is motivated less by an
attempt to discourage the exercise of formal rights than by a desire
to prevent the dissident views, either on policy or leadership, from
gaining a wider audience. Retaliatory removals prevent dissident
views from being seen as a legitimate alternative within the union
and ultimately, from succeeding in changing the policy or the leadership. The whole point of retaliatory removals, in other words, is to
suppress dissent within the union.
The Schonfeld doctrine is flexible: it allows a court to find, or
not to find, an attempt to suppress dissent depending on the egregiousness of the union leadership's conduct. It also permits a court to
consider the overall character of the union in question. However, this
flexibility results from the inability of courts to articulate coherent
standards to apply the doctrine. Such standards would require transcending the artificial division of officer and membership rights and
viewing Title I rights as part of the means to insure politically open
unions that value diversity. The existence of a purposeful attempt
only matters if the cramped view of speech and assembly is rejected
in favor of this broader vision. The Schonfeld doctrine is coherent
only if it is understood as asking whether, in a particular situation,
the exercise of formal rights of membership is sufficient to satisfy the
LMRDA.
The flexibility of the doctrine also allows inappropriate considerations to determine the outcome of cases. A union with an unsavory
reputation is more likely to be found to be engaging in an attempt to
suppress dissent than a union that seems "responsible."2 0° Perhaps,
in some sense, this is justified. However, responsibility may mean not
only the absence of organized crime, but also that the union's attitude towards employers, collective bargaining, and strikes comports
with the court's social vision. Thus, as is typical of rank and file
dissidents, Dave Newman criticized the leadership of his local and
international for their lack of militancy, as well as their lack of debadly that convention had to be recessed); Goldberg, Cleaning Labor's House: Institutional
Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989 DUKE L.J. 903, 965-974 (describing the

situation in IBT Local 560, which was dominated by organized crime).
206. Compare the Second Circuit's attitude towards Schonfeld's removal from the notoriously crime-ridden Painters Union with its handling of Newman I, which involved the
"clean" CWA.
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The court of appeals in Newman I recited a history that
could plainly have brought the case within the Schonfeld doctrine,
but declined to apply it. 2a8 Instead, it reversed the preliminary injunction against Newman's decertification. Nonetheless, despite its
evident hostility to Newman's claims, 209 when on remand the District Judge found that the decertification was part of a deliberate
plan to suppress dissent, the Court of Appeals, in Newman H,
affirmed.21 0
207. Democratization of the union and a more militant stance towards the employers are
typically the twin demands of opposition movements. See, e.g., James, supra note 18, at 32829 (discussing the origins of Miners for Democracy); D. LA BOTZ supra note 48 (discussing
the Teamsters for a Democratic Union).
Most union members who become reformers do so when they come to feel that their
attempts to fight the employer over money, working conditions, job security, safety, etc.-the
issues that prompted them to become active-are being frustrated rather than aided by the
union leadership. Their attempts to change the policies of that leadership, or the identity of the
leaders, then force them to confront, and attempt to change, the lack of democratic means to
do so. For many oppositionists, the demand for union democracy, which might never have
arisen if the autocratic leadership had "delivered the goods," becomes an important value in
itself: the inability to deliver the goods and the undemocratic nature of the union are seen as
inevitably linked.
208. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
209. The court's hostility to Newman's particular criticism of the union is barely
concealed:
[T]he local's management . . . favored relatively calm and dispassionate negotiations with Bell [New York Telephone Co., the employer] looking toward obtaining
from Bell by peaceful means provisions for retraining programs in order to alleviate
layoffs caused by technological changes in the Bell system, improvements in the
existing pension plan that would take into account increases in the cost of living, a
possible reduction in the work week, and increases in vacation and personal leave
periods. Newman, on the other hand, favored a commitment to, and advance organization of the entire union for, a nation-wide strike and "rejection movement" unless
Bell agreed to a contract meeting certain minimum demands, including "job security," i.e., a 32-hour week at 40 hours pay, or a no lay-off clause.
Newman I, 570 F.2d at 446.
The leadership's "calm and dispassionate approach" (which was trying to obtain concessions by "peaceful" means) is contrasted with Newman's belief that the entire national union
should be prepared to reject an inadequate contract offer (presumably by non-peaceful
means--or worse yet, a strike).
210. Newman v. Local 1101, 597 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman I1). The Newman
H holding does not rely in any way on the fact that Newman was elected; like many of the
cases that followed the Second Circuit in recognizing the existence of a Schonfeld exception,
the doctrine was applied regardless of whether the official was appointed or elected.
In Newman II the court gave three reasons for the reversal of the grant of the preliminary
injunction in Newman L Id. First, it said, the district court's decision had "failed to differentiate between the Local's right to discipline its officials or agents as such for insubordination in
implementing its policies and the right of members as such to criticize the Local's management." Id. at 835. This problem was cured by the district court's finding that "despite Newman's opposition to policies of the Local's management, he had faithfully and effectively performed his duties as a job steward," Id. at 836.
But in Newman I, the court had said that:
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In a case that illustrates the usefulness and flexibility, as well as
the limitations of the Schonfeld doctrine, the Second Circuit considered the issue of whether the doctrine survived Finnegan in Cotter v.
Owens."' Finding the doctrine still viable, the court of appeals reversed the district court's refusal to consider the plaintiff's Schonfeld
argument. 1 2 Both Frank Schonfeld and Dave Newman had been
elected. In Cotter, the court now applied Schonfeld to the case of an
appointed official.2 " The case exemplifies why protecting only
elected officials from retaliatory removals does not adequately safeguard the ability of union members to achieve democratic control of
their unions. For that reason, it is worth examining the facts of the
case, and what the Second Circuit made of those facts, in some
The inability or unwillingness of Newman to explain the Local's program and
policy to employees in a manner designed to enlist their cooperative understanding
of it, much less himself to implement that policy, is obvious. As a vigorous opponent
of that policy he favored eradication, rather than promotion or even objective criticism, of the policy. Under the circumstances he could not be expected to explain it
fairly to the membership. In short, his political interests were incompatible with
some of his principal duties as a steward.
570 F.2d at 447-48.
In other words, the District Judge, on remand, found as fact what the Court of Appeals had
said could not be true.
The second reason for the remand, explained by the court in Newman II, was the fact
that there had been "no showing in the record that the purpose or effect of decertifying Newman as a job steward was to discourage his free speech rights as a member or those of others
as members." 597 F.2d at 835. In fact, as the court admitted in Newman I, the District Court
had found "that other plaintiffs . . . were likely to succeed in showing that the decertification
of Newman had 'chilled their speech in violation of'" §§ 101(a)(2) and 609. 570 F.2d at 444.
It was not the absence of record evidence that had forced the reversal of the preliminary
injunction. What the court actually said in Newman I was that "[T]he record is equally clear
that neither the purpose nor the effect. . .was to discourage his exercise of his free speech
rights as a member." Id. at 448. Again, on remand the District Court found the opposite.
Finally, the Newman I court stressed that on remand the District Court had found that
Newman had not disrupted a meeting with the local president, which was the reason the local
had advanced for the decertification. 597 F.2d at 836. But in Newman I, the court had explicitly declined to consider this controverted fact as relevant by stating that: "even if Newman's
version is accepted, it is clear his removal was justified." 570 F.2d at 447.
The flexibility of the Schonfeld doctrine, and the risks inherent in that flexibility, are
apparent. It is hard to escape the conclusion that a determined District Judge (Whitman
Knapp) simply ignored the prejudices of the Court of Appeals, and that the Court of Appeals
gave in. (The two appellate panels had only one member in common, Judge Mansfield-but he
was the author of both opinions.)
In addition, the importance and implications of the case may have been better appreciated
by the Newman 11 panel because of the amicus brief submitted on behalf of several reform
groups from other unions, including Teamsters for a Democratic Union.
211. 753 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
212. Id. at 229. The court found the question a close one, but decided that Finnegan's
explicit "not unfavorable reference to Schonfeld" meant that the doctrine had not been extinguished. Id. at 229-30.
213. See id. at 228-230.
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detail.
Michael Cotter, a nuclear power plant mechanic and long-time
shop steward,214 was removed from the local's Nuclear Safety Committee after he helped found "Fight Back." This was an opposition
group whose newsletter criticized high officer salaries, the failure to
regularly convene the committee and to obtain better exposure-level
and safety rules. 15 In rejecting the argument that Cotter might be
exempt from the Finnegan holding under a "nonpolicymaker" exception,216 the court emphasized that "the subject of nuclear safety,
particularly at Indian Point [Nuclear Power Station], is obviously of
vital concern."21 7 This was a key issue "in a long-standing, bitter
fight between rival factions in the Local. 21 8
The safety committee "participated in the development, if not
the implementation of union policy, identified priorities for training
and safety procedures, and met with management. . .and with members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ' 21 9 The committee had
been created by the Business Manager of the Local and "the Local
has a legitimate interest in insuring that it reflects the policies of the
present leadership. The Local argues that it should not be forced to
give these dissidents a 'bully pulpit,' and indeed, it is not unimagin'220
able that the Committee could become such a forum.
Concluding that Cotter could not avail himself of a nonpolicymaking exception, assuming it existed, the court nonetheless remanded the case, because there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the removal "was not merely an isolated act of retaliation for political disloyalty," 221 but instead, fell within the Schonfeld
exception. The court held that they could "conceive of rare situations
where the retaliatory firing of policymakers might be part of a series
of oppressive acts by the union leadership that directly threaten the
214. Cotter had twenty-six years of seniority when the case was decided; he was a shop
steward for "most of" the previous twenty-four years. 753 F.2d at 224.
215. Cotter, 753 F.2d at 224-25.
216. The nonpolicymaking employee issue is discussed below. See infra note 446 and
accompanying text.
217. Cotter, 753 F.2d at 228. "It was important enough," the court noted, "for Cotter to
successfully claim that Con Edison fired him for pressing the subject too aggressively." Id. at
225. Cotter had been fired, but had been reinstated when the Department of Labor found that
the firing was in retaliation for his complaints about nuclear safety violations by Con Edison;
he later won a state wrongful discharge action. Id.
218. Id. at 226.
219. Id. at 228.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 230.
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'
freedom of members to speak out."222
The court then recommended that the case, on remand, be consolidated with two other pending cases. One challenged "the removal
of three members of Fight Back as elected shop stewards."223 In the
other, a District Judge had already

twice enjoined the Local, once from processing its own by-laws
amendments without those of Fight Back, and, two months later,

from "interfering with the right of plaintiffs to present their proposed amendments to the By-Laws . . . to the membership" and

"from causing or participating in disruptions" of the Local's membership meetings so as to prevent the members from considering
224

the proposed amendments.

In fact, the court noted, litigation between factions in the local had
been continuing for fifteen years.225
If the difference between a retaliatory removal that falls within
the Schonfeld doctrine and one that does not is simply that the
plaintiff must show the removal "was not merely an isolated act of
retaliation for political disloyalty, ' 226 then the record recited by the
Court of Appeals demonstrates that Cotter has obviously met his
burden. If he must prove that the purpose or effect of the many acts
was to suppress dissent,227 then, except in the unlikely event that the
union leaders admit that this was their aim, he needs to show that
their actions do indeed have the effect of suppressing dissent. 228
But what would constitute proof of such an effect? Evidence
that dissidents were regularly removed from union positions would
prove nothing: each of the removals would be allowed under Finnegan. Even if the removal was one of many actions by the leadership,
222.

Id. at 229.

223.

Id. at 229-30.

224.

Id. at 223 (quoting Fight Back Comm. v. Gallagher, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2685

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17 1983) (citation omitted)).
225. Id. at 229.
226.

Id. at 230.

227. The usual phrasing of the Schonfeld doctrine, involving a "purposeful" and "deliberate" attempt to suppress dissent, would seem to indicate that the union hierarchy's subjective
motivation is the central issue. The courts that have applied the doctrine have not emphasized
this factor, often referring to the "purpose and effect" of the leadership's actions as if they
were the same thing. This is just as well; there is nothing in the LMRDA to indicate that the
infringement of rights is justified by either good faith or inadvertence. See generally Local
3489 Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977) (meeting attendance rule that has the effect

of disqualifying over 96% of union members from running for office violates Title IV).
228.

The Cotter court, citing Newman I as its authority, says that on remand Cotter

would be required to show by "clear and convincing proof" that he came under the Schonfeld
doctrine. 753 F.2d at 229. Why this higher standard should be imposed is never explained.
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some of which violated the LMRDA, that should not affect the le1 9 Affidavits from members
gality of the removal.22
that they are
afraid to speak out might indicate that the removal chilled the members' Title I rights.23 0 However, since the court believes that forcing
a union member to choose between speaking out and holding union
office is legitimate, any "chilling" of a member who refrains from
speech out of fear of this consequence would also be legitimate.
The Cotter court cannot explain how some retaliatory removals,

(those "rare situations" and "unusual circumstance[s]" of which it
says it can conceive,) can "directly threaten the freedom of members
to speak out" ' 3 because, if "speaking out" is understood in the way
Finnegan has defined it, then retaliatory removals do not threaten

that fundamentally empty right. The LMRDA is concerned with
more than "speaking out". Its goal is to ensure that unions are democratically governed.23 2 The rights guaranteed by Title I, especially
the speech and assembly rights, are meant to advance that wider
goal. 3 3 The only logical justification for the Schonfeld doctrine is
that retaliatory removals are almost always part of an attempt to
229. In Johnson v. Kay, 860 F.2d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1988) the court distinguished "random acts of individuals directed solely at Johnson as union President," which would not invoke
the Schonfeld doctrine, from "organized attempts by the defendants to prevent union members
sympathetic to Plaintiff from expressing their views." The court pointed out that:
[i]n addition to relating ... instances of physical intimidation directed at [the
elected local president] and her supporters, the complaint describes a series of actions by the defendants designed to monopolize communication and power within
the union, and to take physical control of the union building . .

.

.Moreover, the

nature, intensity and extent of the defendants' scheme, including [physical threats],
and the attempts to block her normal channels of communication with other members during the period before the vote on the proposed constitutional amendments,
the planned disruption of. . .meetings designed to frustrate union members from
supporting Johnson, and the seizure of the union building, would strongly tend to
chill union members who desired to exercise their rights in a fashion disapproved by
the [rival] faction.
Id. at 537.
If there really are physical attempts to prevent union members from expressing their political views, there is no need to invoke the Schonfeld doctrine. If it is these actions, directed at
members' rights, that state a claim under § 102, with the removal of the officer also being
actionable only because it was a part of the whole plan to suppress dissent, then the doctrine
should not apply to Newman II, or Cotter, where neither the members nor the removed official
had these rights directly eliminated.
230. This is assuming that the court does not apply the Catch-22 logic of Newman I,
which held that the very fact that members are willing to challenge the leadership by continuing to support the removed official demonstrates that the removal has not chilled their rights.
See Newman 1, 570 F.2d at 448-49.
231. Cotter, 753 F.2d at 229.
232. See id. at 226.
233. See id.
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prevent the members, not simply from speaking and assembling, but
from effectively challenging the incumbent's control of union policy
and positions.
Cotter was removed precisely because his committee membership was important, a key workplace issue was involved, and Fight
Back could potentially use his position to legitimize their views. And
it is precisely for these reasons that removing Cotter would hinder
the ability of dissidents to change union policies and replace the current leadership. Effects such as these constitute the suppression of
effective dissent.
The Cotter court cannot explain what actions violate the Title I
rights of the members under Schonfeld because it hasn't any idea of
the role that lower-level officials play in creating and leading alternatives to incumbent leaderships. It does not understand the need for
diverse opinions within the union leadership in order to allow membership involvement. Most important, its view of democracy does not
value that diversity.
Cotter says that the safety committee should "reflect" the policies of the present leadership. 234 The union has a legitimate interest
in ensuring that the safety committee's official statements and actions do not contradict those of the elected leadership. But the court
has confused this limited legitimate union interest with the entirely
separate interest of the leadership to maintain power. There is no
indication that Cotter did anything contrary to this limited interest
of the union. He was removed because the rank and file group with
which he was associated criticized the union leadership over the crucial safety issue, not because either he or the committee was accused
of any improper actions.
The union-as distinct from its leadership-has no legitimate
interest in hindering the dissemination of those views. The union, not
the present administration, has no legitimate interest in preventing
an opposition group from deriving information on vital issues by
serving on union committees. The union has no interest in refusing to
accept input in formulating safety policy from political opponents of
the leadership. The union, in sum, has no interest in making it easier
for union officials to stay in power and more difficult for an opposition to succeed.
Removing Cotter, removing Schonfeld, and removing Newman,
serves those interests well. However, the law should not help incumbent union leadership maintain a monopoly on communication. It
234. Id. at 228.
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should not fear that the opposition acquire a "bully pulpit." The law
should not assist union leaders to require, as a condition of participation in the union's political life, that each voice reflect a monolithic
agreement on every issue.
Cotter, by allowing the possibility that the removal of an appointed member of a union committee may violate the LMRDA, illustrates the usefulness of the Schonfeld doctrine. In contrast, the
court's inability to articulate any standard for when a removal falls
within the doctrine, its unwillingness to distinguish the interests of
the union from that of the leadership, and its failure to acknowledge,
or perhaps to understand, that the LMRDA requires meaningful democracy outside the formal bounds of Finnegan, all demonstrate the
limitations of the doctrine.
The application of the Schonfeld doctrine also varied greatly
between circuits. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Adams-Lundy v.
Association of Professional Flight Attendants23 5 discussed Schonfeld extensively and recognized the validity of the doctrine. Some of
the court's language implies a broad view of union democracy:
Sometimes, however, one group or faction within a union may
become so entrenched and despotic that the democratic character
of the union is threatened. When that happens, and when the dominant group strives to stifle dissent and efforts at reform within the
union, the rights of union members to belong to an open democratic labor organizationare infringed. As these are the core interests protected by the LMRDA, the Act does provide a remedy in
such a case, even if the particular repressive action challenged is
the removal from office of a political opponent of the dominant
clique-an action not ordinarily comprehended by the terms of
§102.236
But this language is deceptive. The court is merely allowing for
the possibility of a Schonfeld exception for elected officials; and it
turns out that its view of what threatens "the democratic character
of the union" is a circumscribed one. The plaintiffs' allegations were
held insufficient to support their likelihood of success under Schonfeld.23 7 This was despite the fact that the plaintiffs were the majority of the elected local executive board, who had been suspended
from office by the minority faction, in a vote in which the members
of the majority were prevented from participating because they had
235.
236.
237.

731 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1158 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1156.
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a personal interest in the outcome.23 8

The court held that the preliminary injunction granted below
had to be vacated because the plaintiffs had failed to make a prima

facie case that:
their suspension from office was part of a scheme to subvert the
union's basic democratic structure or otherwise directly implicated
rights of members. . . .[T]here is no claim or proof that the defendants are attempting to dismantle the union's electoral system
nor that members opposing that faction are in any fashion suppressed or threatened with reprisals. In other words, the injury
done to the plaintiffs was done to them in their status as officers,
2 39
not in their status as individual members.
To the Court of Appeals, the union's "basic democratic struc-

ture" had not been subverted and its electoral machinery remained
intact; it was just that the results of the elections could be reversed.

The members' right "to belong to an open democratic labor organization" has not been infringed; it has only been redefined.
In contrast, in a series of cases decided between Finnegan and
Lynn, the Ninth Circuit was more willing to find a purposeful
scheme.2 40 Indeed, in its disposition of Lynn,24 the case that the Supreme Court later affirmed on an even broader basis, the Ninth Circuit seemed to say that the very fact that a removed official was
elected was enough to invoke Schonfeld. 42 The court also reserved
238. Id. at 1156. Although the suspended members were a majority, the local president
was part of the minority. While the record is not clear, presumably the parliamentary ruling
that prevented the majority from voting on its own suspension from office was made by the
president and required a supermajority to overrule.
239. Id. at 1159 (emphasis added).
240. Before Finnegan, the Ninth Circuit had held that the retaliatory removal of an
appointed official violated § 609 as well as Title I, without requiring evidence of a plan to
suppress dissent. See Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.
1976); Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964); (holding
that retaliatory reassignment to less desirable location is actionable).
The Ninth Circuit also apparently did not require that the existence of the plan be proven
by "clear and convincing evidence," unlike the Second Circuit. See Cotter, 753 F.2d at 229.
At least in one case, a panel of the Ninth Circuit found that Finnegan had extinguished
the Schonfeld doctrine. In Bloom v. General Truck Drivers Local 952, 783 F.2d 1356 (9th
Cir. 1986), in an inexplicable misreading of Finnegan, the court quoted the Supreme Court's
language that clearly left open the possibility of the Schonfeld exception, and held that it
referred only to the possibility of a cause of action by nonpolicy and nonconfidential employees. The Supreme Court was, beyond any doubt, leaving this open as an additionalpossibility,
apart from the Schonfeld doctrine. Compare Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 440-41 and n.1l with
Bloom, 783 F.2d at 1359 n.3.
241. Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc., 804 F. 2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1986), affid,
488 U.S. 347 (1989).
242. Certainly this was the characterization of Judge Anthony Kennedy, who dissented,
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the issue of the possible application of Schonfeld to the removal of
an appointed official in a way that implied that, at least sometimes,
it did apply.24 s
In Brett v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 879,244 the

court supported the Lynn rationale in saying that "at a minimum an
elected official has a cause of action when he or she suffers a retaliatory removal which occurred as a purposeful and deliberate attempt
to suppress dissent within the union. 2 45 The usual phrasing of the
Schonfeld exception requires that the discharge be "part of" the
purposeful attempt to suppress dissent, which implies (though does
not require) that a series of acts occur apart from the retaliatory
removal. The Ninth Circuit's formulation is a subtle change; it indicates that the removal itself may constitute the attempt to suppress

dissent, and would be illegal if that were its purpose. This is particularly interesting because the facts of Brett did not require it: the case

included allegations of a long history of repressive activities. 246 The
fact that the court holds that "at a minimum" a cause of action
exists in a Schonfeld situation, indicates a broader view on retaliatory dismissals. "It appears to us that the LMRDA goal of union
democracy will be much better served if the membership's elected
representatives may speak out on issues relating to their office witharguing that "the mere fact that Lynn was an elected officer is not sufficient to bring this case
within that exception." 804 F.2d at 1486 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
But in Brett v. Hotel & RestaurantEmployees Local 879, 828 F.2d 1409, 1416 n.l I (9th
Cir. 1987) a different panel of the Ninth Circuit characterized the Court of Appeals' Lynn
holding more cautiously:
We do not hold an elected official always has a cause of action. Instead, we merely
follow Lynn to hold that at a minimum an elected official has a cause of action when
he or she suffers a retaliatory removal which occurred as a purposeful and deliberate attempt to suppress dissent within the union.
828 F.2d at 1416 n.11 (citation omitted).
243. Lynn, 804 F.2d at 1478, n.4 (stating "We do not address the question of when
removal from appointive office, in an attempt to suppress dissent, violates section 102. See
Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 440-41." (emphasis added)).
244. 828 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).
245. Id. at 1416 n.ll.
246. Id. at 1412. Brett claimed that:
[H]er removal was part of a three-year effort by officials of Local 879 to purge
Kay Rollison and her supporters from positions in Union leadership. Rollison, in her
attempts to protest union activities, run for union office, and stay in office once
elected, had been met with a series of illegal obstructions carried out by the Local
and the International.
Id. (citations omitted).
It is possible that the court simply adopted the similar language in the Court of Appeals'
disposition of Lynn, where all the acts alleged were directed against Lynn himself, See supra
note 241 and accompanying text.
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out fear of reprisal from elected officials higher up. '247
With that statement, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Schonfeld, even stretched to its limit, was insufficient to satisfy the statute's intent. The Schonfeld doctrine is irreconcilable with Finnegan
because no removal can violate "membership rights" in the way that
Finnegan conceived of them. The courts that applied Schonfeld were
implicitly, sometimes unconsciously and frequently reluctantly, transcending the formal conception of rights, but they were constrained
by the Supreme Court's delineation.
3. Discipline and the "Incidents of Union Membership"
Finnegan held that the removal of a union official is not "discipline" under section 609 because that term "refers only to retaliatory actions that affect a union member's rights or status as a member of the union. ' '248 This resolution does not provide a framework by
which the question of what constitutes union discipline can be decided in other situations; the reasoning of Finnegan is inapplicable
outside the context of retaliatory removals without creating unacceptable results. In Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers,24 decided
seven years after Finnegan, and less than a year after Lynn, the Supreme Court was forced to invent a second limitation on the statutory meaning of discipline to avoid the consequences of applying Finnegan's separation of membership from officer rights. 250 The
resulting analysis, albeit unintentionally, further weakens Finnegan.
In Breininger, the plaintiff, a rank and file member, claimed
that the union failed to dispatch him from its hiring hall in retaliation for his dissident activities.25' In rejecting this claim, the Sixth
Circuit had relied on the major holding of Finnegan: that the rights
247.

Brett, 828 F.2d at 1415 n.10. In addition to the Fifth Circuit's narrow view of what

effect was necessary to show a purposeful plan, and the Ninth Circuit's more expansive interpretation, some courts seemed uncertain whether the key issue was the union official's motiva-

tion or the effect of their actions. For example, when a secretarial employee who was a union
member was fired after a union election, she claimed she was not discharged "for conflicting
loyalties but merely to make an 'example' of what happens to members supportive of dissi-

dents, thus infringing her rights as a union member." Hodge v. Drivers Local 695, 707 F.2d
961, 964 (7th Cir. 1983). The court dealt with this argument by finding that the evidence
showed that the union was motivated by a desire to have a loyal staff, rather than a general
desire to punish enemies, but did not consider the effect of the action. Neither the parties nor

the court, however, seemed to have explicitly considered the Schonfeld doctrine.
248. 456 U.S. at 437 (emphasis in original).
249. 493 U.S. 67 (1989).
250.
251.

Id. at 91.
Id at 71-72.
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guaranteed by Title I were only rights of "members." '2 52 The Sixth
Circuit applied this reasoning to Breininger's section 609 claim,
which depended on his having been disciplined for "exercising any
right to which he is entitled" by the LMRDA. 2 3 As the Supreme
Court characterized the decision below:
The Court of Appeals reasoned that because "[h]iring hall referrals ... are available to nonmembers as well as to members," and

the hiring hall was not an exclusive source of employment for sheet
metal workers, petitioner did not suffer discrimination on the254basis
of rights he held by virtue of his membership in the union.
The Court did not adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals.
Nor did it accept the argument of the petitioner that "Congress
could not have intended to prohibit a union from expelling a member
of the rank-and-file from a members-only hall for his political opposition to the union leadership, but to permit the leadership to impose
the same sanction if the hiring hall included a few token non-members as well."255
Instead, the Court declared that it:
[N]eed not decide the precise import of the language and reasoning
of Finnegan ... because we find that by using the phrase "other-

wise discipline," Congress did not intend to include all acts that
deterred the exercise of rights protected under the LMRDA, but
rather meant instead to denote only punishment authorized by the
union as a collective entity to enforce its rules ....

The term refers

only to actions "undertaken under color of the union's right to control the member's conduct in order to protect the interests of the
union or its membership."'2 58
The Court gave three reasons for its view.257 It explained first
that the enumerated forms of discipline in the statute (fines, expulsions, and suspensions) "imply some sort of established disciplinary
process rather than ad hoc retaliation by individual union officers. 258 In a footnote the Court hastened to deny any implication
"that 'discipline' may be defined solely by the type of punishment
involved," and acknowledged that it would be "discipline" if the
252. Id. at 90.
253. Id.
254. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 849 F.2d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1988)).
255. Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Scalia, did adopt the Solicitor General's argument, who joined the petitioner as amicus curiae.
256. Id. at 91 (quoting Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 912, 915 (5th Cir. 1976)).
257. The Court seems always to give three reasons, even if there are only two.
258. Breininger,493 U.S. at 91-92.
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union imposed a suspension of hiring hall referrals as a "sentence" to
"punish a violation of union rules. ' 2 59 If this is so, then the distinction between "discipline" barred by section 609 and those "acts that
deterred the exercise of rights protected under the LMRDA" but
which Congress did not intend to prohibit, is simply the existence of
formal proceedings. 26 0 The Court, in the same footnote, denies this
as well, in a passage which seems to vitiate what the Court has just
said:
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion ... we do not hold that disci-

pline can result only from "formal" proceedings, as opposed to "informal" or "summary" ones. We note only that Congress' reference to punishments typically imposed by the union as an entity
through established procedures indicates that Congress meant "discipline" to signify penalties applied by the union in its official capacity rather than ad hoc retaliation by individual union officers.261
If this statement means the individual action of a vindictive
union official may not be charged to the union, then it is only a recognition that the LMRDA is meant to promote and protect union
democracy, and not simply provide a federal cause of action for private disputes. But such a recognition would entail an analysis of
each claim in its factual setting. The plaintiff in Breininger was not
alleging this sort of private dispute. He was claiming that the union
hierarchy was discriminating against him, though without formal announcement, because of activities protected by Title I of the
LMRDA.262 It is hard to believe that Congress could have meant to
so severely limit the union leadership's right to formally discipline
members, both by the substantive bar of section 609 and the procedural requirements of section 101(a)(5), 263 but simultaneously was
willing to allow punishment without any limitations so long as the
union did it informally and secretly. Nor does the "expansive lan259. Id. at 92 n.15.
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 98-99. The dissent noted:
At this pleading stage, petitioner's allegations must be accepted as true and his
complaint may be dismissed "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under
any set of facts that could be consistent with the allegations." Petitioner alleges
"that in failing to refer him for employment... the defendant, acting by and
through its present business manager, David Williams, and its present business
agent, Michael Duffy, 'have otherwise disciplined' plaintiff." The union's abuse of
the hiring hall system is further said to have "been part of widespread, improper
discipline for political opposition."
Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
263. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(5), 529 (1988).
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of both sections 101(a)(5) and 609 support the Court's

view. The safeguards of the first section are required whenever discipline is imposed by the "organization or by any officer thereof."28
Even more telling, section 609 prohibits discipline for improper reasons by "any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward,
or other representative of a labor organization.... 2 6 If Congress
had been concerned with discipline only in the narrow sense to which
the Court has limited it, the emphasized words would be unnecessary. 267 As Justice Stevens, dissenting from this aspect of Breininger,
put it: "It is inconceivable that a statute written so broadly would
not include such sanctions within its compass. '"288

An echo of Finnegan appears in the Breininger Court's second
reason for excluding the union's acts from the meaning of "discipline". The Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended
264. Breininger, 493 U.S. at 97 (Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
265. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(1988) (emphasis added).
266. See 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1988) (emphasis added).
267. Nor is it credible that Congress meant to exclude economic retaliation by unions
from the definition of discipline. The Court's evidence for this is that an early Senate version
of the statute included criminal penalties both for improper discipline and for using
force or violence or ... economic reprisal.... [T]he fact that even in an earlier bill
improper discipline by a labor organization was listed separately from economic
coercion by any person shows that the Senate believed that the two were distinct
and that it did not intend to include the type of unauthorized "economic reprisals"
suffered by petitioner in the instant case in its definition of "discipline." Breininger,
493 U.S. at 93-94.
There are a number of things wrong with this reasoning. First, of course, this draft did
not pass; perhaps it did mean exactly what the Court thinks it meant and that is the reason it
was rejected. I have no evidence whatsoever for this; the Court has none to indicate that the
rejected draft reflected Congress' intentions.
Second, the legislative history that does exist indicates that the Court's interpretation is
exactly the opposite of Congress'. The second part of the provision, but now limited to "force
or violence" and not mentioning "economic coercion," became § 610 of the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. § 530, and like its predecessor, it is an exclusively criminal provision. The removal of
the reference to economic coercion was explained by Rep. Griffin, introducing the draft that
did pass: "[W]e believe the quoted language is too vague for criminal enforcement and further
that the activity proscribedis covered and should be prohibited under the phrase 'orotherwise
discipline' in Section 609 where civil remedies are available for enforcement." 105 CoNG.
REc. 14,346 (July 27, 1959)(emphasis added). I am indebted to Prof. Summers for bringing
this legislative histoiy to my attention.
In addition, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the earlier provision was "addressed to attempts to interfere with rights protected by the substantive provisions of Title I and not to the
arbitrary imposition of discipline at which the procedural provisions were aimed." Breininger,
493 U.S. at 96, n.4 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Finally, it should be obvious that even if Congress thought that not all forms of economic
coercion were forms of discipline, it does not then follow that Congress thought that no form of
economic coercion was discipline. A fine is both; uniformly requiring kickbacks of all members
who wish to be referred to a job is not discipline.
268. 493 U.S. at 98, (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that the formalized procedure set forth in section 101(a)(5) occur
each time before the union hiring hall failed to refer a member for a
job.2169 If this failure to dispatch is "discipline" within the meaning
of section 609, and if "discipline" means the same in sections 609
and 101(a)(5), then such a formal procedure might seem to be
required.
The simplest answer to this problem is that it is a problem created by the forms of legal reasoning imposed by courts, and not one
created by Congress or that would come up in the real world. It is
perfectly rational-even if it violates some sense of symmetry-to
believe that a union's refusal to refer a member from the hiring hall,
in retaliation for political views, constitutes "discipline" under both
sections, but that the failure to provide the formal procedures normally required is not an independent violation of the law because
those procedures are impossible under the circumstances.
But even this explanation is in fact unnecessary. The Court's
reasoning in Breininger is simply a non-sequitur: The union has done
something which, because of its summary nature, precludes the application of the procedures of section 101(a)(5). Therefore, what the
union did could not have been discipline.2 7 0 It makes more sense to
analyze the events in a different way. The union has punished a
member in a manner-by failing to dispatch him from a hiring
hall-that can never be appropriate legal discipline. 27 1 The union is
not entitled to punish a member2 72 in this way under any circumstances. The source of this prohibition is not the LMRDA but the
National Labor Relations Act. 273 This is true even if the member
269.

Id. at 93.

270. Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 469 U.S. 517 (1984)(stating that although no pre-deprivation process could reasonably take place, failure to provide post-deprivation remedy would constitute deprivation "without due process of law" under the Fourteenth Amendment).

271. Neither the employer nor the union may affect the employment relationship based
on internal union activities since these activities are protected by § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1988); see Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); In re Nu-Car Carriers,
88 N.L.R.B. 75 (1950) (employer); National Maritime Union v NLRB, 423 F.2d 625 (2d Cir.
1970) (union). The only exception to this involves discipline for the non-payment of dues or

equivalent fees, when such payment is required by the collective bargaining agreement, as the
proviso to § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988) specifies. But in that case,
the procedural requirements of § 101(a)(5) also do not apply, see supra note 33 and accompanying text (enumerating LMRDA § 101 (a)(5)).
Specifically, union administered hiring halls are legal only if they treat union members
and non-members in a nondiscriminatory manner. Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
667 (1961); see GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 664-70 (1976).
272. Or, indeed, a nonmember. See Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944).

273. See Hoisting and Portable Engineers Local 4, 189 N.L.R.B. 366 (1971), enforced
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has received full due process, and it is true even if the union would
be entirely justified in imposing some other form of discipline.274 It is
hard to believe that, if in addition to imposing an illegal punishment,
the union has done so for reasons barred by the LMRDA, that does
not constitute an independent and actionable violation of law. The
fact that the union's failure to provide proper procedures would be
excusable if the union's action had otherwise been proper should not
affect the fact that this form of punishment is prohibited, nor that
the reason for the punishment is also prohibited.2 75 The issue of procedural regularity is thus irrelevant in this situation: compliance with
section 101(a)(5) can never justify the union's refusal to refer the
member from the hiring hall when it is a form of punishment; compliance with section 101(a)(5) is never required when the union's
refusal to refer is not punishment. 6 Similarly, a union official temporarily removed, assertedly because of financial malfeasance, would
not have a claim against the union for failure to provide the prediscipline hearing required by section 101 (a) (5). But that should not
affect her ability to claim that the asserted reasons for the removal
are false, and that the union has violated section 609.
The third reason cited by the Court in Breininger for its narrow
view of the meaning of "discipline" is a peculiarly selective version
of the legislative history of the statute, that points out how earlier
456 F.2d 242 (Ist Cir. 1972).
274. In a sense, then, the Court is right in saying that a refusal to dispatch a member
from a hiring hall is not "discipline," if discipline is understood as encompassing only those
punishments that, for proper cause, and with proper procedures, a union is entitled to impose.
In fact, this is not what the Court means, since it notes that "[e]ven respondent acknowledges that a suspension of job referrals through the hiring hall could qualify as 'discipline' if it
were imposed as a sentence on an individual by a union in order to punish a violation of union
rules." Breininger, 493 U.S. at 92 n.15. I agree with the view that such action would be discipline within the meaning of both §§ 609 and 101(a)(5), but I can think of no circumstance in
which the union would be legally entitled to impose this punishment, except for the nonpayment of dues, when § 101(a)(5) does not apply. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
But see Carpenters Local 1913 (Fixtures Unlimited) 189 N.L.R.B. 521 (1971), enfd mem.,
464 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding such discipline is not unfair labor practice).
275. The Court necessarily recognizes this: the fact that the failure to provide procedural safeguards was excusable does not affect the claim that the failure to dispatch violated
the union's duty of fair representation to Breininger, nor that it might violate §§ 101(a)(1) and
101(a)(2), see infra notes 290-291 and accompanying text. Nor is the inapplicability of §
101(a)(5) relevant to deciding whether the failure to dispatch constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, see 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988). It is only because the Court held in Finnegan that the words "otherwise discipline" mean the same in § 101(a)(5) as in § 609 that the
preclusion of pre-deprivation procedures mandated by § 101(a)(5) is thought to be relevant to
the definition of discipline under § 609. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
276. For example, when a union refuses to dispatch a member (or non-member) because
she has lower seniority in the geographic area than others.
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drafts-drafts that were never passed by Congress-contained language that, like Section 101(a)(5), seem to contemplate that "discipline" would involve formal procedures.2 7 7 Insofar as this history has
any relevance at all, it merely serves to reinforce the first two arguments the Court makes, arguments whose implications the Court 78itself found it necessary to limit, and thereby make unintelligible.
The way the Court handled the Section 609 issue in Breininger
is puzzling at first. It could have said, as Justice Stevens did in dissent, that "[a]s a matter of plain language 'discipline' constitutes
'punishment by one in authority . . . with a view to correction or

training.' 7 9 Union discipline is thus punishment imposed by the
union or its officers 'to control the member's conduct in order to protect the interests of the union or its membership.' "280 This definition

would continue to exclude private vindictive acts by union leaders
from regulation by the LMRDA. But it would change the focus of
the inquiry from the procedures that were followed or from the form
that the discipline took, to whether it was done by the union leadership in order to punish a member for exercising protected rights.
That is, such a definition would require the courts to do exactly what
the statute seems to say they should do.
Instead, the Court adopted a definition of discipline that will
prevent plaintiffs in Breininger's position from claiming a violation of
section 609.81 While that result is unfortunate, and indicates the
Court's inconsistency in treating claims under the LMRDA in the
context of the statute's purpose, the holding also undermines Finne277.

Breininger, 493 U.S. at 92-93.

278. See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text, discussing footnote 15 in Breininger, where the Court denied that it is holding that "discipline can result only from 'formal

proceedings, as opposed to 'informal' or 'summary' ones." 493 U.S. at 92 n. 15.
279. Breininger, 493 U.S. at 97 (Stevens, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 644 (1976)). Justice Stevens

also cited two other standard dictionaries for this meaning.
280. Breininger, 493 U.S. at 97 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 912, 915 (5th Cir. 1976)).

281. See Breininger, 493 U.S. at 70-71. But they will still be able to claim that the
union's retaliatory failure to dispatch from a hiring hall violated the union's duty of fair representation. This was the main issue decided in Breininger. The Court held that Breininger's

allegation stated such a claim, and that the claim was not within the primary jurisdiction of
the NLRB.
In addition, the Court left open the possibility that the union's action could infringe a
member's rights to equal treatment and to free speech and assembly guaranteed by §
101(a)(1) and (a)(2). Breininger had failed to allege that the union's refusal to refer him from
the hiring hall violated the substantive protections of Title I and was therefore actionable
under § 102 independently of § 609. Despite attempts to raise this issue before the Supreme

Court, the Court declined to consider it but expressly left open the possibility of future claims.
Breininger, 493 U.S. at 94 n. 18.
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gan's view of section 609's meaning in the case of retaliatory removals. In a retaliatory removal, whether the procedures followed are
formal or not, the action is almost invariably "authorized by the
union as a collective entity to enforce its rules," and "undertaken
under color of the union's right to control the members' conduct in
' 2 In
order to protect the interest of the union or its membership. 28
those situations, Breininger's definition of discipline is met; nor
would there be any difficulty in according the official a hearing
before her permanent removal. Finnegan's refusal to apply section
609 to retaliatory removals is then left with a single, thin, justification: the exemption of temporary removals from the procedural protections of section 101(a)(5).

sa

Yet, accepting Justice Stevens' view would have had even more
devastating consequences for the Finnegananalysis. If the Court had
held that the treatment of Breininger was indeed "punishment authorized by the union as a collective entity to enforce its rules,' ' 2 4 it
would then have been forced to reach the issue that it had declined
to consider: "the precise import of the language and reasoning of
Finnegan. '285 The issue would then be whether the punishment imposed on Breininger affected his "rights or status as a member of the
union. '28 6 If it did, the union's action would constitute discipline
under the Finnegan definition. The Section 609 holding of Finnegan
would still stand, albeit only on the flimsy support of the single reference in the Conference Report concerning suspensions from office.
The main holding of Finnegan, however, would be left with no rationale. Finnegan rested on the proposition that a removed union official has not had her Title I rights infringed because, although she
may have been punished (though not "disciplined") for exercising
those rights, she can continue to exercise them fully. The union's
action did not prevent Breininger, any more than the Finnegan plaintiffs, from speaking, attending union meetings, or voting.
If Finnegan is right, and cannot convincingly be distinguished,
then Justice Stevens' position in Breininger must be wrong. Justice
Stevens resolved this problem by distinguishing Finnegan, which he
had joined, on the grounds that the right to be referred from a union
hiring hall was a "membership" right, protected by the LMRDA,
282. I obviously do not mean that the removal is in fact in the union's interest, see
supra, text accompanying note 234 (discussing Cotter).
283. See supra, text accompanying note 144.
284. Breininger, 493 U.S. at 91.
285. Id.
286. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 437 (emphasis in original).
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while the right to hold union office was not.
It is clear that since the hiring hall in Breininger was available

on a non-discriminatory basis to non-members of the union, the right
to use the hall was not a membership right in precisely the same

(unreal) sense that the right to hold union office is not a membership
right.28 7 Just as union membership does not give anyone the right to
hold union office, neither does it give any member the right to be

dispatched from the hall. That latter right comes from the collective
bargaining agreement, the authority for which in turn derives from

the exclusivity provision of the NLRA, and legally cannot depend on
union membership status. 288 In neither situation is the "privilege" or
"right" that is at issue (the choice of term determines the outcome)
an attribute of union membership. In both situations, the penalized
person, if a union member, can continue to attend meetings, speak
on union issues, and vote for candidates. The member simply has to
pay a price for exercising these rights.

Because this conclusion is so obviously absurd in situations such
as a hiring hall, it is admirable that Justice Stevens refused to accept

it.289 But he could not, without undercutting the rationale of Finnegan, identify the punishing of Breininger's protected speech and assembly, without more, as an infringement of those rights. Instead, he

was forced to define Breininger's right to be dispatched from the hiring hall as itself a substantive right protected by the equality guarantee of Title .290
287. This was the holding of the Court of Appeals in Breininger, 849 F.2d 997 (6th Cir.
1988).
288. Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) provides that the union
chosen by a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit "shall be the exclusive
representative" of all unit employees.
289. Justice Stevens accepted the argument of the Solicitor General's amicus brief in
Breininger: "Finnegan's conclusion that the Act did not protect the positions and perquisites
enjoyed only by union leaders was surely not intended to narrow the class of benefits, enjoyed
by the rank-and-file, that cannot be withdrawn in retaliation for the exercise of protected
rights." 493 U.S. at 101, (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting brief
of the United States as amicus curiae).
In fact, since eligibility for most appointed union offices is limited to union members,
while the right to be dispatched from a hiring hall is not, the "positions and perquisites enjoyed only by union leaders" comes closer to being an attribute of membership than does the
right to be dispatched. In neither case is membership a sufficient condition to exercise the
"right;" in the case of being dispatched, it is not even a necessary condition.
290. The discriminatory treatment of Breininger should, I believe, be viewed as violating
the guarantees of equal rights of § 101(a)(1) and of speech and assembly of § 101(a)(2), an
issue upon which the Court did not pass, since it was not raised below, see supra, note 281.
But the formalistic view of Finnegan could be applied to this case as well: if the right to be
dispatched is not itself a Title I right, then members in Breininger's position have not had their
equal rights to exercise those rights "infringed". One hopes that the courts will, even if unable
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The majority, protecting Finnegan's formal definition of Title I
rights, but unwilling to join the Court of Appeals in applying that
definition to a situation where its unreality was so apparent, chose to
on the meaning of "discipline" that defies
create a new limitation
291
sense.
common
PART

II: LYNN AND THE NEW DICHOTOMY

The formal view of rights was undercut by the Supreme Court's
decision in Sheet Metal Workers International Association v.
Lynn,29 2 which held that the retaliatory dismissal of an elected union
official violates the LMRDA. But the three problems caused by formalism and the resulting officer/member distinction have only partially been solved.
Edward Lynn was an elected business representative of Local
75 of the Sheet Metal Workers.2 9 a In the year following his election,
"Lynn and other members became increasingly critical of expenditures by the Local's officers and organized a dissident group, which
successfully campaigned to defeat proposals to raise the Local's
dues."2 94 The local officers, including Lynn, then appealed to the International to take whatever action was necessary, including the imposition of a trusteeship, to deal with the local's finances.29 r The International union appointed a trustee, who soon came to the
conclusion that a dues increase was necessary.2 96 Lynn refused to
to abandon Finnegan, reject its extension to an area where its only legitimate rationale-the
vindication of the election results-is plainly inapplicable.
291. I do not mean to imply that the Justices plotted to protect the Finnegan holding. It
is possible, certainly, that the formal view of rights that animated Finnegan also, and independently, led to the resolution of Breininger. But the Court's treatment of the overall issue in
Breininger, whether the punitive failure to dispatch is illegal, implies a willingness to find a
solution so long as it did not require reconsidering Finnegan. The Court did not leave Breininger without a remedy: it reversed the Court of Appeals, and held that he had stated a claim
that the union had breached its duty of fair representation; it also left open the possibility of a
§ 101(a)(2) or § 101(a)(1) claim. See supra, note 281.
I believe the Court's handling of Breininger's § 609 claim was necessarily heavily influenced by the way the Court handled the infringement issue in Finnegan. The resolution of both
issues depends on whether the statute permits placing a penalty on the exercise of protected
rights. It is no accident that the Sixth Circuit decided the discipline issue in Breininger by
relying on the Supreme Court's resolution of the infringement issue in Finnegan, nor that
Justice Stevens' dissenting view in Breiningeris based on the same point, but with the opposite
conclusion from the Court of Appeals.
292. 488 U.S. 347 (1989).
293. Id.
294. Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc., 804 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986),
aff'd, 488 U.S. 347 (1988).
295. Id.
296. Id.
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support the increase without a commitment to reduce expenditures,
spoke against it at the special meeting called to vote on the proposal, 297 and the proposal was again defeated. In response, the trustee

removed Lynn as business representative.2 9 s The Supreme Court
held that the removal violated Title I.

Lynn did not concern union discipline, and so Finnegan's restricted view of the meaning of section 609 remains unaffected.

99

Lynn does overrule decisions holding that even elected officials are
subject to retaliatory removal, which separated the right to be a candidate from the right to win. But these decisions have not become

simply historical curiosities; they manifest more than the inability of
the lower federal courts to anticipate the later twists of Supreme

Court doctrinal analysis. Rather, they indicate an insensitivity, indeed a numbness, to the whole point of the LMRDA. It remains
remarkable that courts could have failed to understand the implications of holdings like Newman POO and Dolan.30 1 Nor was this failure unique. Every court that faced the issue in the years between

Finnegan and Lynn thought Finnegan had some application to
elected officials and most thought it applied fully. 30 2 Even those that

viewed the distinction between elected and appointed officials as significant limited their holdings.30 3 None said, as the Supreme Court
297. Section 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1988), requires a secret ballot vote of
the members to raise local union dues. The Court found that "this critical Title I right does
not vanish with the imposition of a trusteeship." Lynn, 488 U.S. at 358.
298. The union also brought internal charges against Lynn, fining him $2,500, and allegedly refused to dispatch him to employers, and refused to handle his grievance. Lynn, 804
F.2d at 1472. These issues were not before the Supreme Court.
299. Breiningerwas decided after Lynn. On the other hand, the recognition that retaliatory removals violate § 609's prohibition on discipline or that they violate § 102's prohibition
on "infringement" of Title I rights would make unnecessary the resolution of the other issue.
Since Lynn concerned only the infringement issue, the remainder of this article will argue that
the holding of Lynn should be extended to appointed officials, and will not deal with the § 609
problem.
300. Newman I was a pre-Finnegancase, but continued to be cited as precedent. See,
e.g., Kudla v. NLRB, 821 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1987). At least one court read Finnegan as
settling a circuit split in favor of the Newman I holding. See Local 314 v. National Post Office
Mail Handlers, 572 F.Supp 133 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 181-187.
302. See supra note 105. Finnegan itself never discussed whether the holding applied to
elected officials, though much of the language seems to be confined to appointed positions. The
concurrence viewed the holding as limited to "appointed union member-employees who will be
instrumental in evolving the president's administrative policies," citing the Court's cases limiting political patronage under the First Amendment. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 442-43 (Blackmun,
J.,
joined by Brennan, J.,concurring).
303. See, e.g., Kapau v. Yamamoto, 455 F. Supp. 1084, 1090 (D.Haw. 1978), a id, 622
F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1980), (stating that "[p]laintiffs' right to nominate candidates and to vote
in elections would be meaningless if, after having nominated and voted for a successful candi-
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said in Lynn, that removing an elected official for exercising rights
guaranteed to members by Title I violates the LMRDA, even without any showing that the removal was "part of a systematic effort to
stifle dissent within the union. ' 0 4
Lynn's rejection of the need for a "purposeful plan" is a recognition that the development of a doctrine of exception to the membership rights/officer rights dichotomy was only partially successful
in protecting "the rights of union members to belong to an open
democratic labor organization ...[which are] the core interests pro-

tected by the LMRDA."' ° The dissonance between Schonfeld's recognition that the removal of a union official could violate the members' right to political dissent and Finnegan's narrow and formal
description of that right could never be reconciled.
Lynn is a wholesale rejection of that description, a rewriting of
Finnegan that abandons its basic premises, and recasts it as a defense of democratic governance. The logical result of the institutional and structural perspective by which the Court analyzes the
LMRDA in Lynn, however, is not a reaffirmation of Finnegan's conclusions, though limited to appointed officials and for new reasons. If
Lynn's approach to union democracy were combined with a realistic
understanding of the role of appointed officials in creating the conditions in which democracy can flourish, Finnegan would be, not the
rule, but a minor exception necessary to advance democracy in a few
date, they are nevertheless deprived of his services as an elected officer due to defendants'
concerted actions to subvert the results of a valid election.").
The court is careful to link the infringement to the union's "concerted actions to subvert.
an election" and "a calculated and deliberate effort by the defendants to unlawfully deprive
the plaintiffs of some of their Title I rights. . ." Id.
Thus, although the court's analysis certainly implies that the right to nominate and vote
would be "meaningless" without the right to serve in office, it is the "concerted" and "deliberate" attempt by the union to undo a valid election that gives rise to the cause of action under §
102. Kapau is thus a Schonfeld case, albeit a Ninth Circuit version of Schonfeld.
In Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 912, 917 (5th Cir. 1976), the court said that "if Sewell's
recognition that a member retains his statutory rights despite his dual capacity as a member
and a union official or employee is to have meaning, § 412 must provide a remedy for retaliation against a member's exercise of free speech even if he is not punished in his capacity as a
member," (footnote omitted, citing Sewell v. Grand Lodge IAM, 445 F.2d 545, 550 (5th Cir.
1971)). But the Fifth Circuit retrospectively rewrote Miller as a Schonfeld issue in AdamsLundy v. Assn. of Professional Flight Attendants, 731 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1984).
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Lynn, although worded as requiring a "purposeful plan to
suppress dissent," does in fact recognize that "[a]llowing the removal of an elected official for
exercising his free speech rights would in effect nullify a member's right to vote for a candidate whose views he supports." 804 F.2d at 1479, n.7.
304. Lynn, 488 U.S. at -, n.7, 109 S. Ct at 645, n.7.
305. Adams-Lundy, 731 F.2d at 1158.
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unusual circumstances.

6

The Court began its analysis by drastically recharacterizing
Finnegan. Justice Marshall, writing for all but one participating justice,30 7 began by quoting Finnegan on "the basic objective of the
LMRDA: 'ensuring that unions [are] democratically governed and
responsive to the will of their memberships.' "308
"We considered this basic objective in Finnegan,"309 continued
the Court and
[w]e held that the business agents could not establish a violation of
§ 102 because their claims were inconsistent with the LMRDA's
"overriding objective" of democratic union governance. Permitting
a victorious candidate to appoint his own staff did not frustrate
that objective; rather, it ensured a union's "responsiveness to the
mandate of the union election." We thus concluded that the
LMRDA did not "restrict the freedom of an elected union leader
to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own." In rejecting the business agents' claim, we did not consider whether the
retaliatory removal of an elected official violates the
LMRDA ....

310

The distinction between membership rights and officer rights,
the cornerstone of Finnegan'sreasoning, which every court since Finnegan had viewed as central, is not mentioned. Instead, the Court
says the plaintiffs' claims were rejected because they were inconsistent with union democracy. 3 1' The formalism of the distinction is
306. This argument was advanced by the plaintiff in Franza v. IBT Local 671, 869 F.2d
41, 45 (2d Cir. 1989). See infra notes 444-446 and accompanying text (discussing the "Finnegan exception" argument).
307. 488 U.S. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 641. Justice White concurred in the result; Justice
Kennedy did not participate. He had sat on the Ninth Circuit panel below, and had dissented
on the retaliatory removal issue, rejecting the importance of the elected/appointed distinction
and taking a narrow view of the applicability of the Schonfeld doctrine:
[T]he mere fact that Lynn was an elected officer is not sufficient to bring this case
within that exception. At least absent allegations that his suspension was part of a
scheme to subvert the union's basic democratic structure, . .

.,

the injury suffered

by Lynn is primarily connected with his status as an officer, not a union member,
and does not support a claim under the LMRDA.
804 F. 2d 1472, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
308. 488 U.S. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 643 (quoting Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 436)(alteration
made by Lynn Court).
309. 488 U.S. at
.,109 S. Ct. at 643.
310. Id. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 644 (citations to Finnegan omitted).
311. Id. at
, 109 S. Ct. at 643. To bolster this emphasis, the business agents, whose
job included "participation in the negotiating of collective-bargaining agreements, organizing
of union members, and processing of grievances [and] sit[ting] as members of the Stewards
Council, the legislative assembly of the Union," Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 434, are now only the
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given short shrift. It is true, admits the Court, that like the business
agents in Finnegan, Lynn was never prevented from exercising his
Title I rights. 12 But, "[ft]his argument is unpersuasive," because
"the business agents' Title I rights had been interfered with, albeit
indirectly, because the agents had been forced to choose between
their rights and their jobs" and Lynn, too, "paid a price for the exercise of his membership rights." 1 '
Given that in both cases the removed officials' Title I rights had
been interfered with, the decisive question is whether such interference creates a cause of action. And this "must be judged by reference to the LMRDA's basic objective: 'to ensure that unions [are]
democratically governed and responsive to the will of the union
membership as expressed in open, periodic elections.' "1314
The Court thus rejected the idea that penalizing the exercise of
rights is immaterial as long as the rights can still formally be exercised. There is no way to distinguish between the situation faced by
the Finnegan plaintiffs and that faced by Lynn on the basis of the
officer rights/membership rights dichotomy. Instead, the distinction
is based on whether the removal advances union democracy. And,
said the Court, the removal of an elected official does not advance
this basic LMRDA goal:
The consequences of the removal of an elected official are much
different. To begin with, when an elected official. . .is removed
from his post, the union members are denied the representative of
their choice. . .Lynn's removal deprived the membership of 3his15
leadership, knowledge and advice at a critical time for the Local.
In judging the effect of a retaliatory removal within the framework of the statute's mandate to advance union democracy, the
Court has effectively created an irrebuttable presumption that the
retaliatory removal of an elected official is contrary to this goal. Because of the special role of elections, this view is justified. But the
portion of Finnegan that remains, that the removal of an appointed
official for exercising Title I rights does advance democracy is, conelected president's "staff."
312.
313.

488 U.S. at
Id.

_

109 S. Ct. at 644.

314. Id. (quoting Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441) (alteration by the Lynn Court).
315. Id. at -. , 109 S. Ct. at 645. The Court also says that removing an elected official
is more likely to chill the free speech rights of those who voted for him. I do not understand
why this should be so; removing any official from a full time job, it seems to me, would be
equally chilling. See supra text accompanying notes 195-196 and infra text accompanying note
403.
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trary to Lynn's rewriting of Finnegan,almost always unjustified. The
membership rights/officer rights dichotomy that Lynn overturns was
wholly inimical to the institutional perspective of the LMRDA.
However, the new dichotomy that Lynn created, between elected and
appointed officials, does not serve the goals of the statute either.
There are three reasons for this. First, the doctrinal dichotomy
between elected and appointed officials does not correspond to the
rationale offered to explain why it furthers union democracy; in doctrinal terms it is underinclusive. Beyond doctrine, it completely fails
to take into account the role of appointed union officials in creating a
viable opposition; in the real world of union politics it is vastly overinclusive. Finally, it cannot be reconciled with the analysis that the
Court has adopted in a closely analogous area, that of political patronage. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
A.

The New Dichotomy Does Not Correspond to its Rationale

The appointed/elected distinction that Lynn has created does
not correspond to the rationale that the Court has advanced to justify it. Given the model of democracy that the Court has accepted, if
the result in Finnegan is pro-democratic, then the removal of elected
officials can also be pro-democratic, and this is most true in situations such as presented in Lynn. The reasoning of Finnegan, as described in Lynn, directly contradicts the Lynn holding.
On the logic of Finnegan it would be proper to remove from
office an official elected by a small constituency, for example a local
president, whose otherwise protected speech or actions displease (or
display "disloyalty" to) an official whose mandate is far wider (for
example, the International President). This becomes apparent if the
situation of the Teamsters local in Finnegan is applied to a national
union arena. Suppose a newly elected national president found his
positions criticized by the long-time president of an important local,
who had supported the defeated national incumbent. Suppose the
victorious challenger had run on a pledge to enter into joint cooperative programs with management, which the local president opposed.
Unless the law recognizes the institutional value of diverse and competing voices in the leadership of the union, the fact that a relatively
small group of members had elected the local president should be
outweighed by the desire of the democratically elected national president to have local officers who will carry out his policies-policies
which a majority of the whole membership can be presumed to
favor. (After all, a substantial number-though a minority-of the
local members voted for the defeated incumbent who had appointed
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the fired business agents in Finnegan; that fact played no role in the
Court's analysis.).
Lynn itself could have been interpreted this way. The national
president of the union, chosen to represent the entire Sheet Metal
Workers' membership, removed a business representative from office
in a single local that was financially endangered.31 The removal was
motivated by the business representative's open opposition to the
union's policy that was meant to put the local on a sound financial
footing. The national president's mandate, we can presume, reflected
a desire of a majority of the entire membership that his policies,
including his financial policies, be implemented.
A court that identifies "the union" with the highest level of bureaucracy involved could, faithful to the analysis of Finnegan, even
as rewritten by Lynn, decide in both examples that the national president's removal of the local official was a vindication of the democratic process Congress meant to protect. That result would
strengthen the one-party state even more.
Fortunately, Lynn, by its express terms, almost completely forecloses such a result a1M but that is because the holding in Lynn implicitly requires a model of democracy that values diversity and pluralism, rather than the centralized model of democracy implicit in
Finnegan. The Lynn Court's characterization, in dicta, of the ability
of an elected union leader to remove appointed staff at will as prodemocratic is made without considering what structures a democratic system would require. It is possible to have a political system
in which a distinction between the ability to remove elected and appointed officials is reasonable. American political life until recently
presented a model in which patronage dismissals were acceptable for
lower level appointed officials but would not have been allowed for
elected officials.318 However, the American political system, on which
the LMRDA was modeled, suggests that the distinction between
elected and appointed officials derives its significance from the struc316. The trustee, rather than the international president removed Lynn, but the trustee
109 S. Ct. at 642. In any event,
was clearly the agent of the president. See 488 U.S. at -,
the direct removal of Lynn without the imposition of a trusteeship would have been, if anything, less likely to have been accepted by the Court.
317. The Court expressly rejected the need to establish that the retaliatory removal of

an elected official was part of a Schonfeld scheme. Lynn, 488 U.S. at -,

n.7, 109 S.Ct. at

645, n.7. I can think of no way of distinguishing the Lynn holding from any future case, except

perhaps the extremely thin argument that the particular speech for which Lynn was removed
involved a vote on a dues increase, a subject specifically covered by Title I. I cannot imagine a

court that reads Lynn accepting such a distinction.
318.

See infra text accompanying notes 346-383.
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tural distribution of power. The multiplicity of elected offices in civil

society, based first on the division of executive from legislative powers,319 on functional distinctions (school board, mayor), on geographical differences (school district, county commission), on levels of government (county attorney, state attorney general) and on federalism

(which includes elements of the other distinctions), does not simply
reflect a desire for local autonomy or regionalism; this structure is
based in part on a belief that the dispersion of power promotes di-

verse views among the holders of power and therefore serves as a
check on the growth of power.

While unions have always had elected local officials, and most
have intermediate bodies such as regions or districts, 2 0 these geo-

graphically-based distinctions are usually the only diffusion of
power. 321 There is no division between union executive and legislative
3 22
powers, and effectively no independent judicial function.
If this centralized model is a form of democracy (the imperial
democracy of a Napoleon III, perhaps, or the "shareholder democ-

racy" of the modern public corporation), it can only be because the
electorate as a whole has delegated its powers to the victorious candidate to do with as he sees fit; the model does not include represen-

tation of those sections of the electorate who have lost the (single)
general election. Within this centralized model, the ability to remove
319. And in many cases from the power delegated to an elected judiciary as well.
320. Title III of the LMRDA, which limits both the reasons for which, and the procedure by which, a subordinate union body may be placed in trusteeship is evidence that the
statute is concerned to some degree with protecting local autonomy. But that general concern
nonetheless allows a union to create as centralized a structure as it chooses, in sharp contrast
to the elaborate dispersion of power in the political arena.
321. Some unions provide for the representation of industry groupings, for example,
aerospace workers in the United Auto Workers and airline workers in the Teamsters. But this
is usually done by the appointment of an elected national union official to head an industry
"division" or "council;" in most cases such a division only groups already existing locals. Similarly, when industrial unions such as the UAW provide for the representation of skilled workers, who are incorporated within plant-wide locals, this is not accomplished by allowing the
skilled workers separately to elect top union leaders.
322. As Professor Summers has written:
[O]ligarchic control leads to and is reinforced by centralization of control. The incumbent officers seek to enlarge their functions, often in the name of increasing
efficiency and strengthening the union to enable it to deal more effectively and rationally with employers. The effect is to increase the bureaucracy, which feeds on its
own hunger . . . . Centralization is at the expense of subordinate units which lose
their autonomy of finance and function. Leaders of subordinate units lose their independent power bases and their ability to challenge the central administration. The
bureaucratic structure becomes monolithic, leaving little room for multiple centers
of independent political power.
Summers, supra note 53 at 98.
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lower level elected officials who represent only a part of the constituency of the higher official advances democracy in the same way as
the ability to remove appointees; it is not possible to distinguish the
claim that removing the Finnegan plaintiffs is pro-democracy from
the claim that removing Lynn for opposing the dues increase is prodemocracy.
As the next sections of this article demonstrate, the ability of an
elected official to remove appointees could be pro-democratic in the
sense that the Court presumably means only if there are competing,
stable, opposition groups whose power is, in the long term, approximately equal to that of the incumbent party.
B. Real Democracy Requires Effective Opposition: the Role of
Lower-Level Officials
The second reason for rejecting the notion that Finnegan advances union democracy is that, even as to appointed officials, the
Finnegan situation is the rare exception in the real world of union
politics. In the great majority of situations, the authority of an
elected official to remove an appointed official in retaliation for her
speech does not protect democracy, it preserves the one-party state.
There are several related aspects to this point. Victories by nonincumbents (unless they are the chosen successors of incumbents)
are rare and the need to insure that the staff carries out the political
program of the newly elected officials can be met in more limited
ways that comport with the language and intention of the LMRDA.
Most important, because of the role of appointed officials in many
unions, the Finneganrule is a major inhibition to the development of
opposition groups with a substantial possibility of success.
The situation that Lynn and Finnegan purport to describe,
where the authority of a newly elected official to remove the appointees of the old administration is necessary in order to carry out the
mandate of the electorate, is unusual first of all simply because victories by dissident candidates are unusual. Even if the Finnegan rule
helped advance democracy in those unusual cases, it would not be
worth retaining if the primary effect of the doctrine is to prevent
those cases from arising more often. It is in large part because of the
decisive importance of the union's appointed staff in creating an
electoral machine that, at the national union level, the defeat of in3 24
cumbents by an outside candidate323 is so rare.
323. See James, supra note 18 at 263-283. By "outside" candidate, I include anyone
who was not chosen by the incumbent leadership, not merely someone who has held no previ-
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Even without Finnegan, the fear that the mandate of a newly
elected officer may be obstructed by holdover appointees is generally

unfounded. If obstruction means continuing to express views contrary to those of the elected officials, then the law indeed should nor-

mally protect the official against retaliation. The union will in fact be
stronger. But if obstructing the political program of the elected lead-

ership means refusing to handle grievances with which the official
disagrees, or not attending meetings, the law should not prevent the
3 25
removal of any official, appointed or elected.

Finnegan is thus rarely needed to allow a newly elected official
to fire the old appointees; but it is an ever present threat to fire the

incumbent's own appointees should they fail to support him on every
issue with sufficient enthusiasm.

This brings us to a more fundamental explanation of why Finnegan does not generally advance democracy: the role of appointed officials in union politics. It is not merely that they are faced with a

dilemma: if they support a candidate, and she loses, they will be
fired. 326 It is that they are under tremendous pressure not to remain
neutral, even if they wanted to. They will be fired, not only for sup-

porting the loser, but for failing to support the winner, and even for
ous major positions in the union.
Courts have only rarely recognized that because of the enormous resource advantages of
incumbency, the LMRDA requires not "neutrality" between entrenched incumbents and their
opponents but an attitude of encouraging diversity:
The function of the law must be to loosen the grip of oligarchy so that those opposed
to the incumbents can make their voices heard and the weight of their opposition
felt. The law's dominant concern must be protecting the rights of the opposition and
reducing the advantages of the incumbents in the political contest. The incumbents
seldom need the aid of the courts; they are more than able to help themselves.
Summers, supra note 53 at 99. One example of this recognition occurred in the Ninth Circuit's disposition of Lynn. In distinguishing a case that allowed the retaliatory discharge of an
elected official during a trusteeship, the court mentioned, among other differences, that "Buffalow was part of the Local's established leadership, rather than head of a dissident group like
Lynn." Lynn, 804 F.2d at 1480 n.8.
324. The recent, extraordinary victory of the Ron Carey/TDU slate in the Teamsters is
the exception that proves the rule. The circumstances of the election were unprecedented. The
Teamster leadership agreed to a membership-wide vote as part of an agreement with federal
prosecutors to drop a RICO suit; the election was held under the close supervision of officials
appointed by the federal court, which severely hampered the bureaucracy's ability to use its
advantage in resources and probably eliminated its ability to miscount the vote itself. In addition, the existence of an established and stable national group such as TDU, which deserves
much of the credit for Carey's victory, is, unfortunately, still a rarity in the union movement.
The argument of this article is that retaliatory discharges makes the creation and growth of
such groups much more difficult, not impossible.
325. See infra note 414 and accompanying text.
326. As Finnegan acknowledged, 456 U.S. at 442.
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failing to support the winner with enough energy.3 27 Almost inevitably, this means that they will be forced to support the incumbent,
and this is truer the higher up the elected position. The result is the
creation of a powerful machine committed to keeping the incumbents in office and giving them an extraordinary advantage against
any opposition. The logical exception to this proposition is itself telling. A business agent, or international representative, may feel
free-indeed may feel compelled-to oppose a local incumbent when
a higher level of the bureaucracy supports the opposition. Thus, local
presidents who oppose the policies of their international presidents,
or of their regional directors, may indeed find themselves with a staff
that obstructs their political program. And typically, Finnegan will
not help them at all-because the staff jobs involved will be controlled at the higher level. 28
Nor is the threat of removal confined to electoral politics or
election periods. The union leadership can remove any appointed official who raises any doubt on any union policy: any criticism of a
proposed collective bargaining agreement, even if confined to a meeting of the leadership; any doubt expressed about the union's political
strategy, or its attitude towards organizing; anything that implies
that other views are legitimate. The Finnegan rule furthers the total
identification of the leadership as the union, and it is effective.3 29
The threat of being fired is clearly a restriction of the right to
speak or vote, often far more so than the threat of being shoved
around or having one's tires slashed. This is most true when the official position is a full-time job, usually higher paid, more interesting,
with far more control, than the regular job that the official has left.
Often the fired union official can return to that job, but not
always.330
327. See Hodge v. Drivers Local 695, 707 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1983), where the plaintiff
attempted to distinguish Finnegan on the grounds that she had been fired not for open support
of the leadership's opponents but for her neutrality. The court held that this was irrelevant
since the leadership could choose whatever staff it considered loyal.
328. This was the situation in which Ed Sadlowski found himself when he was elected
(after election rigging to keep him out) to the Directorship of the largest District in the Steelworkers union. See James, supra note 18 at 344.

329. It also assures that a union leader will have difficulty finding out what the members
are actually thinking, even if he wants to. The phenomenon of the isolated autocrat, from
corporate executives to Stalin, is well known. See Summers, supra note 53 at 106.
330. The retaliatory removal may for example cause the loss of superseniority. See, e.g,,

Brett v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Local 879, 828 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987).
Long term full-time union officials may no longer be entitled to leave from their original employer; some may have had their old job eliminated, or their original employer may have gone

out of business.
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Even when the official position is unpaid or barely paid as is the
case with most shop stewards, 331 or posts such as members of union
committees,3 32 the loss of these positions involves a penalty. Sometimes the perquisites of such union jobs are substantial-though
often those benefits may not be obvious to the outsider. Anyone who
has every worked on an assembly line understands the value of
spending a day or two a month showing safety films, or raising
3 33
money for the Torch Drive, or even sitting grievances .
The loss of these sorts of benefits is a penalty that the individual
union official suffers. But there is a far greater penalty-a penalty to
the union and to the possibility of democracy. Lower-level union positions are the place, usually the only place, where potential leaders
of an opposition can develop political skills, become known to, and
come to know, larger numbers of members, and create networks
among themselves than can become an alternative leadership. It is
often in lower level union positions that active and concerned members, anxious to be involved in the union, become opponents of the
leadership, as they experience frustration with the bureaucracy's
methods and results.3 4 Union members who are most dissatisfied
with their wages or working conditions, and are most willing to attempt to change these, are more likely to attend union meetings, to
walk picket lines during strikes, to be willing to participate in rallies,
hand out union leaflets, staff telephone banks. Their lack of apathy,
their militancy, is viewed initially by the leadership in all but the
most corrupt unions as exactly what the union needs. They are the
people most likely to be appointed to low-level union positions, 33 5 or
sometimes elected either informally or formally by small work
groups.3 3 6
In those positions, these militants, far more than other members, are confronted by the policies of the higher officials of the local,
or of the national union.3 37 Often, these policies come to be seen as
part of the problem, as a barrier to fighting the employer, or even as
331.

See, e.g., Newman v. Local 1101, CWA (Newman 1), 570 F.2d 439, 448 (2d Cir.

1978) (removed steward received $20 for each of four union meetings per year to cover
expenses).
332. See, e.g., Cotter v. Owens, 753 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
333. See, e.g., Cehaich v. UAW, 710 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1983) (benefits representative

received regular pay from employer).
334. See, e.g., D. LA BOTZ, supra note 48 at 144-46.
335. See, e.g., D. LA BOTZ, supra note 48 at 63-4. This is the main reason why prevent-

ing retaliatory removals matters even without requiring non-partisan hiring initially.
336. See, e.g., D. LA BOTz, supra note 48 at 46-48.
337. See, e.g., D. LA BOTZ, supra note 48 at 70-71.
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actual support for the employer. For some, the frustration of feeling
that "the union" is an indifferent or even hostile force results in
dropping out, in a return to "apathy." But for others, it leads to a
determination, perhaps beginning over a single issue, to change the
union. Becoming an opponent of the union leadership is thus usually
a process, and the process often takes place while occupying lowlevel, often appointed, union positions. It is precisely for that reason
that union hierarchies want to control these positions.
Penalizing union officials for speaking and voting thus not only
"chills" their willingness to exercise those rights; it severely hinders-often prevents-the formation of an alternative body of political leaders. It preserves the one-party state by making loyalty to the
party the only means to be heard, because disloyalty is punished by
the loss of legitimacy, and by confinement to a marginal role in the
political life of the union.
Allowing the retaliatory removal of appointed officials thus
weakens democracy in two important ways. It allows the incumbents
to create a powerful political machine, with financial, organizational,
and time resources that opponents will be unable to match. And it
prevents some of the most likely participants, if not leaders, of an
opposition movement from developing in that direction, thereby-in
many cases-preventing the formation of any opposition at all.
Are there not, nonetheless, situations where the rule of Finnegan does advance the primary goal of the democraticization of unions, where abolishing it could lead to a kind of "tenure" in an appointed post? The argument that barring retaliatory removals would
create a sort of civil service is a red herring. As will be discussed
more fully, the LMRDA itself creates a standard by which removals
of union officials may be measured; that standard is grounded on a
distinction between the legitimate interests of the union and that of
the leadership." 8 In those rare cases where the political agreement
of an official with the leadership serves a legitimate interest of the
institution as a whole, then such agreement may be required. In a
situation where the union can show that the retaliatory removal is
necessary to advance democracy, a "Finnegan exception" would be
justified."3 9
The example that seems to require this is the post of business
agent in some unions, especially the Teamsters, that is both ex338.
339.

See infra note 391 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 444-446 and accompanying text (discussing "Finnegan exception"

doctrine).
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tremely powerful and locally appointed. 340 Finnegan himself was one
of these. It is understandable that a successful insurgent candidate

would feel a need to remove his opponent's loyalists from control of
such crucial positions. 41 The solution to this problem that is not only
consistent with the statute but with the political goals of these victo-

342
rious dissidents, is that these jobs should be elected, not appointed.

340. The Teamsters Union, contrary to popular perceptions, is in some ways far less
centralized than other major American unions, though, of course, this relative decentralization
has not coincided with democracy. While the Teamster constitution provides the General President with almost unlimited powers, since the days of Jimmy Hoffa no Teamster president has
been able--or perhaps even wanted-to create a single powerful central authority. Instead, the
various regional powers in the IBT, sometimes reflecting the backing of rival criminal organizations, have functioned more on the model of powerful feudal barons, some (like the Dukes of
Burgundy), achieving as great power as the kings to whom they owed nominal allegiance. It
was the inability of the Teamster bureaucracy to function as a united political machine that
was one of the causes of the stunning victory of Ron Carey and his TDU-backed slate in
December, 1991.
341. Professor Pope has suggested that a newly-elected administration should be exempt
from a general restriction on removing certain officials, such as business agents. See Pope,
supra note 110. While there is much to recommend viewing this situation as an example of the
rare case where a retaliatory removal advances democracy, there are also many problems.
When the leadership of an international union uses all its resources to prevent the reelection of
an incumbent local dissident, the newly installed local president, loyal to the international,
would then be able to fire the holdover appointees, and help insure that the dissidents never
win again. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
The career of Harold Leu, the local president whose firing of the holdover business agents
in Finnegan was approved by the Supreme Court as a vindication of the mandate of the electorate, presents another cautionary example. He went on to become the head of the Ohio Conference of Teamsters (Jackie Presser's old bailiwick), and was the candidate for International
Secretary-Treasurer on the slate endorsed by the incumbent Teamster leadership.
It is difficult to articulate a convincing interpretation of the statute that would allow distinguishing situations where a newly-elected administration's ability to remove holdover appointees encourages opposition and pluralism in the union as a whole from those where it
would serve the opposite purpose.
Given the fact that one of the major problems with the appointees of entrenched leaders
in unions like the Teamsters is that these appointees tend not to do very much to earn their
pay (that is, that these jobs tend to become sinecures for loyalists and sometimes for the administration's "muscle"), a simple requirement by the new administration that these holdovers
do their job will end by justifying the removal of many of them. This is equally true at the
national level: perhaps the first task of Ron Carey's "transition team" might be to ask each
national Teamster functionary what his job is supposed to be. One may presume that while
most (though probably not all) could answer that question, the relationship of the daily functioning of many of them to their supposed job description would be sufficiently distant as to
justify discharge even under a "just cause" standard.
342. The demand for elected business agents and stewards has probably been the single
reform that Teamsters for a Democratic Union has fought for the longest and most consistently. See D. LABOTz, supra note 48 at 79 (First TDU national campaign was for democratic
local bylaws; "[a]t the top of the list of bylaw reforms was the right to elect union stewards
and business agents.") The Teamster leadership's response to the TDU campaign was to have
the union constitution amended to prohibit locals that had not yet done so from amending their
bylaws to provide for these posts to be elected. See TEAMSTER CONSTITUTION, art. XXII, § 8
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Keeping these powerful patronage positions as they are only leads to
the perception that the newly elected outsiders-like the old guard
they have replaced-are more interested in patronage and privileges
than in changing the union. And this perception can become reality-reformers who want to use antidemocratic means to advance
democracy end by recreating the system they meant to abolish. Finnegan as it stands today is not a neutral rule that sometimes helps
union dissidents who win control of a local. It rarely applies to them
and even when it does, these dissidents-if they are serious about
reforming the union-should use other means.343
The problem of retaliatory removals cannot be solved by eliminating appointed positions, however; some union positions, including
membership on various committees, are not suited for formal elections. These posts are often staffed by volunteers because, despite the
advantages of occasional variation in work, they are not sought after.
Often, serving on the local safety committee is viewed as asking for
aggravation: disgruntled members blame the committee for problems
which only the union leadership, rather than the committee, can act
on. And in many jobs, showing oneself as a active union member
brings undesired attention-more careful supervision and tighter
standards-from management. 44
If these offices are not widely sought, why would a union leader
ever try to remove someone who was doing an adequate job? And
why would a safety committee member try to resist being removed? 345 Because, while these sorts of jobs are not desirable in the
(1986). I thank Michael Goldberg for pointing this out to me.

343. The LMRDA of course does not require that these positions become elective; I will
discuss whether appointed business agents like the Finnegan plaintiffs ought to fall within a
"Finnegan exception" below.

In determining whether removal of appointed staff advances democracy in a particular
case, it should be relevant that the new appointees are to serve only on an interim basis until

elections for those posts can be held. For example, when the Miners for Democracy succeeded
in defeating the long-entrenched leaders of the United Mineworkers, they dismissed executive

board members who had been appointed from districts in trusteeship, and appointed a new
board of interim officers who immediately voted to mandate "elections in all districts where
appointed officers had been dismissed." James, supra note 18 at 353. Similarly, it might be
justified for the newly elected national Teamster leadership to remove appointees as part of a
process of making their posts elective.

344. Special treatment on the basis of union activity is of course illegal. It is also almost
universal. Sometimes, when a union is powerful, or perhaps when the employer feels comforta-

ble with the arrangement at which he has arrived with the union, holding a union position can
lead to more favorable treatment in regard to such things as tardiness or the length of breaks.

Lower level union officials who criticize the union's lack of militancy are rarely the beneficiaries of this kind of favorable discrimination.
345.

The danger that an appointed official will somehow use the excuse of free speech to

hold on to a job from which she should be removed because she is not performing satisfacto-
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patronage sense, for the personal advantages they bestow, and while
they may bring the foreman's unwanted careful checking of production figures and time-cards, they are indeed a training ground for
future leadership. It is precisely when a low-level official begins to
realize his potential disagreement with the regime that appointed
him, that the regime sees a need to remove him. It is precisely as an
oppositionist begins to create himself that the regime senses the possibility of his creating an opposition. For the small title of member of
the safety committee creates legitimacy and-equally important, and
perhaps as an aspect of legitimacy-the perceived possibility, perhaps only the thin possibility, that opposition is not completely futile.
It is at that moment that the regime cannot tolerate him.
The benefits to union democracy of allowing emerging union
leaders, oppositionists in the process of developing, to continue in
these appointed posts, despite disagreements with the union hierarchy, must be weighed against the small risk that in rare instances an
appointed official will succeed in keeping a post from which she deserves to be removed. Nurturing the process of creating diverse
voices within the union, even if it is only occasionally manifested, is
surely worth the price.
C. The Analogy of the Political Patronage Cases
The third reason for rejecting the appointed/election distinction
and the survival of Finnegan's formal view of rights is the discordance between that view and analogous areas of the law.
In the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has decided three
political patronage cases, Elrod v. Burns,346 Branti v. Finkel,3 47 and
Rutan v. Republican Party,348 that strongly undercut Finnegan's
mechanical interpretation of the LMRDA. In considering the action
of a governmental body in dismissing 49 and in hiring, promoting,
and transferring 350 public employees based on their political activities or affiliation, these cases reject both the foundations of the
Court's retaliatory removal jurisprudence. They reject the "illegal
conditions" aspect of Finnegan: the formal and unreal logic that refrily, the "tenure" problem, is even more remote in situations such as these, since the motiva-

tion to keep the position is primarily political. And in the unlikely event that such an occurrence does come to pass, it is hard to see how the democratic process has been seriously

harmed.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
445 U.S. 507 (1980).
U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 347; Branti, 445 U.S. at 507.
Rutan, U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2729.
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uses to see that punishing the exercise of a protected right is often as
effective a means of preventing the exercise of that right as a direct
prohibition. And they also reject the rights/privilege strand of Finnegan: the view that, since there is no legal right to hold union office,
the union may remove an official for any reason. The reasoning of
these cases removes the doctrinal underpinnings of Finnegan.
The Court rejected out of hand the argument that because public employees can continue to exercise their First Amendment rights,
adverse employment decisions based on exercising those rights were
not unconstitutional:
This is not credible. Employees who find themselves in dead-end
positions due to their political backgrounds are adversely affected.
They will feel a significant obligation to support political positions
held by their superiors, and to refrain from acting on the political
views they actually hold, in order to progress up the career ladder.
Employees denied transfers to workplaces reasonably close to their
homes until they join and work for the Republican Party will feel a
daily pressure from their long commutes to do so. And employees
who have been laid off may well feel compelled to engage in
whatever political activity is necessary to regain regular paychecks
and positions corresponding to their skill and experience. 351
And, while the retaliatory removal cases say that Congress did
not want to create a system of tenure for union employees, the Court
has more recently said that while "[t]he First Amendment is not a
tenure provision, protecting public employees from actual or constructive discharge," it "prevents the government, except in the most
compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with
its employees' freedom to believe and associate." 351 The Court has
351. Id. at.., 110 S. Ct. at 2736 (footnote omitted); compare with Bloom v. General
Truck Drivers, 783 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "[a]n indirect burden on
membership rights, such as a forced choice between expressing one's opinion and losing one's
job, is insufficient to state an LMRDA claim.").
352. Rutan at __,
I10 S.Ct. at 2737-38; see also id. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2740
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 56768, (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.)):
[R]ecognition of plaintiff's claims will not give every public employee civil service
tenure and will not require the state to follow any set procedure or to assume the
burden of explaining or proving the grounds for every termination. It is the former
employee who has the burden of proving that his discharge was motivated by an
impermissible consideration. It is true, of course, that a prima facie case may impose a burden of explanation on the State. But the burden of proof will remain with
the plaintiff employee and we must assume that the trier of fact will be able to
differentiate between those discharges which are politically motivated and those
which are not.
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said that the lack of legal entitlement to a job transfer or promotion

is "beside the point. '3 53 Penalizing the exercise of constitutional

rights, especially freedom of speech, is unconstitutional.3 54 Thus,

even if Congress had meant to create a sharp distinction between
protected membership rights and unprotected officer rights, it is impossible to reconcile the political patronage cases with allowing the

removal of a union official for exercising rights that Congress indisputably did intend to protect. Although the Constitution does not

give anyone the right to have a government job, it does require the
government not to penalize constitutionally protected activity. In
precisely the same way, the LMRDA which does not give any union
member the right to union employment, forbids the union from pe-

nalizing activity protected by the statute. Just as the Court has recognized that attaching an "unconstitutional condition" to receiving
or maintaining government employment is itself unconstitutional, the

Court should recognize that attaching an "illegal condition" to holding union office is itself illegal.
1.

The Appropriateness of the Analogy

The analogy of the political patronage cases to the retaliatory

removal decisions is a powerful one. This power does not derive
solely from the fact that every argument that the Court has accepted
as determinative in the patronage cases applies with equal or greater
force to retaliatory removals; and moreover that every argument ac-

cepted by the Court in Finnegan applies equally to the political
arena-and has been rejected. The power derives from the conscious
decision of Congress to model Title I of the LMRDA on the Bill of
Rights, and specifically to model section 101(a)(2) on the First
Amendment. That decision reflects something more than the obvious

political attractiveness of the concept.
353.

Rutan, -

U.S. at

-,

55

It also recognizes the rela-

110 S. Ct. at 2736.

354. The Court has used the identical passage three times to stress this point:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there
are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
110 S. Ct. at 2736 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
Rutan, __
U.S. at -,
597 (1972)) (emphasis added). The same language is quoted in Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360-61
(plurality opinion) and in Branti, 445 U.S. at 514-15.
355. The argument that Title I would merely give members within their unions the
rights enjoyed by all Americans in society surely made it more difficult to vote against passage.
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tionship between political democracy and the protection of speech
and assembly. Because the commitment to political democracy of the

Constitution and of the LMRDA are analogous, the methods by
which

the democratic

process

is to

be protected

are

also

analogous. 5 6
However, there are differences between the proper way to analyze limitations placed on the government by the Constitution and
limitations placed on a union by the LMRDA. The language of the
Constitution is different from that of the statute, and they do not
operate in equivalent spheres. In addition, the special role of the
Constitution as the ultimate source of law, combined with the special
role of the judiciary in interpreting it, have led to the evolution of
doctrines of judicial interpretation which may not apply to a statute.
When these three interrelated differences are examined, however,
they are either irrelevant to the applicability of the patronage cases
in the interpretation of the LMRDA, or actually strengthen the argument that Finnegan cannot be reconciled with them.

One possible distinction involves examining the purpose of the
LMRDA provisions and of the First Amendment. The political paThe original McClennan amendment to introduce the Bill of Rights passed the Senate only by
the tie-breaking vote of the Vice-President.
356. That is why the political patronage cases are more useful in analyzing the retaliatory removal cases than are cases decided under various anti-discrimination laws, even though
those cases also uniformly reject the rights/privilege distinction.
It is a truism that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988 and Supp. 1992), and similar anti-discrimination laws prohibit adverse employment decisions based on race, gender, and other proscribed categories even if the employee
has no entitlement to being hired or promoted. The NLRA itself, in § 8(a)(3) prohibits discrimination by an employer to "encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization," 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
There is also a societal goal in anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII. They do not
exist simply to protect individual rights. Nonetheless, there is a distinction between such antidiscrimination laws and laws that are aimed at the political process itself.
Similarly, all of § 8(a) is meant to protect the exercise of the rights guaranteed by § 7, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1988), which are clearly intended to protect a collective process. Nonetheless,
the analogy of the discrimination prohibition of § 8(a)(3) to the prohibitions of §§ 101(a)(l)
and 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA is not as clearcut as is the analogy of the political patronage
cases. This is because the commitment to political democracy in the union and in society is
analogous. Unfortunately, there is no such commitment to industrial democracy in the NLRA,
or at least no such commitment has been recognized for many decades.
The cases that recognize the government's right to restrict the political rights of public
employees deal with another side of the problem. See, e.g., C.S.C. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973). They are a different method of limiting the distortion of the political process
through patronage. This method is inappropriate for low-level union officials, because it would
remove a major source of potential oppositional activity. It is, however, quite an appropriate
model in dealing with professional employees of unions. See infra note 365 and accompanying
text.
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tronage cases are based, at least in part, on an individual rights perspective. It is the burden on the individual's exercise of her First
Amendment rights that is the "unconstitutional condition:" "The
cost of the practice of patronage is the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and association. ' 57 Indeed, it is the arguments proffered in defense of the patronage system that emphasize an institutional perspective. Patronage is said to advance the two-party system
and therefore the democratic political process. 8 ' These arguments
were rejected by the Court.
The basis of the argument in the union context is different. The
institutional interest in union democracy requires severe restrictions
on retaliatory discharges. This argument does not depend on the individual rights of union officials. 359
A closer look at the patronage cases shows that the Court recognized that removing the burden on individual rights is closely connected to allowing the political process to function democratically:
It is not only belief and association which are restricted where political patronage is the practice. The free functioning of the electoral process also suffers. Conditioning public employment on partisan support prevents support of competing political interests ....
As government employment . . . becomes more pervasive, the
greater the dependence on it becomes, and therefore the greater
becomes the power to starve political opposition by commanding
partisan support, financial and otherwise. Patronage thus tips the
electoral process in favor of the incumbent party, and where the
practice's scope is substantial relative to the size of the electorate,
the impact on the process can be significant.36
The Court acknowledged the existence of other factors in the
political arena that tend to counteract the importance of pa357. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355 (plurality opinion).
358. "[P]atronage stabilizes political parties and prevents excessive political fragmentation ... ." Rutan, - U.S. at __,
110 S. Ct. at 2752. "[E]liminating patronage will
significantly undermine party discipline; and ... as party discipline wanes, so will the strength
of the two-party system." Id. at
, 110 S. Ct. at 2754 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 382-87 (Powell, J., dissenting); Branti, 445 U.S. at 527-532 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
359. The fact that removal from union jobs penalizes officials is relevant to my analysis
because the fear of losing the advantages of the office motivates officials to work for the incumbents. It is not relevant to the other anti-democratic effect of retaliatory removals: removing
potential leaders and members of an opposition from positions that confer visibility, legitimacy,
and training. In neither case is the penalty on the removed official the wrong that must be
corrected.
360. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356 (plurality opinion).
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tronage 6 1 First, "the proliferation of merit systems" means that far
fewer voters than in the past owe their jobs to patronage. 2 In addition, the Court listed "[n]ew methods of political financing, the
greater necessity of expertise in public employment, growing issue
orientation in the elective process, and new incentives for political
campaigners." '6 3 These countervailing factors were not enough to
remedy the patronage system's distortion of the political process; and
they are far weaker in the context of union politics, when they exist
at all.364
"Growing issue orientation" can be seen as counteracting the
effects of patronage only if it means that voters are willing to desert
the candidate of their traditional party to support the candidate of
another party with whom they are in programmatic or single-issue
agreement. This presumes the existence of on-going rival parties.
The "greater necessity of expertise" is not relevant to the sorts
of union positions that have been discussed here. Rather, it chiefly
affects unions in hiring professional employees such as economists,
accountants, and attorneys, who are typically not members of the
union and, while the resources they provide inevitably strengthen the
incumbents, play a secondary role either in preventing or advancing
political democracy in the union. 6 5
Finally, the "new methods of political financing" that may offset the importance of patronage in public employment do not exist in
unions, where the importance of the union staff has increased. The
staff has always been the primary source of campaign contributions,
as well as donations of personal time.36 6 "Flower funds," ("office
361. Id. at 354, n.8.
362. Id. at 366.
363. Id. at 354 n.8 (plurality opinion).
364. I am not sure what the Court means by "new incentives for political campaigners,"
unless it is a reference to the development of professional campaign consultants. If so, it has
little relevance within unions.
365. The areas where these employees are most important is in their financial support
and the "donating" of their professional services to the incumbents-support that the increased need for expertise does not affect as long as these are considered good jobs and there
are more professionals who want them than there are jobs available. These professional employees may then be expected to act loyally-including by financial support-whether or not
they were initially hired because of their loyalty or connections. The argument that the
LMRDA should prohibit most retaliatory discharges does not apply to such employees. In my
view, such employees should be barred from all union political activity, including donating
services or financial contributions to any union candidate or faction.
366. "For incumbents, the largest single source [of campaign financing] is the paid
staff." United Steelworkers of America v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 129 n.4 (White, J., dissenting). In addition, incumbents can run a campaign with far less money than their opposition because of their control of the union newspaper, their easy access to membership names,
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officials regularly contribute are a comfunds"), to which all loyal
3 67
unions.
of
feature
mon
Insofar as anything has changed, it is that in the past fifteen

years, for the first time, some unions have introduced rules that realistically bar any alternative source of funds.3 6 8 In addition, the Labor Department's interpretation of the LMRDA's ban on accepting
"employer" funds is not limited to employers who have any bargain-

ing relationship, present or foreseeable, with the union.36 9 This
makes the union staff an even more crucial source of funds. Rank
and file members, who are the only other alternative, typically will

contribute only small amounts.3 70 This makes the ability to know
and to reach as many people as possible, for example in the course of
one's job as a business agent, even more important. 71
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Rutan, viewed patronage as institu-

tionally valuable.3 72 He argued that by holding out the hope of readdresses and phone numbers, and the free legal services they obtain. Id. In the 1977 Steelworkers election that Sadlowski lost, the administration-backed winner received about 90% of
his funds from the union's staff. James, supra, note 18 at 349. In addition to the factors
mentioned by Justice White, incumbents need less money than insurgents because they often
receive in-kind contributions from vendors, such as the union's public relations firm. Id.
367. An extreme example is presented by Tony Boyle, former president of the United
Mineworkers, who was subsequently convicted of murdering his opponent, Jock Yablonski.
Of the 198 non-clerical employees on the union's staff with incomes over $10,000,
only nine failed to contribute and two of those were Yablonski and his brother. The
relative uniformity of contributions by job category, the sequence of receipts, and
the timing and amount of two subsequent salary increases all belied Boyle's attempt
to characterize the contributions as voluntary.
James, supra note 18 at 331-32.
368. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (rejecting LMRDA challenge to absolute ban on union candidates accepting any funds from any
nonmember of the union, including retirees and relatives); No. 83 Union Democracy Review,
(Aug. 1991) at 1 (describing similar absolute ban in Service Employees International Union).
369. 29 C.F.R. § 452.78(b) (1991) (interpreting § 401(g) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 481(g) (1988)). This can mean that the local bar owner, assuming he employs a bartender,
cannot contribute twenty dollars to the candidacy of one of his regular customers. Basically, a
broad interpretation of this provision eliminates almost anyone who might have enough money
to contribute. See Marshall v. Teamsters Local 20, 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1979).
370. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 128-29 (White, J., dissenting, summarizing position of
Clyde Summers).
371. As for civil service systems, which the Court mentions as one of the developments
that has reduced the importance of patronage in the public arena, they do not exist in unions.
However, union clerical employees, as opposed to union staffs, are themselves often unionized,
and this provides a measure of protection. But these jobs concern patronage in the sense of
having to know someone in order to get hired; this is not a major impediment to the creation of
an opposition. Like union professional employees, who are also sometimes unionized, these
positions are not usually held by members of the union in question, and the LMRDA protections do not apply to them.
-,
110 S. Ct. at 2753-54.
372. Rutan, 496 U.S. at
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ward "if not this year, than the.next,"'3 73 a patronage system encourages loyalty to the "outs" as well as to the incumbents, thus

strengthening the two-party system. 374 The arguments favoring patronage assume the existence of a stable two-party system: "The pa-

tronage system does not, of course, merely foster political parties in
general; it fosters the two-party system in particular.

' 37 5

The Elrod

plurality had questioned the need for patronage in preserving a
healthy party system: "Patronage can result in the entrenchment of
one or a few parties to the exclusion of others . .

.

. [It] is a very

effective impediment to the associational and speech freedoms which
are essential to a meaningful system of democratic government.

' 37 6

One need not decide whether the Court or the dissenters are correct
to understand that neither argument supports a patronage system

when there is no stable opposition party that is likely to survive an
377
electoral loss.
Individual First Amendment rights of belief, speech, and association are closely related to protecting a democratic political process,
and whatever other purposes the First Amendment may have, the

protection of the political process is central. Even in a two-party system, the Court has held, the possible benefits of a patronage system

are outweighed not merely by the burden on the individual's First
Amendment rights, but also by the effect on the political process
3 78
that burden creates.

The protections of Title I of the LMRDA were modeled after

those of the First Amendment37 9 precisely because, just as the personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution are cen-

tral-"indispensable"- to a democratic political process in society,38 0 so too the rights guaranteed to union members by Title I are
373. Id. at -,
I10 S. Ct. at 2753 (dissenting opinion).
374. Id. at
-,
110 S. Ct. at 2754.
375. Id.
376. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 369-70 (plurality opinion).
377. "Although Justice Scalia's defense of patronage turns on the benefits of fostering
the two-party system . . . [i]n each of the examples that he cites-'the Boss Tweeds, the
Tammany Halls, the Pendergast Machines, the Byrd Machines and the Daly Machines'-patronage practices were used solely to protect the power of an entrenched majority."
Rutan at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2744, n.4 (Stevens, J.,concurring) (citation omitted, quoting id.
at -,
110 S. Ct. at 2747 (Scalia, J.,dissenting)).
378. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372-73 (plurality opinion).
379. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 111.
380. "[Tlhe system of government the First Amendment was intended to protect [is] a
democratic system whose proper functioning is indispensably dependent on the unfettered
judgment of each citizen on matters of political concern." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372 (plurality
opinion).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol9/iss2/2

84

Feldman: Effective Democracy and Formal Rights: Retaliatory Removals of Un
Retaliatory Removals

1992]

necessary to establish a democratic political process in the union. Be-

cause the union is a one-party state in which low-level officials play a
central role in maintaining the leadership's control over the instruments of power, and because those officials are usually crucial in creating and maintaining any serious possibility of opposition, the protection of their associational rights is necessary for union
democracy. 381 It is true that, while the sheer numbers of patronage
employees in government may itself pose a danger to the political

process, this is a relatively slight concern in unions.3 82 But the centrality of lower union officials, both to the creation of a machine that
entrenches incumbents and to the possibility of creating an effective
opposition, makes the threat of retaliatory removals a far greater
factor in distorting the political process.

83

It is this mirroring of the connection between the Constitution's
protection of individual rights and political democracy that makes
the political patronage cases especially relevant to the issue of retaliatory discharge.
PART

A.

III:

THE STATUTE-BASED STANDARD

"Reasonable Rules" and Legitimate Purposes

However attractive the comparison between the political patronage cases and the retaliatory removal cases, there remains an
important difference between the way the judiciary must examine
governmental actions attacked as unconstitutional and union actions
attacked as violating the LMRDA. This difference may seem great
enough to render the comparison irrelevant, or even to favor the use
of incompatible analyses. Such a conclusion derives from a superficial application of the distinctions in the appropriate "level of scrutiny" in constitutional interpretation to adjudications under the
LMRDA. A more careful consideration of this question, however,
reinforces the applicability of the substantive analysis of the political
patronage cases to the retaliatory removal area and points to the de381. The close interrelationship of these two strands inside unions intensifies the severity
of the violation by creating an ever descending cycle. The inability to create and sustain a
democratic union itself prevents the protection of the rights of speech and assembly: the entrenchment of the union hierarchy is the result.
382. Though in many unions, the typical membership meeting, when no contract is being negotiated, is attended by so few members that holders of official positions make up a
fairly high proportion of the meeting. See Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 308 n.4 (1977)
(noting that the average attendance in Steelworkers local of 660 members was 47).
383. Though the influence of the union staff simply because of its numbers is not negligible. The Steelworkers president controlled over 1,500 full-time positions in the late nineteenseventies. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 128 (White, J., dissenting).
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velopment of a standard, based on the statute, by which the legality
of retaliatory removals should be judged.
The political patronage cases involved the action of a govern-

mental body in dismissing, and in hiring, promoting, and transferring public employees based on their political activities or affiliation.
These employment practices thus collided directly with the First
Amendment's guarantees of free speech and association, with the
collision occurring over political association in the most narrow
sense: "the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment."3 84 The constitutionality of these practices therefore depended

on whether they served a compelling state interest and were as narrowly drawn as possible to do S0.385
The provisions of the LMRDA guaranteeing free speech and
association and equal rights to union members both include language
that makes it clear that "reasonable" rather than "compelling" exceptions are permissible.386 For that reason, the Supreme Court has
held that although it was modeled on the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, the LMRDA Bill of Rights does not simply incorporate
First Amendment doctrine. 87 Insofar as the Court has held that in
passing the LMRDA, Congress did not intend to make it as difficult
for a union to limit its member's speech or assembly as the Constitution makes it for Congress or the states to limit the speech or assem-

bly of citizens, the result is sound.38 8 A union need not demonstrate
384. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356 (plurality opinion).
385. Even if it were correct that "less-than-strict scrutiny is appropriate when the government takes measures to ensure the proper functioning of its internal operations, such a rule
has no relevance to the restrictions on freedom of association and speech at issue" in political
patronage. Rutan, -

U.S. at

-

,

110 S. Ct. at 2735, n.4.

386. See supra notes 29 and 30 (enumerating §§ 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2)).
387. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 108-11. There is however evidence in the legislative history
that Title I was intended to give to union members precisely the same substantive rights that
American citizens have under the Constitution. On introducing the Bill of Rights, Sen. McClennan, whose committee hearings were the main impetus to the passage of the LMRDA,
said: "We should give union members their inherent constitutional rights, and we should make
those rights apply to union membership as well as to other affairs in life." (April 4, 1959). In a
similar vein, Rep. Landrum, after whom the LMRDA is named, said: "[N]o American living
today, whether he is a member of a union or not, is without the rights contained in this socalled bill of rights, because they are substantially contained in the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution. The only argument is that we may be applying them in a field that is completely new." 105 CoNG. REc. 15,711 (1959).
388. Although Professor Summers has argued that:
[flree speech needs even wider scope in a one-party state than in a two-party system
because there is no free press and no established opposing party to criticize those in
power. Restrictions imposed by a one-party system must be even more strictly scrutinized and stringently tested, for those in power are less tolerant of criticism and
less subject to political check. Curbs by a ruling oligarchy on those who would chal-
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that the challenged restriction is the best way -it can achieve an end

that it must accomplish.3

9

But this does not change the fact that the rights guaranteed by

Sections 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) are central to the scheme that
Congress created in the same way that political speech and associa-

tion are central to the scheme of the First Amendment.as ° Nor does
lenge their control are entitled to less deference than restrictions adopted by a twoparty legislature.
Summers, supra note 53 at 116.
389. While it is correct to reject a requirement that the union justify a rule by showing
that it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling union interest, this should not be confused
with the rejection of "strict scrutiny" in the constitutional context. The LMRDA imposes
something different than a constitutional "rational relationship" test. First, there is no logical
reason for adopting such a test. Since the constitutional doctrine does not apply, the rejection
of half of what that doctrine presents as an either/or choice is not based on the Constitution,
and does not leave one with the single alternative of adopting the other half of the choice.
Second, the LMRDA speaks of "reasonable" rules which, as in state constitutional law,
seems to describe a "fit" between the rule and its justification that, while not as restrictive as a
requirement that it be "narrowly tailored," nonetheless requires more than a rational relationship. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (explaining that as long
as a law is rationally correcting an evil, it is constitutional; it need not be logically consistent
with its aims in each and every respect.) with F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412 (1920) (explaining that state classifications may not be arbitrary; they must have a fair
and substantial relation to the aim of the legislation in order to be sustained under the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
More important, the LMRDA restricts not only the "fit" between the means and the end,
but also the permissible subject matter. In this sense, the reasonable rules exceptions incorporate the constitutional distinction between restrictions touching on fundamental rights and
those that do not.
In Sadlowski, the Court clearly rejected the application of "strict scrutiny" under §
101(a)(2). 457 U.S. at 11. But the proffered justification for the union rule in Sadlowski was
one that the Court viewed as among the goals of the LMRDA, limiting the interference of
outsiders in the union. Id. at 112. The Court then analyzed the union rule under the proviso to
§ 101(a)(2), and found it reasonably related to that justification. Id. at 115-16. While the
result in Sadlowski is completely contrary to the reality of union politics, the method the
Court used does not contradict the argument of this article.
390. Part of the reason for the application of a rational relationship test in the constitutional context is that the legislature is a coequal branch of the government. The separation of
powers and, in the case of state legislatures whose enactments are challenged in the federal
courts, concepts of federalism counsel deference to the legislative decisions. There is a presumption of constitutionality unless there is some reason to apply strict scrutiny.
It could be argued that the desire to avoid government interference in internal union
affairs except to the extent necessary to assure fidelity to the labor laws requires similar deference to the decisions of the union.
This argument does not add much. I am advocating judicial interference only to that
extent as well. In any case, such deference simply does not apply when, as here, the challenged
restriction touches on what are in this context fundamental rights. Instead, this should trigger
the LMRDA equivalent of strict scrutiny.
I say the "equivalent" because I obviously do not mean that the rule need be other than
reasonable. The rejection of constitutional strict scrutiny in Sadlowski was a rejection of a
"narrowly tailored" test, and it occurred in a situation where the challenged rule was only a
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the fact that "reasonable" rules restricting speech, assembly, and
equal voting rights are permissible answer the question of what rules
are reasonable. The fact that the rule need only be "reasonable"
39
' 1
cannot be separated from the issue of "reasonable to do what?

The LMRDA allows reasonable restrictions in a specific context, the
protection of democratic processes in the union. The language of the
exceptions does not answer every question that may be raised, but
neither is it so vague or open-ended as to be meaningless.
The proviso of Section 101(a)(2) allows a union to "adopt and
enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from
conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations. 392 This "reasonable rules" exception to the
protection of speech and assembly provides substantive meaning in
four ways. First, the proviso to Section 101(a)(2) limits to two categories rules restricting speech or assembly that can be reasonable.39 3
Second, it incorporates a distinction between the interests of the
union as an institution, to protect which reasonable restrictions are
permissible, and the interests of the leadership. Third, permissible
restrictions apply to membership rights; no distinction between the
restrictions that may be applied to members and those that may be
partial interference with one aspect of the political rights implied by the statute: the ability to
contribute financially to a campaign. In a retaliatory removal, the core right to speak and
assemble is itself implicated. A union restriction that does not implicate the rights guaranteed
by §§ 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) should be treated with great deference by courts. See Infra,
note 399; Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971) (holding that courts may not judge
basis of union discipline). But a union rule that penalizes the exercise of rights that are, in the
context of union politics, both "fundamental" personal rights as well as an indispensable assurance of political democracy, clearly justifies judicial intervention.
391. Cf. Dep't. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding that a federal food
assistance program available for households containing only related people did not constitute a
rational effort to deal with state concerns); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (holding
that Alaska's residency requirement in distributing benefits is not rationally related to a valid
state interest and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
392. The proviso to § 101(a)(2) reads:
Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor
organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct
that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations,
29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1988); see supra note 30 (restating full text).
393. The body of § 101(a)(2) also includes a narrow qualification that relates to only
one type of speech: "Every member. . .shall have the right ... to express at meetings of the
labor organization his views, upon candidates . . . or upon any business properly before the
meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings ..
" 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1988). See supra, note 30 (restating full text).
The free speech provision thus does not permit a member to speak at meetings whenever he
wants, about whatever he wants; the union may conduct orderly meetings.
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applied to officers is either necessary or justified. If a rule is reasonable within the meaning of the statute, its violation may be penalized
without disobeying the statute. If it is not reasonable, no one may be
penalized for violating it. Finally, it necessarily follows that the reasonableness of a rule cannot depend on whether the official to whom
it is applied is elected or appointed.
The proviso of Section 101(a)(2) does not simply allow any
"reasonable rules;" it limits the sorts of rules that can be deemed
reasonable. First, a union may adopt reasonable rules "as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution." Second, it may limit conduct "that would interfere with its
performance of its legal or contractual obligations." 94 These two exceptions are meant to ensure that the rights of speech and assembly
3 95
not be used to "unduly harass and obstruct legitimate unionism."
The union may thus reasonably restrict those rights when they conflict with its position as exclusive bargaining agent: when its ability
to carry out its legal and contractual obligations is endangered.
The union may also protect itself as an institution against employers or rival unions. Unlike the First Amendment, the LMRDA
permits the union to defend itself as an entity without any showing
that the speech in question poses a "clear and present danger," or
indeed, any actual danger, to the union. But the "institutional responsibility" exception also effectively codifies the requirement that
it be the union's interest, and not that of any particular leadership
group within the union, that is being defended. Just as the political
patronage cases rest on a distinction between governmental and par394.
395.

LMRDA § 101 (a)(2), 29 U.S.C. 411 (a)(2) (1988).
105 CONG. REc. 6721 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Church on the Labor Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959).
The Bill of Rights was introduced as an amendment on the floor of the Senate by Sen.

McClennan, whose committee's investigation into union corruption was the impetus for the
"Labor Reform Act" that became the LMRDA. The McClennan amendment was narrowly
passed by the Senate, but then the Senate "by an unusual legislative maneuver substituted...

a modified version sponsored by Senator Kuchel ... and others. This then became the basis of
the Title I enacted into law." THE LABOR REFORM LAW at 402 (BNA) (1959). The proviso to

the speech and assembly provision first appeared in the Kuchel substitute. Steelworkers v.
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 110 (1982).

The precursor to the proviso first appears in the bill reported by the House Labor Committee, but as part of § 101(a)(5); it was explicit authority to discipline a member who failed
in "loyal observance. . .of his responsibility toward the labor organization as an institution
and toward the labor movement as a whole" as well as conduct interfering with the union's
legal or contractual obligations. House Labor Committee Report accompanying HR 8342, reprinted in THE LABOR LAW REFORM, supra, at 298 (emphasis added). The emphasized words
probably were meant to insure that the union could continue to discipline members who, for
example, failed to honor another union's picket line.
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tisan interests in light of the First Amendment's protections, 398 so
too does the LMRDA incorporate an analogous distinction in limiting permissible restrictions of its speech and assembly rights.
No rule that penalizes the exercise of those rights-in other
words, no rule that directly contravenes the policy of the law which
allows the rule in the first place-can be "reasonable" simply because it helps the leadership either to stay in power or to prevent

competing views from being heard. A rule that penalizes a union
member for exercising her rights under the LMRDA can only be
reasonable in the context of the Act if it advances union democracy,
3 97
or advances some other goal recognized by the LMRDA.
A rule is not reasonable because it seems to a court to serve the
"larger" goals of "labor stability" or peaceful resolution of conflicts.
The degree to which these general goals of national labor policy
ought to be allowed to restrict membership rights is recognized in
the LMRDA itself. Thus it is legitimate for a union to restrict
speech in order to prevent a breach of its legal or contractual obligations, but that should not allow restrictions on advocacy of more militant collective bargaining postures.' 98 This limitation on speech
should be confined to protecting the union's position as exclusive bargaining agent. Courts that allow views of what constitutes socially
responsible unionism to color their understanding of the scope of
membership rights are not unusual. 399 But the LMRDA represents
396. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362 (plurality opinion). "[Clare must be taken not to confuse the interest of partisan organizations with governmental interests. Only the latter will
suffice." Id. See also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 512, 517 n.12.
397. Thus the Steelworkers' restriction on outside financing of election campaigns was
held a reasonable rule, despite its partial restriction on § 101(a)(2) rights, because it advanced
the union's interest in preventing nonmembers from exerting influence on union policies. Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 115 (1982). The Court held that this was "a legitimate
purpose that Congress meant to protect," emphasizing the expressed concern of Senators, including Senator McClennan, who introduced the Bill of Rights on the Senate floor, of allowing
unions to remove outside influences that had "infiltrated". Id. at 116. (Though, as the Court
acknowledged, Senator McClennan was referring primarily to organized crime.) That is to
say, like the interest in democratic unions, the interest in limiting the influence of nonmembers
is one of the "interests of the union as an institution" recognized by the LMRDA.
398. The narrow scope of this exception is further indicated by the fact that Congress
limited it to union rules that relate to a member's "refraining from conduct that would interfere" with the performance of the union's "legal or contractual obligations."
399. See supra notes 209-210 (discussing Newman I). See also NLRB v. Boilermakers,
581 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir. 1978) (denying enforcement of General American Transportation
Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1977)). In Boilermakers, the court refused to enforce the NLRB's
finding of a § 8(b)(1)(A) violation for removing a steward who filed unfair labor practice
charges against the employer on his own behalf without using the grievance procedure. The
court said that "[b]ecause the union policy to which the member ... refused to adhere [using
the grievance procedure] reflected a legitimate union interest in harmony with our national
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Congress' decision that the labor policy of the United States can best
be effectuated by encouraging democratic unions.4 00

A rule that has the effect of penalizing a member for exercising
rights protected by the LMRDA clearly harms democracy, and

should be presumed invalid under the Act.40 1 A union official who is
able to show that her removal was in retaliation for exercising her

membership rights under Sections 101(a)(1) or 101(a)(2) should be
reinstated unless the union can demonstrate that the removal fur-

thers the goals of the LMRDA, principally democratic governance.
B.

Applying the Statutory Standard to Retaliatory Removals

1. The Implicit Meaning of Lynn
In Finnegan, the Supreme Court held that the retaliatory removal of an appointed official did not violate the LMRDA without
labor policy, we hold that the union's action in removing him from an appointive union office is
not the type of constraint on a union member's actions intended ta be proscribed by [§
8(b)(1)(A)]." Id.
In that case, the court's infatuation with the national labor policy favoring private dispute
resolution conflicted with the NLRB's insistence on unimpeded access to Board processes. But,
in general, the Board suffers from the same problem. See Hartley, supra note 63 at 43-44
(noting that the NLRB prevents unions that act "irresponsibly" from disciplining members for
not conforming, and defines union's use of legal economic weapons of which the Board disapproves as irresponsible).
400. Congress passed the LMRDA while fully aware of its relationship to basic federal
labor laws. The act that is partially codified as the LMRDA also included important amendments to the NLRA.
It is perhaps ironic, though I believe consistent, to couple arguments for increased judicial
protection in the internal affairs of unions with warnings against judicial activism. Asking
courts to be faithful to the mandate of Congress is not inconsistency and there is nothing odd
about recognizing that if given discretion in some areas by Congress, courts will sometimes
exercise that discretion in areas that Congress had not intended. My reading of the LMRDA
is that Congress intended courts to protect the free speech of union members, and to decide
which union rules restricting speech were reasonable. However, Congress did not intend the
courts to decide "reasonableness" in light of the judges' own principles of political economy.
Congress wanted reasonableness to be decided in light of the policies of the labor laws as
expressed in the LMRDA. It should be recalled that the constrained view of rights and of
union democracy against which I am arguing is that of the judiciary, including the Supreme
Court, and, so far as we can tell, not that of Congress. There is nothing inconsistent about
asking the courts to balance what Congress has told them to balance, but to respect the balances that Congress has struck itself.
401. A deferential standard is not appropriate because the interference with speech and
assembly in the union context is in most cases interference with the political process that
allows us to identify the rule with the decision of the majority and thus justify deference in the
first place. To pursue the constitutional analogy, a rule that penalizes a union member for the
exercise of rights guaranteed by Title I of the LMRDA implicates two of the rationales that
would trigger strict scrutiny under the Due Process clause: it interferes with what are, in this
context, "fundamental rights," and it thereby prevents the political process from operating
democratically. See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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attempting to analyze the union's action under the "reasonable
rules" exceptions of the statute; it never even mentioned them. In
Lynn, the Court found the removal of an elected official violated Title I, and again did not discuss the "reasonable rules" exceptions.
Yet Lynn makes sense only if it is seen as an application of this
statute-based standard of membership rights to actions taken against
officials. Indeed, the reasoning of the case is consistent only if it is
carried beyond its holding, and seen as applying to appointed as well
as elected officials.
In a footnote, the Lynn Court points out that "[t]here is no suggestion that Lynn's speech in opposition to the dues increase [for
which he was removed] contravened any obligation properly imposed
upon him as an elected business agent of the Local. ' 40 2 If the
Court's footnote is read simply to mean that there was no such obligation because the union's constitution or bylaws did not provide for
one, then the rule that Lynn creates will be swallowed by this exception. The only reading that is consistent with the holding in Lynn is
that for an obligation to be "proper" requires not only that it has
been adopted properly, (according to the procedures that the constitution and bylaws provide), but that it must be substantively proper;
it must be a reasonable rule within the meaning of Sections
101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2). This interpretation is reinforced by the location of the footnote. The Court's reference is to the effect on members of removing an elected official:
Not only is the fired official likely to be chilled in the exercise of
his own free speech rights, but so are the members who voted for
him. Seeing Lynn removed from his post just five days after he led
the fight to defeat yet another dues increase proposal, [here the
Court places the footnote,] other members of the Local may well
have concluded 3that one challenged the union's hierarchy, if at all,
40
at one's peril.
How would the membership be less chilled by seeing Lynn removed if they knew the union constitution had required him to support the dues increase? Indeed, how would the membership be less
chilled if Lynn had been appointed rather than elected? While in
that case their right to vote would not have been affected, certainly
the conclusion that "one challenged the union's hierarchy, if at all,
at one's peril" would have equal power. 404
402.
403.
404.

Lynn, 488 U.S. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 645 n.6.
Id. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 645 (citation omitted).
In Franza v. Local 671, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 869 F.2d 41, 48
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The effect on the membership, the infringement of their right to
speak, associate, and vote to change the leadership and policies of
the union, can vary with the adoption of a union rule imposing an
obligation on Lynn only if the propriety of that obligation is to be
determined by reference to the standards guaranteeing those rights.
In other words, rules that limit an official's ability to speak, just as
those that limit a member's right, cannot be reasonable within the
meaning of Title I unless justified by a "countervailing interest
rooted in union democracy that suffices to override [the] protection" 405 of the statute.
The Court returned to this issue in the context of the imposition
of a trusteeship. There is, says the Court, "nothing in the International's constitution to suggest that the nature of Lynn's office
changed once the trusteeship was imposed, so that Lynn was obligated to support [the trustee's] position. 40 6 Again, is the Court only
saying that the union's constitution could have such a provision, but
did not? The Court hints at an answer a moment later, in another
footnote: "We do not address a situation where an international's
constitution provides that, when a trusteeship is imposed, elected officials are required to support the trustee's policies and thus may occupy a status similar to the appointed officials in Finnegan. Cf.
§ 101(b). ' 0 7 Section 101(b), to which the Court refers, says that
"[a]ny provision of [a union's constitution or bylaws] which is inconsistent with the provisions of [the Bill of Rights] shall be of no force
or effect."'408 It is unjustified, of course, to read the Court's reservation of an issue not presented as resolving that issue. The Court's
reference to Section 101(b) does not mean that any such union rule
would violate the LMRDA. But it must mean that the proper measure of the validity of such a rule is its conformity to the rights guaranteed by Title 1.409 That is, the validity of a union rule that man(2d Cir. 1989), the court stated that Lynn "only reinforces our decision" to allow the retalia-

tory removal of a fulltime appointed official because Lynn was based on the fact that removing
an elected official "so chilled the official's free speech rights as a union member, as well as

other union members' rights as to warrant LMRDA protection." This is obviously nonsense as
far as chilling the official's own rights is concerned. Losing a fulltime job is the same deterrent

to exercising rights regardless of whether the job was obtained through appointment or
election.

405.

Lynn, 488 U.S. at

109 S.
406. Id. at -'
407. Id. at
1'
t09 S.
408. LMRDA § 101(b),
409. Lynn, 488 U.S. at
ened because it is made in the
thority of the national union

-,

109 S. Ct. at 647 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).

Ct. at 646.
Ct. at 646 n.11.
29 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1988).
-, 109 S. Ct. at 646. The force of the Court's point is heightcontext of a properly imposed trusteeship, when the legal auleadership to override the desires of the local electorate is
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dates the proper conduct of elected officers depends on whether it
violates standards, set forth in Title I, that supposedly guarantee
only rights of membership.41 Lynn thus overrides the membership/
officer right distinction as applied to elected officials.
In fact, as the Court had pointed out earlier, the union's constitution did contain language that indicates that the officials of a Local under trusteeship effectively occupied the same status as of the
appointed officials in Finnegan. The constitution allowed the trustee
to remove them at his discretion. 411 The conclusion to be drawn from
this is that even when an official occupies the equivalent of an "at
will" position, she still may not be removed in retaliation for exercising Title I rights. This reasoning applies with full force to appointed
officials as well. The Lynn analysis thus removes the logical basis of
the Finnegan holding. The attempt to recast Finnegan as a defense
of union democracy succeeds only by eliminating the membership/
officer rights distinction on which Finnegan is based.
While these observations were not the focus of the Court's attention in Lynn, their logic is nonetheless central to the case. There
are only three ways to read the holding of Lynn. The Court could
have meant that no elected official could ever be removed for any
reason. That is clearly not what the Court intended; it is at odds not
only with the Lynn dicta, but also with the explicit command of the
statute.412 Second, the Court might have meant that an elected union
official may not be removed from office for protected speech unless
the union has had the forethought to so provide in its constitution or
bylaws, in which case it is legal. If that is the meaning of Lynn, the
effect of the case is trivial. It will last only long enough to allow
union constitutions and bylaws to be amended. 41 3 The third possibilgreatest.
410.

Id.

411. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. 642. "The general president ... delegat[ed] to the trustee
. . . the authority 'to supervise and direct' the affairs of the Local, 'including, but not limited
to the authority to suspend local union ... officers, business managers, or business representatives.' Art. 3, § 2(c), Constitution and Ritual of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association." Id. (omission in quotation by the Court). It is clear that the trustee was given the
authority to "suspend" local officers for the duration of the trusteeship.
Strictly speaking, the Court is correct in saying that the union's constitution did not require elected officials to support a trustee's policies. But it allowed their removal whether or
not they supported the trustee's policy.
412.

See supra note 162 (discussing LMRDA § 401(h), 29 U.S.C. § 481(h)(1988),

which requires a union to provide in its "constitution and bylaws ... an adequate procedure
for the removal of an elected officer guilty of serious misconduct.").
413.

There would also be an odd dissonance created. In Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401

U.S. 233 (1971), the Court held that § 101(a)(5) did not require that the specific act for
which a member was disciplined be listed in the union's constitution or bylaws, so long as the
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ity, and the only one that comports with everything else the Court
says, is that the proper measure of any rule imposing a penalty on
the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 101(a)(2) is conformity
with the "reasonable rules" exceptions contained in the section itself.
C. Protecting the Union While Advancing Democracy
While the "reasonable rules" provision refers to both members
and officers, there can be situations where a rule is reasonable as
applied to officers but not as applied to members. The statutory language provides a framework to analyze these situations; undertaking
this analysis further illustrates that the LMRDA requires that its
protections be applied equally to elected or appointed officials. The
application of this standard furthers the goal of democratic unionism
while preserving the union's right to defend its legitimate interests
that are recognized by the statute.
1.

"Legal and Contractual Obligations"

This category allows rules related to conduct that interferes
with the union's performance of legal or contractual obligations.
Certainly, such conduct may include speech, as in the First Amendment context. Thus, a union could properly impose a rule that disciplined a member for leading a wildcat strike, even if that leadership
414
was expressed verbally.
But a collective bargaining agreement may place an affirmative
obligation on union officials to end wildcats. 41 5 A member who engaged in a wildcat would thus risk her own wages and job, while an
officer who participated, or even who simply failed to attempt to end
the wildcat would, in addition, subject the union to legal liability. In
this situation, it would not violate Title I for the union, in keeping
with its right to have reasonable rules to prevent interference with its
legal or contractual obligations, to provide for the removal of an officer who failed to attempt to stop a wildcat, while not imposing any
member was clearly notified of the content of the charges against her. If, in contrast, a retaliatory removal is permissible only when an official has violated specifically enumerated obliga-

tions, the removal would require a greater degree of procedural protection in this respect than
would formal discipline.
414. I do not believe that a member who urged the membership at a union meeting to

call a strike that would be illegal or in breach of contract could properly be disciplined by the
union. But a member who walked around the plant urging others to follow her out of the

workplace in a strike that was illegal or in breach of contract would not be protected by §
101 (a) (2) from union discipline. Whether a union should penalize a member for these sorts of

actions is a different issue.
415. The wisdom of a union agreeing to such a provision is not at issue here.
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such requirement on other members.4 1

To say that such a rule would be permissible as to officers is
simply to recognize that the terms of the statute allow such a distinction when the "legal or contractual obligations" differ between
members and officers. It is finally no different from recognizing that
a shop steward who repeatedly misses scheduled grievance meetings,
thereby causing the grievances to be forfeited, is failing in a responsibility that a member does not have. A union rule that allowed removal of a steward under these circumstances would not be subject
to challenge because it distinguished between officers and members.
What would prevent a union from setting forth in its constitution or bylaws, as part of the responsibilities of the particular office,
such things as publicly supporting the collective bargaining strategy
of the top union officials, 417 or supporting their reelection by requirto their campaign funds and personal
ing financial contributions
418
campaigning for them?
This issue returns us to the Lynn Court's discussion of a "properly imposed" obligation.41 9 Once the officer/member distinction is
eliminated, it can be seen that the statute itself provides a narrow

definition of what sorts of obligations are properly imposed under
this exception and what sorts of "job requirements" the union may
introduce. The union has a legal obligation to represent the employ416. Similarly, the NLRB treats misconduct by a union agent differently than misconduct by a member or union supporter in deciding whether such misconduct warrants setting
aside a union victory in a representation election. See, e.g., Milchem Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362
(1961). A union that removed an official for such misconduct would not violate the LMRDA
even if it did not discipline ordinary members for the same actions.
417. See Newman I, 570 F.2d 439, discussed supra notes 209-210, where the court relied heavily on this sort of reasoning by finding in the CWA steward's manual a job requirement of representing the position of the leadership to the members. The court treated the
steward's manual essentially as if it was an employee's manual produced by company management. The reason for this treatment, if not the justification, is clear. Throughout Newman I,
the court's view of unions as hierarchical enterprises exactly equivalent to any other business is
evident. See supra note 36. The fact that labor unions are structured differently from businesses, operate under different laws, and-most important-have a fundamentally different
purpose, is completely ignored.
418. See supra notes 366-367 and accompanying text. So-called "flower funds" to which
union officials and staffs "voluntarily" contribute to aid in the political goals of the union
administration are not uncommon.
While § 401(g) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 481(g)(1988), prohibits the use of union
resources to promote particular candidates, at least in elections governed by Title IV, see
supra note 163 (explaining which elections are so governed), the statute has been interpreted
to permit "incidental" campaigning by union staff. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.76 (1991). In addition, staff may campaign on their own time. It is of course very difficult to determine which
particular eight hours an official is working, and which time is his own.
109 S. Ct. at 639 n.6; see supra notes 402-403 and accompany419. 488 U.S. at -,
ing text.
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ees for whom it is the exclusive bargaining agent. 42 0 A rule that allows the removal of a shop steward for failing to file grievances is
within the scope of the union's right to make rules to prevent members from acting in derogation of that obligation. In many cases
where the union attempts to remove an official for incompetence or
nonfeasance, the union has a legal obligation to prevent that nonfeasance. There is of course no legal or contractual obligation to support
an incumbent.
The elimination of the artificial division between officer rights
and membership rights allows distinguishing most situations where
the LMRDA ought to prevent officer removal from those where removal of an officer is proper, for example for stealing from the union
treasury. If a removed officer could also properly be banned from
running for reelection-that is, if his "membership rights" (in the
narrow sense that even the most reluctant courts have recognized
them) could be limited without violating the LMRDA, then the removal itself does not violate the Act. 421 The same is true of appointed officials. If an appointee could be removed and properly be
prevented from running for office, (or if he could properly be expelled or suspended from the union), then the removal from office,
whether or not accompanied by additional penalties, would not be
illegal.
Thus, under this exception, a member and an official, elected or
appointed, must be treated identically for voicing opposition to the
policies of the union leadership, except when the legal or contractual
obligations of the speaker differ because of their status.422
420. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). While mere negligence on the part of a
steward would not constitute a breach of the union's duty of fair representation, there need not

be a perfect fit between the legal requirement and the union rule meant to prevent that requirement from being breached. Id. See supra note 389.

421. This would not prevent a union disciplinary body, in a proper removal, from removing an elected official, but choosing not to limit his membership rights. That is, a situation
apparently similar to the one I have criticized earlier would be created. See supra notes text
accompany notes 181-193 (discussing Dolan and Newman 1). But the similarity is a superficial
one. The removed officer could run to regain his office, and if he repeated the conduct that

caused his removal, he could be removed again. But the conduct itself would never have been
protected by the LMRDA, whether the individual was then only a member, a candidate, or an

elected official. In contrast, in cases like Newman I and Dolan, it was conceded that the acts
committed by the removed officials could not have subjected them to any penalty if they had

been members but not officials or employees of the union, and that even as officials or employees, their acts subjected them only to penalties that (according to the courts) did not affect

their rights as members.
422.

Even then, it is only conduct, including conduct manifested in speech, that may be

punished.
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"'Responsibilityto the Union as an Institution"

The other category is more ambiguous, since its language does
not refer to familiar legal classifications. The members' responsibility
to the union as an institution4 2 3 is a concomitant of majority rule.
The union is a collective institution that must balance competing
needs 424 and, often use the bargaining power of its strongest members to advance the interests of its weakest. 425 The members depend
on mutual commitments, and the union must have the ability to protect those commitments.42 6 The statutory right to defend the union
as an institution recognizes that unions are not simply discussion
groups; one of their chief purposes is to strengthen the economic
power of workers by maintaining the unity of the collective.4 27 Thus,
the "institutional responsibility" exception allows the union to adopt
a rule disciplining a member for advocating the elimination of the
union, or persuading members to join a different union-even when
the disciplined activity is pure speech.42 8 It also allows unions to discipline members for working during a strike,42 9 violating a properly
431
imposed boycott of an employer,43 0 or violating production norms.
While different contractual or legal obligations of members and
officers, justifying different treatment, are relatively easy to ascertain, the distinction is not always as clear under the institutional responsibility exception. However, the clear cases-where the union
removes officials simply because they no longer support the leadership as fully as the leadership wants-are hardly unusual. The
knowledge that removal will swiftly follow an act of disloyalty or
even an inadequate display of zeal in support of the incumbents and
423.

Ultimately, it is impossible to separate one's view of what constitutes appropriate

responsibility to the institution from one's view of the nature of that institution. The sort of
loyalty owed to the union depends on what one believes a union should be. The appropriate
scope of that responsibility, for too many courts, has been narrowed by the view that union

"management" has a right to run its "business" however it wishes. The LMRDA requires a
much more democratic view.

424. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
425. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1975).
426. See Pattern Makers League of N. Am. v. NLRB , 473 U.S. 95, 126-27 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
427. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
428. Whether any discipline other than suspension or expulsion from the union would

violate § 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA is a separate issue. See Local 125, International Molders
and Allied Workers Union (Blackhawk Tanning Co.), 178 N.L.R.B. 208 (1969), enfd 442
F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971); Tri-Rivers Marine Eng'rs Union, 189 N.L.R.B. 838 (1971).
429. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1967).
430. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961).

431.

See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1969).
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their policies, freezes the secondary leadership of the union into a
machine to preserve the political status quo. The adoption of an interpretation of the LMRDA that restricts removal of union members
to reasons permitted by the statute would, by itself, weaken the leadership's ability to prevent the formation of alternative leadership
groups in the union.
Under the institutional responsibility exception as under the
contractual and legal obligations exception, many difficult problems
are resolved by understanding that an official can be removed whenever she can also be disciplined as a member. A business agent who
fails to perform picket duty is an example of this. It would be legal
to remove her for this failure, even though there is no legal or contractual obligation to picket, if it is permissible to bar her from running for the office, and if the union could also discipline a member
for failure to picket. Discipline for advocating adherence to a different union, for working during a strike, and for violating production
norms similarly concern the members' institutional responsibility.
Could a union remove from office a business agent who fails to
attend union meetings, contrary to a properly adopted rule, when no
such rule applies to members? Again, removal would be legal if
other discipline, affecting "membership rights," would also be
proper. This response is not question begging. Under current law, a
court would have to decide the reasonableness of such a rule at the
suit of an official who was "disciplined" for violating it. The same
inquiry should apply if, instead of being "disciplined," the official
were removed from office.4"' The statutory right to defend the union
as an institution does not require any distinction between the political rights of officers and members, though it sometimes involves a
recognition of their different positions. In the great majority of cases
where those positions differ sufficiently to warrant differential treatment, as in this example, the political activity of the official is not
the cause of the removal.4 3
Situations in which an official's responsibility to the institution
may differ so greatly from that of a member as to justify removal
432. My own view is that the union would generally be justified in applying such an
attendance rule to its officials, including elected officials.
433. One could argue that a refusal to picket, or to attend union meetings, is political
expression; surely a wide range of expressive activity is recognized as "speech" under the First

Amendment. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Assuming that the removal is not
pretextual in the narrow sense (for example, if the rule were only enforced against business
agents who oppose the administration), it seems to me that a more limited understanding of
speech and association adequately protects the statutory interest in union democracy, without

risking the weakening of the union's right to defend its institutional integrity.
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from office for what would normally be protected speech are extremely uncommon. The analysis I am proposing must be able to
accommodate them in order to serve as a general standard. By considering the hard cases, one can test whether barring almost all retaliatory removals conforms with the scheme of the LMRDA.
While it is easy to see a principled distinction between a union
rule that requires a shop steward to process grievances in a timely
manner, 434 and a rule that requires the shop steward to support the
candidacy of an incumbent union president, rules that require support, not of the leadership as individuals but of the leadership's policies, present more difficult problems. Is a rule requiring shop stewards to publicly support a strike, once it has been properly called, a
reasonable rule to defend the union as an institution? Or a rule that
requires the steward to support a contract ratification if the bargaining committee so recommends? What about a safety committee
chairperson who voices complaints about a particular department,
when the union leadership believes such complaints will hinder the
improvement of safety conditions in the plant as a whole?
A strike is perhaps the most difficult moment in the life of a
union and its members; 4 5 it is then that mutual dependence is greatest, and when the union's ability to act unitedly is most necessary. A
union official who publicly calls on members to return to work while
the strike continues is surely failing in her responsibility to the union
as an institution. This is true even though the members, including
the official, have a legal right to return to work. But, it seems clear
that a union official who, rather than calling on members to cross the
picket line, instead urges the members to vote to end a strike, has
not violated this institutional responsibility-any more than has an
official who urges the members to vote to continue a strike against
the leadership's advice.
This is not an example of differing standards of member and
officer institutional responsibility. It should be equally legal for a
union to discipline a member who calls on others to return to work
while a strike continued; 43 6 it would be equally illegal to discipline a
member for urging the membership to vote to end the strike.437
434. I believe this rule would be justified either by the "legal or contractual obligation"
exception, or the "institutional responsibility" exception.
435. See Local 248 (Allis-Chalmers Mfg.), 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 70 (1964).

436.

See Winery, Distillery and Allied Workers Union, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Sept. 13,

1989). It is possible that only penalties such as suspension or expulsion from the union, rather

than fines, would be legal under the NLRA under these circumstances. See supra note 428.
437.

See Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers Local 24-P, 473 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1973).
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When an official urges rejection of a contract that the leader-

ship has recommended, the same principle obviously applies. However, the two cases are not the same. An official may have a responsibility, that members do not have, to explain the leadership's

position on the contract, as on other issue. When a business agent or
steward, whose job includes communication between the leadership

and the members, fails to so communicate, it is legitimate for the
union to remove him. That is not the same as a responsibility to sell

the contract to the membership; it is not a requirement "to explain
the

. .

.[union's] program and policy to

. .

.[members] in a man-

ner designed to enlist their cooperative understanding
While the distinction between being removed from office
to inform members about union policy and being removed
ing union policy may sometimes lead to factual disputes,

of it."' 438
for failure
for opposthe differ-

ence is a great one.4 39 In fact, such a failure to inform is no different

then if the official failed to inform members of an upcoming mem44 0
bership meeting, or the location of the contract ratification vote.
These cases, then, are not retaliatory discharges, but examples of

"nonfeasance." The problem is not that there will be difficulties of
proof, that the courts will in this area, uniquely, be unable to distinguish between permissible and prohibited motivations. Rather, the
danger to date has been too great a willingness to accept as a failure
438. Newman I, 570 F.2d at 447-48.
439. These disputes are not different from those that courts are forced to resolve every
day. Even in retaliatory removals, it should be easier to determine whether the official was
removed for her views than to decide whether her removal was part of a deliberate and purposeful attempt to suppress dissent under Schonfeld, see supra text accompanying note 200,
an inquiry that is regularly undertaken today.
Thus, in many retaliatory removal cases, courts must already follow the procedure described by Justice Stevens in Rutan, see supra note 352. Such a standard would not add to the
difficulties of proof, but would make a substantive change: far fewer retaliatory removals
would be permissible.
The distinction is well illustrated by Newman L See supra text accompanying notes 209210. There, the court found in the CWA steward's manual a job requirement of representing
the position of the leadership to the members. Newman argued that he had always explained
the leadership's position to the members, but had also strongly criticized it. The court of appeals believed that "It]he inability or unwillingness of Newman to explain the Local's program
and policy to employees in a manner designed to enlist their cooperative understandingof it,
much less himself to implement that policy, is obvious." Newman I, 570 F.2d at 447-48 (emphasis added). The court did not require simply that a steward keep the membership informed
of union policy; it believed that lower-level officials could be removed not only for expressing
disagreements with the leadership's policy, but even for failing to attempt to convince members
that that policy was correct.
440. There should be no difference if the official, rather than being incompetent, has a
political purpose for failing to inform the members, for example, because he wishes them to
boycott the meeting or vote. However, an official, under this scheme, would have a right to
inform members of the vote and urge them to boycott it.
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to do one's job any opposition to the union leadership's positions. 4"
The most difficult problems occur when the union's legitimate
interest in acting in a unified way when confronting the employer
may intersect the members', and officials', right to attempt to change
union policy. The examples of contract ratification votes and strike
continuation are aspects of this problem, but each has been
presented as a situation where the speech in question was directed at
convincing members how to vote. This makes the answer relatively
straightforward: the union leadership should not be allowed, because
they won the last election, to effectively control each subsequent
vote.442
There are situations, however, where an ongoing union policy,
not subject to a formal vote, is challenged by lower-level officials who
have some degree of responsibility concerning that policy. An example of this is the chair of a safety committee who wishes to raise
safety issues concerning a particular department. The local leadership believes that there are higher priorities, and that raising these
issues will jeopardize their strategy to improve safety in the workplace as a whole. If the safety committee chair insists on raising the
issues she thinks important in official meetings with management,
she can be removed. 443 This is true despite the fact that the union
441. In Sewell v. Grand Lodge 1AM, 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971), the court sustained
the firing of an international representative for "insubordination." The top union leadership
had decided that the union's constitution should be changed, and the representative had op-

posed the change in discussions with groups of members, though not in official meetings.
If one accepts the view of unions as simply business organizations like any others, albeit

organizations that must occasionally submit to membership votes, then the representative was
surely being "insubordinate."

However, although the court justifies the removal by citing the union's interest in protecting its ability to bargain against a "monolithic front of large commercial corporations," id. at
552, the union's legitimate interest in maintaining unity against the employer was simply not
implicated. This is clear when one considers the content of the proposed change in the international constitution against which the removed official argued. The constitution required that

any amendments made to it at the convention be subsequently submitted to the membership
for ratification. The leadership sought to eliminate this membership vote.

Every one of the hundreds of IAM full-time staffers, the people who handled all higherlevel grievances for the locals, was required to work to get this change implemented. The

penalty for exercising the LMRDA right of dissent in this most central of the law's concerns,
the membership's right to vote on the basic governing structure of the union, was removal.
442. The NLRB also distinguishes "between those rules that restrict a member's right

to advocate a change in union policy through democratic means and those that limit a member's ability to advocate disobedience of a current policy." Hartley, supra note 63 at 49.

443. See NLRB v. Local 212, UAW, 690 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1982). The court found that
the union violated NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) by removing the chair of the Fair Employment Practices Committee after he filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union. Id. at 84. The

court distinguished this from removal of an official who filed an ULP against an employer "in
derogation of the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement" because the
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could not appropriately discipline her in any other way, and could

444
not discipline a member who raised these issues.
This is an example of an official position where political agree-

ment with the leadership, on some issues, is a legitimate require-

ment of holding the position. It is an example of the rare situation
that Finnegan and Lynn treat as the norm: where the ability of the

elected leaders to remove an official who disagrees with them advances union democracy. This situation, which might be termed, if
the statute were correctly interpreted, the "Finnegan exception," 44 5

should be understood narrowly.
The issue is not, as the retaliatory discharge cases imply,
' ' especially when that term
whether the official is a "policymaker," 44

is understood in the broadest possible sense to include "implementa-

tion" of policy 447 or simply anything dealing with an important subject.448 Rather, the proper analysis is whether "party affiliation is an
latter advances the union's legitimate interest in "cohesive leadership rather than in using that
pretext to cloak a device to prevent effective relief for intra-union grievances." Id. at 84 (quoting NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 581 F.2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 1978)).
444. Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that, despite exclusivity, individual employees
or groups of employees may present grievances to management. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
However, attempts to negotiate with management, without the union, are not protected. See
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org'n, 420 U.S. 50, 61-65 (1975).
445. In Franza v. Local 671, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, 869 F.2d 41, 45
(2d Cir. 1989), the plaintiff contended that "Title I was designed generally to preclude retaliatory discharge for the exercise of protected rights, suggesting that Finnegan is itself an exception necessary to promote union democracy." Id. The court rejected this argument; the court
was wrong.
446. Some courts have rejected the possibility of a nonpolicymaker exception left open
by Finnegan. See Local 671, 869 F.2d at 48 (stating that the "test is not whether the employee
is or is not in a policymaking position, rather the question is whether membership rights were
directly infringed by action taken with respect to a union member's employment status.").
447. See Rutledge v. Aluminum Brick & Clay Workers, 737 F.2d 965, 967 (11th Cir.
1984) (stating that "Finnegan applies to union employees who are instrumental in implementing union policy as well as those officials who formulate policy"); Witmeyer v. BRAC, 779
F.2d 206, 208 (4th Cir. 1985) (policymaking includes "implementing" as well as actually formulating policy).
448. See, eg., Cotter v. Owens, 753 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985), discussed supra, in text
accompanying notes 211-25. The court rejected the application of a nonpolicymaker exception
because "perhaps most significant, the subject of nuclear safety, particularly at Indian Point, is
obviously of vital concern," and was the key issue between a dissident group and the local
leadership. Id. at 228. Whether or not the removed safety committee member was a policymaker, there was no indication that he had been removed because he had acted on the
committee in some way contrary to the leadership's policy. The leadership argued, and the
court accepted as justification, that he was removed because his position on the committee
might give the dissident group a "bully pulpit." Id. His removal, as far as the evidence indicated, was not necessitated by the right of the leadership to control official safety policy, but
by the leadership's desire to prevent dissemination of criticisms of that policy.
Similarly, in Genco v. UAW, No. C88-0397, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10178, at *1, 133
LRRM 2053 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 1989) the court allowed the removal of the plaintiff from
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appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the ... of-

fice involved.

'449

Only when it is, and when an office holder's disagreement actually jeopardizes the accomplishment of the union policy, does the retaliatory removal advance democracy.450
Thus, the safety committee chair who opposes safety policy may
be preventing elected leaders from vindicating the will of the electorate-but a safety committee chair who opposes the union's foreign
policy, or the reelection of the national officers, or even the local
officers who appointed her, should not be removable.45 ' Maintaining
his job as Safety Instructor at a General Motors plant. The collective bargaining agreement
provided that this full-time position would be filled by an hourly worker, selected by UAW
officers. The employer required only that the instructor be capable of performing the job. The
plaintiff supported a losing candidate against the incumbent Shop Chairman, who immediately
told GM to remove the plaintiff from the program. The plaintiff argued that he was not a
policymaker since he followed a fixed lesson plan. Id. at *6. The court rejected this argument:
A union employee entrusted with carrying out important union policy ... who was
responsible for communicating information central [to] the safety and health program set out by GM and the UAW in their collective bargaining agreement, occupies a trusted position with the union and must be compatible with the union leadership to serve effectively. Once the union leadership's trust in [him] was lost, he
became subject to removal from his appointed position as a union employee.
Id. at *6-*7 (citation omitted). (It is not at all clear that the plaintiff was in fact a "union
employee," but the court did not address this issue).
449. Rutan, U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2735, n.5 (quoting Branti, 445 U.S. at
518).
450. It is likely that under the Constitution the Supreme Court would not require a
showing that a particular office holder had acted in a way that interfered with the elected
officials' ability to carry out their program, but would allow the categorical exemption from
the rule of Branti and Rutan of those officials with the power to interfere, whether or not that
power had been exercised. Both the governor's press secretary, and (probably) the state Education Commissioner could be dismissed because of their (private) political disagreement with
the governor.
In the case of the LMRDA, such a categorical exemption should be even narrower, effectively limited to "confidential" positions, such as the national president's administrative
assistants.
This distinction is required by the one-party nature of unions. Party affiliation is rarely
"an appropriate requirement for ... effective performance" when there is no competing political party. In a two-party system, an elected official's ability to differentiate her policies from
that of the opposition, an ability partly dependent on her political compatibility with high-level
appointed officials, serves to clarify the electorate's choices.
Whatever the depth of the differences between Democratic and Republican administrations, the existence of two competing sets of office-holders, even if they are nothing more than
that, furthers at least some sense that entrenchment in office is undesirable, that opposition is
not treason, that the government and the party are not the same thing.
In a one-party system, requiring political agreement means further merging the identities
of the union and the "party," denying the value of diversity, and creating a nomenklatura that
prevents the emergence of opposition.
451. In Cehaich v. UAW, 710 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1983), the court rejected the
possible nonpolicymaker status of a benefits representative. The court held that securing benefits is "[o]ne of the most sensitive functions performed by a union ...[requiring] the adoption
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the ability of the elected officials to enforce absolute uniformity on
all issues is not vindicating the election results: it is a means of entrenching the election results forever.
In this situation, the ability of the safety committee chair to
speak out on all matters other than safety should not be compromised. And even as to safety, the safety committee chair has a responsibility to work for the democratically decided policy of the
union, not to agree with it. Disagreement over safety policy, raised at
a union meeting by the appointed official who is most responsible for
it, is conducive to democratically deciding the union's position on
plant safety. It is certainly possible that the employer will become
aware that there are disagreements within the union leadership on
safety policy. It is even conceivable that this awareness may weaken
the union in some cases. However, the employer is as likely to be
aware of disagreements within the membership expressed at the
same meeting, and no one proposes that the LMRDA not protect
that expression. More important, as an empirical matter, such disagreements will typically strengthen the union's bargaining position
by making it clear to the employer that the leadership's position is
more moderate than the alternative, that the leadership is being
4 52
pushed by-rather than dragging-the rank and file.
And finally, even if disagreements weaken the union on a particular issue in the short term, the price-for advocates of unionism-is
worth it.453 It is a necessary part of the participatory democracy that
of union strategy in terms of the representation of union claimants, the union's interpretation
of benefit provisions under the contract, and the formulation of a union position on various
types of benefits." Id. at 239. The court further held that "[an] appointee [is invested] with

the trust of the membership. When that trust is lost, not only will the appointee be subject to
removal; but the elected official has placed his office in jeopardy also." Id.

But the fact that handling benefits is an important job, or even that it is a "policymaking"
job, is not relevant. The plaintiff's removal had nothing to do with the way he administered

benefits, or, so far as the record shows, even any private disagreement on benefit strategy or
priorities. His removal was motivated by his opposition to a collective bargaining proposal,
expressed at a meeting, a thousand miles from his local, called to discuss the proposal. The
court simply accepted the right of the leadership to demand absolute loyalty on every issue as
the price of being included in the union's political life.

452. Members do not typically attack the leadership because it is asking too much, or
because it wants to deal with all problems at once while they wish to take a longer term

approach. Edgar James makes the same point and also points out that "[Tlhe more conservative supporters of the LMRDA ... [who] favored stronger and more detailed election provisions, because they equated non-elite control with bargaining docility, and thought that the
rank-and-file would exercise a moderating influence" on collective bargaining, "flatly misunderstood" the impact of making unions more democratic. James, supra, note 18 at 260.
453. I am skeptical that the union's position would ever be weakened. As Edgar James
has perceptively noted, "[r]ank and file ratification, for example, rarely undercuts union nego-

tiators, but acts as a check on their own militance and ability to articulate member objectives.
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unions need. It does not accord with the notion that courts sometimes have of democracy (and here the analogy of the political arena
is harmful)-an occasional vote to choose leaders who are then free
to do what they like. But insofar as that view is shared by union
leaders, and union members, it is one of the causes of the decline of
American unions.
CONCLUSION

The interpretation of the LMRDA that best advances the goal
of democratic unionism requires that no union official, elected or appointed, may be removed from office for exercising rights guaranteed
by Title I, unless the union can show that the removal is necessary to
democracy.
This is not a proposal for a "just cause" standard in union employment. The union may remove an appointed official without demonstrating cause. But the union cannot remove an official for prohibited reasons. 4 I believe this is the most faithful reading of the
LMRDA, the reading that best advances the goal of democratic
unionism, and the reading that will help create the kind of democracy that, whether their leaders know it or not, unions need in order
to survive.
Unions will not regain their vitality if they emulate the way
business operates. They will not succeed unless they understand that
the battles they need to fight require not a hierarchical structure of
command, but a "new model army," a cooperative enterprise of men
There is a subtle, but important, difference between weakening an officer's position and weakening the union's bargaining strength." James, supra note 18 at 251, n.13.

454. If the removed official is able to make a primafacie showing that the removal was
in retaliation for exercising speech and assembly rights, the union would be required to justify
the removal, either by showing there was some other reason, or that the removal was necessary
under the narrow "Finnegan exception."

The administrative burden on the union would not be great. A union could remove an
appointed official whom it felt was incompetent without worrying about having to document
that incompetence except when the official was able to demonstrate to a court's satisfaction
that the removal was in retaliation for political opposition. A union that claimed the official
was removed for legitimate reasons, but that it had failed to document those reasons until after

the official had manifested political opposition to the leadership, might indeed be forced to
reinstate an official who was in fact incompetent. This is not a great injustice: if a union finds
that ineffective performance merits removal only when it is accompanied by political opposition, the opposition-not ineffectiveness-was the cause of the removal. Every union official
who has ever handled a claim under §8(a)(3) of the NLRA where the employer has fired

someone in retaliation for union activity, rather than the asserted tardiness or poor work record, should be sympathetic to this method of analysis. See NLRB v. Wright Line, 251
N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enfd, 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
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and women whose belief in their union is unshakable because they
have created it, and continue to recreate it.
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